

THE END OF THE GLOBAL?

Edited by
Gabriele Piazza



The Democratic Education Network

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THE END OF THE GLOBAL?

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The 'Democratic Education Network' was formally launched in 2016 with full support of the Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR), as well as Quintin Hogg Trust (QHT). The inspiration for this project came from previous pilot projects within DPIR which include: 'Politics, IR and Development Forum' and 'International Community project'. Our intention has always been to experiment with and implement appropriate strategies to engage students and to develop their creativity and passion through supportive learning and teaching environments. Given the student diversity and the location of the university in the heart of London, the Department has used these as sources of strength to develop a bridge to both local communities as well as international partners. DEN has embraced a new curriculum that emerged through Learning Futures and aims to support our students in acquiring a globalised education. DEN brings together academics, students, local communities, and students and academics from foreign universities through different student-led projects. It places the University in a unique position where it provides much more than a comprehensive academic curriculum. It offers an education that goes beyond borders, in a truly global fashion, while being mindful of individual and local specificities.

This academic journal is one of many projects that DEN has managed in the last two years, and we are proud to have so many students, past and present, who put their imagination, creativity and hard-work to make this possible. The editor of this Journal is Gabriele Piazza who had completed his BA in 2011, and enthusiastically agreed to help the current students to make this possible. The papers in this journal are from the first student-led International Conference organised in May 2017, at the University of Westminster.

This journal would not have been possible without the participation, engagement and encouragement from so many students from the University of Westminster in general, and the Department of Politics and International Relations in particular. Special thanks should be given to all the past and present members of DEN for their collective approach, and for believing and demonstrating that they can create their own world once they work together. There are so many names to include that we are likely to miss many and hence, we are not naming students here and devoting this to the collective student body.

While this is a student endeavour, we would like to thank the staff in the Department of Politics and International Relations, especially Dr. Farhang Morady, the founder and academic coordinator of DEN and Professor Dibyesh Anand, the head of DPIR. We would also like to thank Professor Andrew Linn, the Pro Vice-Chancellor and Dean of Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, Professor Roland Dannreuther, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, and Dr Thomas Moore, Director of Cross-Disciplinary Learning and Teaching for their encouragement and support. Since its launch in 2016, DEN has been generously funded by the Quintin Hogg Trust, and we appreciate its vision and desire to support student initiatives.

FOREWORD

Professor Roland Dannreuther

Deputy Vice-Chancellor

I am delighted to support and express my admiration for this academic journal which is the result of the hard work and dedication of University of Westminster students, through the flagship student-led organisation, the Democratic Education Network (DEN). The University of Westminster is fully committed to the principle of students' partnership, where students are themselves directly involved in promoting and engaging in research and in developing their teaching, learning and environment. DEN has empowered students to engage in academic research, to produce scholarly outputs, and to enhance their academic experience. I am grateful also to academic staff from the Department of Politics and International Relations, who have supported this initiative through dedicating their own time and expertise. I am very much looking forward to DEN growing in strength and becoming an inspiration for students and staff across the University.

FOREWORD

Professor Dibyesh Anand

Head of Department of Politics and International Relations

In an era of growing privatisation of public services, globalization of ideas/goods/values, contestation are taken for granted by political principles, including citizenship/democracy/progress, fractured international relations, and general uncertainty; it is not easy to be involved in higher education. We, as individual academics, sometimes wonder whether the ideals of education for the sake of education, critical thinking, inspiring students to bring about positive change in the world, and so on can survive the onslaught of commodification of education. However, when we engage closely with students, we feel inspired. Inspired to work harder, to partner with them, provide them better space to explore themselves, learn from them, and remember that our profession is about passion. Passion to transform.

Democratic Education Network is our flagship programme to bring together initiatives we have been exploring over the years as well as offer space for new initiatives. We are grateful to Quintin Hogg Trust, for providing funding to support DEN. DEN is not a project but a series of projects that tap into aspirations, hopes, desires and curiosities of students from not only our Department of Politics and International Relations, but the wider Faculty and University. DEN provides support to our commitment to being “100% Political, 100% International”.

The First International Undergraduate conference, and the write-ups from that conference would not have been possible without the hard work of a few colleagues and many more students. We hope this is not the end of a journey, but a new beginning.

1

INTRODUCTION

Gabriele Piazza and Tessa Caplen Browne

This book puts together some of the key papers presented at last year's conference: *The end of the Global*, organized by student members of the Democratic Education Network. This collection of articles explores three different but interrelated themes: Democracy, Inequality and Patriarchy. In addition, this book includes some reflections by some DEN students, on their experience in Vietnam, and an extract from the play "Hands up", written and performed by University of Westminster's students.

The first section of the book explores the concept of democracy in a globalized world. In the opening article *Globalization: a catalyst for both authoritarian stability and rebellious change*, Rasha Hamdy Hussien addresses a crucial question, one that was behind the conference, but also behind some of the most recent political events – Brexit, Trump and the rise of populism across the globe – **Can democracy and globalization co-exist?** Rasha argues that when it comes to democracy, globalization has been a double-edged sword. This is true for both the 'North' and the 'South' of the globe. On the one hand, increasing interconnectedness, the growing power of the private sector, and civil society have forced authoritarian states to devolve powers. On the other hand, regimes had to become more authoritarian to stay in power. This type of globalization, driven by economic liberalization, has caused great social inequality and consequently, political instability. These dynamics, as Rasha argues, help us to understand the recent turmoil in the Arab World.

This backlash against globalization is also visible in the 'developed' world. Mackenzie Macleod looks at the recent ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union (EU) and Canada, and at the reason why so many on both sides of the Atlantic were against it. In his view, this political discontent is set to intensify, unless a shift away from *laissez-faire* economics takes place.

The EU project has divided opinions: some claim that the EU has been the greatest attempt to democratize the international. However, 'Take Back Control' from the 'undemocratic EU' was the main slogan behind the Leave Campaign during the Brexit referendum.

But is the EU really undemocratic, as some on both the Right and the Left claim?

Andrea Miquelasi examines the issue of democratic deficit in the European Parliament. He claims that this has showed some real hopes for democratizing the international, but the issue of democratic deficit remains. The way academics and experts have framed the debate, – creating a split between those who prefer national sovereignty, and those who prefer the supranational – might have made the issue of democratic deficit unsolvable.

The crisis of democracy does not only concern the international; **European countries such as the UK, Belgium and Spain have recently witnessed a revival of separatist movements, which claim that their voices are not being represented.** In her article, Irene Queralt Santamatilde looks at the Catalonia movement for independence, and argues that federalism can be a solution to political exclusion, and at the same time, it may maintain the integrity of nation states that are experiencing separatist movements.

The increasing requests for more democracy internationally pose another crucial question: **can the world be made more democratic?** Megan Asplin argues that this is possible and in a globalized world, the only solution for more democracy is a complete overhaul of international institutions, and she puts forward the radical proposal of a World Assembly. This could replace the current United Nations, and curb the power of more powerful and richer states. Megan is aware of the different implementation problems that may arise, and she invites everyone to contribute to this project.

After decades in which policy-makers believed that social inequality was the inevitable outcome of economic development, the work by people like Piketty and Stiglitz, in the aftermath of the financial crisis has brought the attention back to **the issue of social and economic disparity.** And this is what the second section of the book looks at.

In contrast to the unequal socio-economic reality, the online world has often been described a level playing field, characterized by universality and equality. But Selina March takes issue with this idea. She argues that while **social media** has connected people from around the world, these platforms **reproduce the same social hierarchies of the offline world.**

An issue that exemplifies **the struggle between the haves and the have nots in the South of the world is land-grabbing.** Safa Nafi looks at this phenomenon in Zambia and South

Africa, arguing that the Food and Agricultural Organization approach in its efforts to attract investment to these places, might make this issue even more acute.

In many countries **corruption has a negative effect on economic development**, and corruption affects people differently, according to their socio-economic background, with the poorest being the most affected. In his paper, Rohan Seth looks at this phenomenon in India, and at what Amartya Sen can tell us about the possible solutions to this issue.

And when we look at **inequality across countries**, this always **translates into power imbalances**. Aanchal Mann, looks at the role the Private Security and Military companies play in today's global politics. She argues that these have acted as an agent of imperialism, and she uses the case of Iraq to support her argument.

The third section investigates **the impact of patriarchal structures upon the role of women in both development and politics**.

How successfully can we bridge development theories with the actual implementation of development programs? In her paper, Phoebe Seidel uses the case of Ethiopia to argue that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a platform for both celebration and critique. On one hand, Ethiopia has achieved strong economic growth; yet on the other, the country faces a hindrance of extreme gender inequality.

The biases found in modern patriarchal structures, Phoebe argues, are the same structures which facilitate international development programs such as the SDGs – using the Ethiopian education system as a prime example. **The implementation of largely economic focused development programs can therefore fuel gender inequality**.

As a neoliberal mode of development is visibly sweeping through world economies and political systems, **the struggle to find an equal space for minorities in societies is becoming considerably less plausible through top-down development models**. Is this an increasingly common case for gender and development? As one solution seeks to ignite development through a local level, bottom-up approach, Marina Schmidt extends this debate towards the political context of women in Brazil, in her article *Development as Subversion: A Critical Discussion on Gender in Development Thought and Practices*. Marina argues that patriarchy is deeply ingrained in Brazilian society, and can be reinforced by the very highest of powers, with the government and presidency as key examples. If the lack

INTRODUCTION

Gabriele Piazza and Tessa Caplen Browne

of representation of women in Brazilian government is directly related to the political 'unfreedom' of women, then not only does this restrict political opportunities, but correlates to far wider sources of unfreedoms in social and economic spheres.

Recent movements such as Time's Up and the #MeToo campaign show that the dominant patriarchal systems are facing resistance. As a worldwide phenomenon, these movements are symbolic of societies fixed in patriarchal structures, notably embedded within even the most 'developed' of countries. Jordi Cortes examines the case of gendered norms in both formal and informal public institutions, providing an analysis on the role of women in Spanish diplomacy. Adopting a rights perspective, he argues that while Spanish laws do not discriminate against gender in terms of who can access public institutions, there still remains a significant imbalance of women in roles of power, such as diplomacy.

Education relies upon us asking questions, exploring new perspectives, and being able to challenge one's own thoughts. **And this does not just happen in the classroom.** The final two sections of the book present some of the unconventional learning that University of Westminster's students have been doing over the last year.

Experiencing life in other societies has played a big role in the University of Westminster student experience. Some students in DEN had the opportunity to travel to Vietnam and study alongside students of Dai Hoc Hanoi University, as part of the module 'Learning in an International Environment.'

And for development studies students, there is no better place than Vietnam to understand what development in practice means. From an academic point of view, **Vietnam fails to meet the Western criteria on developmental theories such as modernisation.** Under economic reforms carried out in the last half of the 1980s, Vietnam's market liberalisation lifted over half of the nation's population out of poverty. These market-oriented policies symbolised the welcoming of neoliberalism, an opening up to international trade and relations, and ultimately the fall of communism. However, in contradiction to mainstream modernisation theories, the Communist Party of Vietnam remained steadfast in their authoritarian rule over the country, as is still true of today. In light of the growing controversy towards Western discourses of modernisation and democratisation, **is Vietnam representative of a new course of global development?**

Predetermined assumptions were quickly dismantled through immersion and interaction with the Vietnamese culture. Perhaps the greatest educational value came through the discussion of both local and global ideas with fellow Vietnamese students. The opportunity to learn in a dynamic environment such as Vietnam has encouraged students to challenge their own knowledge and confront new perspectives.

The papers in this section are representative of the insight gained by students during their studies in Vietnam. The first article *The Country in a Box: Can a Communist State Survive in Today's Global Capitalist Economy Without Sacrificing its Key Principles?* by Liam Bemrose explores the dynamics of communism in Vietnam from the past to present day. In their co-written article *Cultural Continuity and Change in Vietnamese Development*, Livia Cuciurean and Victoria Vall analyse Vietnam through the lens of development as an equilibrium, diving into gender inequality, and the role of Confucianism in legitimising social structures.

Finally, the book looks beyond conventional politics to address the issues discussed in the rest of this book. The final section asks the following question: **what is the role of art in progressive politics?** Beatrice Duduianu tells us the story behind the play “Hands up”, that she put together with other DEN members, after seeing the inspiring “Soul of a Nation” exhibition at the Tate Modern. This is followed by Khalil Sabawoon and Jamul Wilson’s reflections on performing in the play. An extract from “Hands up” is also included together with some illustrations drawn by Livia Cuciurean.

2

A DEMOCRATIC STRATEGY TO ENGAGE WITH THE MARKETISATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Farhang Morady

Introduction

Since 1980s the Higher Education Institution (HEI) continues to be under considerable pressure due to the marketisation process, imposed ostensibly to improve quality and efficiency in a very competitive environment (Raffe & Croxford, 2013). As the market became the critical ingredient of different government's policy approach, there are attempts to implement demand and supply strategies in students' education, academic research and other cognate activities. It is assumed that higher education, like any product would allow the consumer to make a rational choice between goods marketed at different prices (Harvey, 2007). The question, however, is if it is possible for prospective students to compare courses and educational experience at different universities through market mechanisms?


With marketisation and globalization, the higher education sector across the world is changing rapidly and becoming more international (Kishun 1998: 64). This has led to debates about the future of higher education and the role of educators in this process, given the forces of such colossal magnitude.

In addition, the growing number of students world wide, for example in the UK, has coincided with an increase in the number and diversity of students in HEI. There are over 2.3 million students in the UK now, including many who have not been through a traditional educational path. It is staggering as in 1962, around 7 per cent of school leavers joined university; whereas, the current figure is around 48 per cent (HESA). As a consequence of this increased participation, the students' population has changed its class, origin, gender, and race. Much of this increase could be as a result of entry of those from working and lower middle-class backgrounds, for whom entering university

was only a dream for them 20 years ago. Undoubtedly, the student population has changed both its class origin and gender. While the number of students from deprived backgrounds has grown, Russell Group universities continue to attract mainly privileged and elite students.

The same story could be said about other higher educational institutions around the world, especially in the global South, with rising number of higher education entrance in countries such as China and India.

Figure 1: Gross Tertiary Enrolment Ratio (%) World and World Regions, 1971-2013



Source: Simon Marginson using UNESCO data and Times Higher Education, 16/06/2016

The rise in the number of university students in the world is not necessarily because of growing demand, employers’ or economic need only. It is partly to aspiration, as the development of the global South and the growth of middle class meant that a large number of families see entry into a university as an opportunity to improve their social status and economic conditions.

This transition is a global phenomenon, where the economic and political processes have been dominant to those involving governments and business elites, seeking the implementation of a new strategy, in many cases of neoliberal market privatisation, presenting this as the best approach in current circumstances. As a result of this, a whole set of changes has been taking place in the HEI; from internationalisation of the curriculum to focus on various aspects such as employability, student experience and encouragement to students to develop their skills as “co-creators of knowledge.” It hopes to encourage students by providing them more confidence and skills to thrive in a changing world.

This paper provides a critical analysis of the marketisation strategies in teaching, learning and supporting students. By focusing on 'bottom-up' approach, this article attempts to provide an alternative to resist the growing pressure of marketisation and to enhance student engagement. In doing so, it will employ the Democratic Education Network (DEN) launched in 2016 in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, as an example of this bottom-up approach. It will also consider students' academic, social, cultural and economic backgrounds in order to identify the best supporting tools for their engagement in universities, such as at Westminster, in the current condition. The article is divided into three sections: (a) critical analysis of marketisation of higher education; (b) its implication for supporting students and (c) presentation of an empirical analysis of DEN by developing Vygotsky's holistic approach to education, in general and specifically, the development of supporting strategy to demonstrate both resilience and alternatives to market.

Marketisation of Higher Education: A Theoretical Review

Against the backdrop of marketisation, HEI sector has been forced to recognise and consider that there are 'life-changing' learning opportunities for students. These challenges have now exacerbated with Brexit, putting more pressure on UK based HEI sector because of changing market conditions, and the emergence of new providers within the sector. Consequently, HEI must consider various strategies, including developing a globally engaged curriculum to withstand growing pressure and demands both locally and globally.

The rationale behind marketisation is that the private enterprise is the most efficient. Hence, students are treated as customers with the power to make a decision; the best possible education that they wish to acquire. Consequently, the government no longer acts as an agency to protect students' interest on their behalf, but its role is limited to provide the right data to students to make informed 'choices'. The students are given 'authority' or rather 'empowered' to act as an independent agency. HEI is forced to respond to their needs and preferences or lose them, like customers. As the system expands, inevitably HEI look for private funds to balance their budget, and to maintain their quality and profitability.

Under such circumstances, issues of student retention and progression have become a fundamental aspect of HEI. This is a particularly pressing issue for students from a disadvantaged background (Quinn et al., 2005). There are financial consequences for HEI,

and so they have to take student retention and progression seriously or face the loss of income (Yorke & Longden, 2004). This has forced HEI to shift their focus to ways through which they do not just manage their budget, but generate income to balance their spending. They must now confront and address various issues arising from this transformation, especially students' satisfaction and fulfilment of their future prospects.

However, the market-led strategy has been under growing criticisms; namely, 'Perfect Market' does not exist in any business including HEI. All the data suggests that such strategy has only created waste in the system, rather than becoming an effective mechanism through which students can develop their necessary knowledge and skills. In addition to this, the HEI title remains restricted as before, and price continues to be controlled for the time being. In fact, many students have no option but to depend on state support through different means such as loans, subsidised fees; a significant number of students are receiving maintenance grants and bursaries.

Whilst some degree of competition may improve efficiency and quality, this is not the reason for seeking to privatise the education. Competing is not necessarily the best use of resource. In the last decades, so many HEI have squandered money on things like marketing, branding, glitzy halls of residence and in many cases, on activities that are of very little use to students.

The growing pressure to meet different targets have put universities, especially their staff, under sustained pressure to maintain quality, retention, progression and Key Performance Indicator, Students Education Experience (SES) and National Students Survey (NSS).¹ However, much of this data does not provide students with comprehensive and thorough understanding of the university they want to attend, the courses they want to study and the department they want to join. For example, the NSS only measures the experience of final year students and may not reflect all the positive or negative changes in place that would be more relevant for the incoming students. It ignores the basic fact that students have different needs, depending on their economic and social backgrounds. NSS is a passive exercise, which assumes that students can act rationally once a year to make a

1 The National Students Survey is an annual survey to collect students' opinion on the quality of their university, courses and support they are provided. It is hoped that it would contribute to public accountability and help students to make better choices. It is also an attempt to assist HEIs to enhance students experience. See <http://www.thestudentsurvey.com/about.php>

reasonable decision to choose their ideal university, department or course. Whatever the merits or limitations, these top-down indicators have continued to measure the well-being of universities. NSS has done very little to alter much universities ranking. Unlike the Russell Group Universities, the most significant challenge for the new universities (post-1992) has been to support and engage students who are enrolled with lower entry criteria and who might have different needs.

Pastoral Support: One, Two or Many Approaches

Whatever the value of marketisation, with the growing number of students, the HEIs have had to consider support, pastoral care and engagement very seriously. Inevitably, because of the growth in the number of students, student support has improved tremendously, but student engagement has continued to be a major issue.

In order to respond to these changes, since the 1990s, universities have developed and implemented different strategies. For example, Wheeler and Birtle (1995) used the term 'Anchor' while Bruner (1998 cited in Woodhead et al., 1994) suggests the concept of 'Scaffolding'. These notions are about the way tutors construct support for learners which is gradually removed as individuals become more competent.

The traditional tutorial system continues to be employed in HEIs. This generally provides students with an assigned tutor to meet regularly, to check on their progress or specific problems. In some cases, these have developed into integrated curriculum model in which each student undertakes a module with their tutor, or in a group covering learning skills and introduction to higher education generally. Such a system also aims to assist students with different procedures and expectations in their institution. While this strategy is a useful exercise if the tutors are proactive at very early stages, lack of it could lead to some students not knowing who their tutor is, as one suggested:

"I don't know who my tutor is, because I have never met her/him. I have no idea what kind of role or support s/he could give me. However, if I need any help, I ask." ("A", February 2018).

Therefore, the tutorial system where a member of staff is allocated 1-2 hours a week of their workload to support students does not adequately meet the need of the current condition.

This is partly because the tutorial system continues to be reactive, rather than proactive; as access to members of staff depends on the tutors' availability, and is restricted to consultation hours. Even when the mandatory meeting of the students is fitted into the system, it is not an answer to the problem. This is because the way students are invited to visit their tutors depends mainly on the approach that tutor(s) takes. Furthermore, under current circumstances, it is difficult for some students, for a variety of reasons, especially those who are working part-time in order to meet their economic needs, to meet their tutors. In addition to this, one-size-fits-all model would not always work for all the institutions and their students, especially, in universities with increasing student diversity.

Whatever role they may have, tutors could lend support to the learners' own constructive activity; enabling them to gain the necessary understanding of the institution and requisite skills, and then to reduce the support progressively. It is hoped that after a certain period, the learner could function autonomously. Educationalists such as Vygotsky², point out that the role played by an educator is vital when she/he puts emphasis on the skills and experience that students already have. The significance of the individual culture, history, social setup/setting and politics are central in Vygotsky's analysis. Hence, without taking these factors into consideration, it is difficult to implement adequate learning or supporting strategies for students who are so diverse. This provides the educator with sufficient understanding of their learners' need to devise both general and a specific plan on which the student can begin to cross different phases, or what he calls 'zones'. By crossing the different zones, Vygotsky proposed the learners could cross a series of steps that could support them to develop skills, confidence and understanding (Vygotsky, 1978, p.29). This is especially vital when students begin the transition to life as an undergraduate. From a financial point of view, understanding these dynamics is important for the HEIs as students are a source of income, and losing them could incur losses for the university.

Student Experience

An important issue for many students when they arrive at HEI is the apprehension about being in a new environment. Contrary to what the followers of marketisation strategy would like us to believe, education is not merely an intellectual process. It is an emotional

2 Vygotsky, L., 1978, *Mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes*, in Graddol et al., 1994, 'Language and Literacy in Social Context', Open University, Routledge. London and New York. Also lecture notes John Smith Institute of education 2002-3

experience too, all arising from joining a new educational institution, meeting lecturers, making new friends, engaging with new concepts, terminologies, theories and evidence, and having to meet deadlines for different types of coursework, such as essays, reports, oral presentations, exams or portfolios. The most significant problem the students have to deal with is the burden of debt that they accumulate whilst they are studying. One estimate suggests that on average, a student accumulates about £44,000 in loan by the time he/she completes a degree. Apart from the financial burden they have to deal with, this also has a psychological impact on young students (Financial Times, 2017). This has now trapped students in a debt cycle at the age 18 onwards which would be with them for a long time.

Student experience is not class neutral but shaped by the family, cultural and social backgrounds. For example, universities such as Westminster continue to pick up students from relatively poor economic backgrounds. Some face the added burden of accumulating debt because of living in an expensive city such as London. Consequently, they have to work part-time, and sometimes even full-time, to meet their economic needs. Under such conditions, it is not easy to engage intellectually or deal with the emotional pressure they are faced with.

As Murphy and Flemming (2000) showed, quite often, students making the transition to HEIs are confused and do not know how to deal with a new life, especially to study and learn. This becomes a vital issue in both student retention and their progression, as research into student withdrawal indicates (Laing & Robinson, 2003). Appropriate intervention and being proactive as a tutor is crucial, but it is not enough for some students who are under considerable financial and emotional pressure to continue and complete their education. The degree of success or failure varies. Cross-institutional research (Dodgson & Bolam, 2002) indicates that a key factor in students' success is the quality of support students receive from staff and the relationship between the two. How it occurs, when and where the main focus of support should be, are all very important. The problems academic staff are facing is that they are left dealing with very complicated issues, including in areas that they are not specialised in. In some cases, the underfunding of student services has added more pressure on academics to deal with issues that they have not been trained to manage.

Given the condition that higher education is facing, university staff and management have to deal with student retention and progression in a very competitive environment (Yorke

& Longden, 2004). At the micro-level there are various reasons why students withdraw, for example, inadequate preparation, lack of support by the institution, and most crucially, developing ownership of the learning space. Therefore, enhancing student engagement is a fundamental strategy for improving the retention, success and outcomes (Chen et al., 2008).

Student engagement demonstrated their academic commitment, application and demonstrates that their energy is devoted to activities that are educationally purposeful. In addition, it indicates the quality of effort of what students are studying in meaningful manner (Marton & Saljo, 1984). By going through this process, students could possess not only ownership of their learning but, also continuously reflect on their own learning. However, engagement is not solely the responsibility of students; education strategies, the HEI, management, lecturers and admin staff, all have a responsibility to provide an environment that facilitates student engagement and learning. The right strategy and its application could encourage students to participate in activities which potentially could lead to success in their education and future employment. The role of a tutor can be important by acting as a bridge between students and institution, to break down barriers, especially for students who are not familiar with HEI. Tracking students' participation, checking their progression, and offering them feedback, could show them the caring side of the institution. However, for this to happen, a right framework of support and funds needs to ensure this would happen smoothly.

To facilitate student involvement both within and outside the curriculum, it is necessary to be immersed in real life of the university that is challenging and relevant to students. As Chen et al., (2008) argued, academic success is not just about the acquisition of knowledge, which is taking place in the classroom; their relations to the HEI as a whole is also important. Their interaction with their fellow students, academics, and admin staff outside this setting is significant as well.

There should be a platform through which student engagement can be encouraged by building a network developing teams to support each other. Through developing different teams or zones, students could be encouraged by academic staff to relate, but also support, inspire, encourage and motivate each other, both within the university and outside. As Vygotsky put it:

“the distance between the actual developmental level, as determined by independent problem solving, and the level of potential development, as determined through problem-solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with a more capable peer” (Vygotsky, 1978, p.86).

Here Vygotsky refers to children’s development, but this can easily be applied to undergraduate students, where proper guidance from their teachers or their capable peers could help them develop their skills and knowledge.

Designing, developing and implementing such a strategy requires HEI leadership and resources to build a community of educators, local communities and learners to meet regularly, to discuss basic academic and non-academic strategies related to their subject and passion. These may not always relate to their studies. It is also vital to recognise students’ potential to create and deliver their own vision of the world.

Extra-curricular activities are as crucial to the student engagement and success as their tutorial. This is not about providing students with an internship or regular volunteering (THE, 2015). The HEI has been looking into different ways of engaging students outside the classroom environment, both domestically and internationally. With the growing global integration and declining cost of travel, it has become easier to travel and also explore the world putting into practice the kind of concepts and theories that students learn in classrooms. For the students of social sciences, the world has now turned into a laboratory, for exploring any of the themes on society, politics, international relations, development, democracy, citizenship, identity, justice, migration, refugees and transnationalism. This is fundamental to the HEI’s success, and to the achievements of students. A student reflecting on an international trip organised by DEN in 2016, puts this succinctly:

“Commitment and communication are crucial for good relationships in families, friendships, businesses, universities, cities, states, and also on an international level. . . this trip has given me a renewed and increased hope that our global future can be bright [and] can be achieved on a local as well as on a global level” (“B”, January 2018).

The international and community engagement in HEI has always been important. This has changed with the rapid pace of globalization, and a huge transformation of the

demographic shape of major cities such as London.³ The partnership between communities, at local, national and international levels has become so crucial for both student engagement and the university image, profile, status and especially, student feedback for SES and NSS. Engagement activities between communities and HEI are key to build a bridge between local and global communities here in the UK and abroad, with students playing a pivotal role in the process.

From Theories to Practice: Democratic Education Network (DEN)

The University of Westminster has been part of the transition process since 1992. As a former polytechnic, it became a university in 1992, mainly attracting students from various backgrounds. It is globally known for its diversity with 22,000 students, 8,400 of which are international students, and many are second generation immigrants, representing 169 nationalities.⁴ The entry-level requirements at A-Level are grades: BCC and there is a 'clearing factor'.


Given the globalization of education and growing number of students, marketisation of universities inevitably has to adjust to the changes. The Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR) has not been an exception to this process. It has implemented various strategies to ensure that effective learning and teaching is in place to suit the students. In this context, different strategies have been implemented in the last 10 years. DEN was launched to embrace a new curriculum, learning about new ways to support and engage our students. The initial strategy was named International Community Project (ICP)⁵ because of the globalization of education and diversity of students, but this later became the Democratic Education Network (DEN).

3 There are now 3.2 million foreign born people living in London and the city has the greatest number of migrants. See <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/>

4 In 2016 the University of Westminster was named the most diverse university in the UK, US, Australia and New Zealand in the Hot Courses Diversity Index (HDI), see <https://www.hotcoursesabroad.com/study-abroad-info/latest-news/press-release-introducing-the-hotcourses-diversity-index-hdi/>

5 This was after running a similar project, International Community Project for 5 years before, with minimum funding in the department of Politics and International Relations, see <https://csdinternationalcommunityproject.wordpress.com/2012/11/29/>

Figure 2: Democratic Education Network, Student support and Engagement




The ICP and later DEN were both managed voluntarily, by both staff and students, initially with a limited budget. However, in 2016, the Quintin Hogg Trust (QHT)⁶ provided a substantial amount of funds for DEN to manage a growing number of projects.

DEN's attempt was to embrace the whole curriculum, including complementing the tutorial system. It aims to provide an umbrella through which it could bring a community of educators and learners under it by facilitating support and engagement for students.

Through different backgrounds of students in DEN, we started building links with various local community groups and international universities. Aside from engaging students, this gave them ownership and responsibility to create a new environment in which they could develop a relationship with their past, and put that at the heart of their education.

⁶ Quintin Hogg is founder of Polytechnic which later became the University of Westminster, see <http://www.quintinhoggtrust.org/>.

Figure 3: Relationship Between Democratic Education Network, Local Communities and International University



Soon, this became an essential aspect of the students’ education as they saw DEN as a vital part of it. The impact of DEN was demonstrated by a number of students, as one pointed out:

“The wide network of students and getting to know and work with people from all over the globe who have different backgrounds, cultures, interests, and stories. Each person who joins DEN will bring something new to the table which you may not have come across before whether it’s new food for the international food festivals, a different way of thinking or different skills. DEN is the epitome of diversity, and I loved it” (“C”, January 2018).

Not surprisingly, DEN has progressed enormously since 2016. It has not only become a cornerstone of the DPIR, but to the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, and to the University as well. The network is now integrated with over 175 students and staff members. It meets once and sometimes twice a week to discuss major projects (see below), and to ensure that all objectives and impacts are openly discussed and identified amongst the students. In addition to the main strands of work, different projects have flourished which have been at the heart of DEN, including Student Action for Refugees (STAR), OutReach, Local Community Projects, Word Heals the World, Conference and Silent Oppressions – a visual art exhibition. As part of the project, students and staff developed

the DEN website, as well as an online magazine (Inside Westminster) and a social media profile through which they could promote their projects and communicate. Every project has been a collaborative work led, managed and delivered by students. DEN has turned into a platform to engage students, to encourage them to freely move around different projects or zones and to express their interests and passion for being creative and imaginative.

Figure 4: Democratic Education Network's Projects



As a result of working on such projects, the interpersonal skills and relationships of students have changed. They have become aware of their strengths academically, as well as finding new skills, knowledge and their ability to work and lead the various projects. This has given them a new lease of confidence, to believe in themselves as well as develop their critical thinking.

“Our strengths, as well as our weaknesses, are exposed as we proceed with this project. The meetings form a melting pot of personalities, even when the workload is vast and the time minimal. The calmness in some helps to bring out the creativity of others and helps us as an organisation to develop new skills and knowledge” (“D”, January 2018).

DEN has given students the confidence to encourage democratic engagement through a collective approach to their education. DEN has integrated the student engagement projects into a coherent and effective network, or what Vygotsky describes as different zones of learning that offer students clear pathways for the community and international participation, opportunities for experiential learning and a range of practical and employment-enhancing democratic skills. This has developed into knowledge diversity, helping different groups of students to build a team with organisational aims, through global networks with universities in Turkey, Vietnam, India, Taiwan and Uzbekistan. An international conference for undergraduate students is organised and delivered in 2017 in London, and attended by the above universities to ensure students meet and exchange their views and constantly build different zones, if and when necessary.

By building a link between the whole curriculum, DEN has developed an inclusive way of engaging students, encouraging them to enjoy their learning, in a healthy environment. This is depicted by a student this academic year:

“What I enjoyed most about DEN was getting the opportunity to work with some incredible people, both peers and university staff who provide constant support and guidance. It was an amazing and memorable experience meeting such inspirational people and working alongside them to create something that speaks to many, others” (“E”, January 2018).

This has provided and encouraged many students to research, and to become involved in student-led workshops, publishing magazines and journals, based on conference proceedings. This has served to increase students’ knowledge on how to open up deliberative and empowering spaces, and how to maximise the impact of their projects on students’ experience and satisfaction. These projects resulted in student-run conferences, both here and abroad, presentations by students, learning and teaching at other universities and the student-edited journals.

It has inspired students and developed their knowledge, skills and confidence. One student has expressed his experience of being involved for the first time in a theatre production that was based on visiting the exhibition in Tate Modern, in London, and was staged in December, 2017:

“...the play taught me how to be confident in expressing my emotions around others, which challenges the notion of hyper-masculinity. I feel this is a big improvement for my personality as it allows me to connect with others in alternative ways.” (“F”, January 2018, see Inside Westminster).


Students have been full of enthusiasm with the rise of their performance, when they participate in exchange activities with local and international communities, and when offered clear and integrated pathways for engagement. These pathways will include mutual exchanges, visits and workshops with local community groups, skill-sharing sessions and participation in international exchanges and conferences. The use of knowledge exchange activities with local communities and groups – essentially using global London as our classroom – is especially empowering for international students, and here, in particular, students have benefited from the networks of community groups. Our international field trips are essential for UK students in developing their multicultural and global awareness. As a student describes his experience in recent visit to Vietnam:

“Not only have my eyes been opened to the real world at a new level and perspective, but my heart and mind have also been convinced to work together to achieve the best for me and others” (“G”, January 2018, see Inside Westminster).

DEN has, therefore, provided students with valuable experiential learning in an international community and public arenas. Here, they have observed, practised and reflected upon different settings, relating to each other, regardless of their ethnicity or nationality, developing from theories into practice and being motivated to build a new environment.

As the pie chart below shows, most of the students who have been involved with DEN have enjoyed working and managing their own projects. Whilst the projects do not always directly complement their study; indirectly, they think these projects have developed their skills for employability, which is vital for our students, especially at the University of Westminster.

Figure 5: Student Motivation for Being Part of DEN



Source: Students Questionnaire, 2017

Interactions with other colleagues in an educational setting have always been crucial for individual development. However, to develop this into something they have not experienced is a shift from the traditional approach to tutorial, both in the university and the Department. Such an experience inevitably has not only engaged students in the university, but has also improved their employability and democratic skills.

Conclusion

The marketisation of education in HEI has led to an ethos of constant restructuring, with different targets imposed on HEI to manage the institution like a private business. This has enforced enormous changes in working practices of academic and supporting staff in a very competitive environment. Under such trying condition, the integration of students by valuing their diversity as their strength is the key to support their academic and professional aspirations. This is crucial for the integration of students into their new life and the broader community, both inside and outside their university. Through DEN we have found that supporting and integrating students to help them feel part of their university and the wider community, facilitates the development of both a sense of belonging and

the relationships with staff and their colleagues. This shared experience is developed and managed through various projects acting as learning zones, to implement what students have a passion for, and not always related directly to their academic works. By encouraging them to express their creativity in art, acting, managing and delivering events, public speaking, and/or supporting their local public partners, we have built a bigger community of mutual support.

DEN has played a proactive role in assisting students to recognise, communicate and celebrate their own achievements through collaborative working on a voluntary basis. The integration of students has been carefully managed by developing roles and responsibilities. DEN has provided academic guidance in a holistic manner rather than just dealing with one or two issues: to support students with time management, decision-making, research and report writing. However, this has been built around their interest and passion which could bring out their real potential, not just around their academic subject, but their association with each other. In a world that continues to emphasise and encourage individualism as the only possible way for growth and development, DEN is demonstrating that collectivism, democratic planning and organisation by students not only enhance their education but also challenges marketisation.

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Democracy and Global Governance

3

GLOBALIZATION: A CATALYST FOR BOTH AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY AND REBELLIOUS CHANGE

Rasha Hamdy Hussien

Introduction

For several decades now, it has been widely believed that there is a strong connection between economic liberalisation and political liberalisation, and that there is a link between economic development and democracy. This assumes that democracy develops slowly in response to particular socio-economic conditions (Lipset, 1959). This paper argues that the link between the two is not always harmonious, and that globalization helped both entrenching authoritarian regimes in the Arab World, as well as developing the tools to resist such regimes.

To shed more light on this issue, this paper will be examining the case of Egypt. This country witnessed a popular uprising in 2011; in which the Egyptians protested against the authoritarian regime and the austerity measures imposed on them through neoliberal economic reform programs (Abbott & Teti, 2017). The protesters chanted the demands for “bread, freedom, dignity and social justice.” These demands marked the intertwined economic and political grievances that lead to the eruption of the uprisings, and they highlighted people’s aspirations to improve their living conditions, both economically and politically. The paper aims to explain how the global neoliberal economic reform programs implemented in Egypt in the last three decades have enhanced authoritarianism rather than democratisation, and deepened the income inequality in the society which generated instability and hindered the democratisation process.

Democracy is a contested concept that invoked various meanings to different peoples and societies (Shin & Kim, 2017). It could be associated with justice and the rule of law,

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Rasha Hamdy Hussien

equality and egalitarian values, or with the values of freedom and individual liberties, or it could be associated to free elections and rights to vote. The broadness of this concept opens the door for different interpretations and understandings.

According to the National Endowment for democracy (2018), the definition of democracy involves the right of the people to determine their destiny freely. The exercise of this right requires freedom of expression, the rule of law and respect of human rights, free and competitive elections, and guarantee of free press and access to information. For the Arab governments, democracy seems to be confusedly identified with the notion of “majority rule”, and with the overwhelming obsession with holding elections per se, with disregard to the other requirements and values of democracy, as stipulated above. Consequently, Farid Zakaria (2007) coined the new term “illiberal democracy” to describe the regimes of some Arab countries, including Egypt.

Globalization is defined as a “set of related processes that involves stretching of economic, social, cultural and political activity and interconnect the individuals, groups, communities, states, markets, and corporations, in a complex web of social relations, intensifying their independence” (Martinelli, 2005, p.103). Thus, it represents the growth of networks of worldwide interdependence and flow of information. It is clear from the definition, that the focus of globalization is on connectivity, competition and interdependence. No longer is it possible to separate a controlled ‘inside’ from a rapidly changing and different ‘outside’.

The Correlation Between Economic Development and Democracy

Modernisation theorists, led by Lipset (1959), established a theoretical link between the level of development of a country and its probability of being democratic. Lipset’s article ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Development’, argued that empirical evidence provided from a comparative study, confirmed a correlation between development and democracy. This was followed by Walt Rostow, who argued that democracies develop slowly in a linear and inevitable path through fixed stages, in response to particular socio-economic preconditions (Rostow, 1960).

It is worth noticing that in his study, Lipset (1959) did not focus only on per capita income. A broader argument was adopted stressing that ‘all the various aspects of economic development- industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and education are so closely

interrelated, as to form one major factor which has the political correlate to democracy' (Lipset, 1959, p.41). This list of factors constitutes the conditions, and not necessarily the causes for democracy, based on the assumption that modernisation could lead to changing social conditions that enhance a democratic culture. In this sense, modernisation was assumed to lead to the creation of behavioural and cultural basis for democratic governance. For this reason, some scholars think that Lipset's theory is in essence, a cultural one (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009).

On the other hand, the correlation between economic development and democracy was questioned by Barrington Moore, in his book, 'The social origins of dictatorship and democracy' (1966). He stressed that socio-economic development did not necessarily lead to democracy, and instead, focused more on social structure and the relations among classes.

These empirical cases and quantitative studies provided evidence that equally supports both arguments. They indicated that "the modernisation level is evidently not determinate, and merely constitutes an environment that may be more or less facilitative of certain kinds of a regime, deterring democracy only at the very lowest level and authoritarianism, only at the very highest levels" (Hinnebusch, 2006).

Arab countries of middle-income level represent an enigma when examined through the lens of Modernisation theory. The theory argues that beyond certain thresholds of economic development, societies would become socially mobilised in a way that will challenge any established authoritarian rule, as the rising levels of literacy, urbanisation, and industrialisation are associated with an increased desire and capacity for political participation (Hinnebusch, 2006).

Although, it is widely believed, especially in Western countries, that democracy becomes likely when countries reach what the World Bank calls the upper-middle income zone or above (Auybi, 1995). It is worth mentioning that in this regard, in the 1990s some Arab countries such as Algeria and Iraq were in this zone. However, they did not democratise, and neither did the Gulf countries (due to them being rentier states and therefore using oil revenues to buy the consent of their population). Lebanon, on the other hand, was in the lower-middle income category albeit with better democratic prospects than other Arab countries. (Auybi, 1995).

These Arab cases certainly raised doubts regarding the validity of Modernisation theory. However, the eruption of the 2011 uprisings in several Arab countries, and the unsmooth transition and setbacks that most of these countries witnessed revived the interest in the theory, and invoke the curiosity to explore the specific variables and aspects of modernisation that enhanced the correlation between economic development and democratisation.

The Aspects of Capitalist Development Linked to Democratisation

The frequently suggested positive correlation between capitalist development and democracy/democratisation depends on the presence of six main variables: the occurrence of a shift in the power of class balance; the nature of the state; state-society dynamics (Huber and et al., 1993); the empowerment of the people (Adly, 2017); stability; and income equality (Lipset, 1959; Boix and Stokes, 2003).

The significance of income equality for realising successful democratisation has been stressed by many modernist theorists. Lipset asserted that a society divided between large impoverished mass, and small favoured elite would produce either an oligarchy or a tyranny (Lipset, 1959). Also, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), concluded that there is a curvilinear relationship between inequality and democracy. Through examining the interrelation between economic inequality and democratisation, they found out that the threat of revolution from below, frightens the elite and leads them to consider democracy. Based on this, they suggested that democracy is most likely to develop when inequality is neither too high nor too low. If it is too high, elites will have much to lose. Therefore, they will oppose democratisation to avoid unpredictable challenges to their *status quo*. Likewise, if inequality is too low, then citizens will have little to gain and thus will feel little inclination to demand democracy (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009).

It is noticed that contemporary global capitalism has widened the income inequality gap, between the haves and the have-nots. It has concentrated power and wealth into the hands of the rich oligarchy while, restricting the state's ability to intervene to support the have-nots or to regulate the market. This has jeopardised the stability of new democracies, leading to a sort of backsliding such as in Poland and Hungary. It also has hindered the democratisation process in some developing countries such as Egypt (Rich, 2017).

The shift in the balance of class power is considered to be the most important factor, accounting for the positive correlation between development and democracy. Capitalist development usually leads to a shift in the balance of class power and a change in social structure. It weakens the power of the landlord class, which is the traditional opponent for democracy and strengthens the subordinate classes; namely, the middle class and the working class. These subordinate classes gain self-organisation capacity, as a result of modernisation, based on the spread of education, industrialisation, urbanisation and the modern means of communication. Also, the dynamics between the classes are essential, as successful democratisation requires an alliance between the middle class and the working class, to be able to push for democracy (Huber et al., 1993). On the other hand, if an alliance was formed by the state and both upper and middle classes, to preserve their interests and privileges, then the chances for democratisation will be very low, as the working class will not be able to push toward democracy by itself (Huber et al., 1993).

The balance of interests among social classes could represent one of the factors that could explain the complexity of the democratic transition in Egypt. The 2011 uprising erupted as a result of a spontaneous alliance between the rural working class and the urban middle class, in a moment where an increase in the grievances of the poor was aligned with increasing aspirations of the middle class (Teti et al., 2017). However, this alliance soon weakened due to social/political fragmentation and polarisation. This division gave the opportunity to the upper class to re-organise itself and form a coalition with the state, as well as attract a portion of the upper-middle class, which is already dependent on the state. Together, they lead a counter-revolution that resulted in a setback in the process of democratisation in 2013.

Contrary to the role of traditional capitalism in history, which empowered the working and middle classes, contemporary neoliberal global capitalism has strengthened a rich oligarchy in some countries. The concentration of power in their hands enabled them to marginalise the other classes (Sztejer, 2015).

The nature of the state and its degree of strength and autonomy are essential in determining the possibility of successful democratisation. The state should be strong and autonomous to enforce the rule of law, as without a consolidated state democracy cannot take place. In the meantime, the state should not be so strong and autonomous to the extent that it could alienate society from it, and as a result allowing it to rule without accountability.

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This signifies the importance to counterbalance the power of the state with the organisational strength of the civil society, and to also balance state relations with religious organisations (Huber and et al., 1993).

It is noticed that global capitalism increased the power of rentier and semi rentier states in the developing south, which deepened the autonomy of these states vis a vis their societies, and gave them power over the people that allowed them to rule without accountability. Also, contemporary capitalism has weakened the nation-state and eroded its sovereignty against global powers or multilateral corporations and international organisations, especially the financial organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank (WB) (Hardt & Negri, 2000). This makes the states more responsive to the demands of global powers, and multilateral corporations and organisations, than to the demands of their people.

Empowerment of the people is considered to be the cornerstone of democracy. Thus, it is noticed that development processes which managed to empower people and to engage them in the different steps of the process fully had successfully achieved a consolidated democracy. This also applies to the Asian countries that adopted an authoritarian route to development and then transitioned to democracy in a later stage, such as Singapore and South Korea. They successfully empowered different classes of society, and engaged them in the development process from the very beginning. The empowerment of the people in production and development motivated the people, at a later stage, to demand political participation and to push for democracy. So, the early empowerment of people in development and production in authoritarian regimes had contributed gradually to the democratic transition of this regime into a consolidated democracy. Empowerment of people is accomplished by providing them with funds, education, health care, capacity building and skills. This enables people to become engaged in producing an added economic value, which they will later be able to receive their share of in the form of profits or wages (Adly, 2017).

There is an obvious lack of empowerment of people in most Arab countries, including Egypt, due to the misapplication of neoliberal economic reform policies. Governments focused on free trade and neglected the importance of increasing productivity through supporting industrial and agricultural development. They failed to attract foreign investments

in these fields, and instead concentrated a majority of investments in the oil and real estate sectors.

Stability is also vital for successful democratisation. There is a consensus that successful economic development enhances stability; which might help achieve democratisation, if other supportive variables are in place. Economic development increases the capacity of a society to satisfy the aspiration of mobilised social forces, and therefore would reduce social frustration and the political instability that might result from of it (Huntington, 1968). It is noticed that concerns for both national and international security are usually provoked by some foreign powers to justify their support for authoritarian regimes in the Arab World. However, from another perspective, it is usually the repression, bad governance and corruption practised by authoritarian regimes that generate instability in the long run.

The absence of these factors in the countries that witnessed uprisings during the Arab spring – namely Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria – in addition to the divisions in society and external influences, explain why development and modernisation in these countries did not lead to successful democratisation. It also explains the unsmooth transition that some Arab countries are currently going through.

How far Does Economic Globalization Affect the Level of Democracy?

Despite some disagreements about its degree of influence, economic liberalisation is widely regarded in Western literature as a keystone for democracy. It leads to long-term economic growth, it fosters the demand for a rule of law and transparency, and it helps to expand democratic values from the economic realm into politics (Teti, 2012).

However, this point of view was countered by dependency theorists, who argued that the global spread of market forces would not lead to greater political participation, but rather to exclusion and inequality. This, in turn, would hinder democratisation and might foster authoritarianism. As a source of income, regimes of developing countries rely more on natural resources, and exporting primary goods than domestic sources of income such as taxation. This places a greater dependence on external parties, rather than domestic powers. In turn, this aligns the interests of the ruling elites in such countries with external parties, such as multinational corporations or global powers, rather than to their citizens. The dependence upon external parties for generating income, accompanied by the rentier state's

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responsibility to distribute the national wealth among their citizens, makes the ruling regimes more accountable to external parties than to their citizens. Since legitimacy and accountability are among the main pillars of a democratic regime, by undermining them, globalization's liberal economy will be enhancing authoritarianism, rather than democracy.

These two schools of thought, modernisation theory and dependency theory, illustrate the existence of conflicting views regarding the effect of globalization on the level of democracy, or the likelihood of democracy. Thus, the current literature on the political implications of globalization for the South adopts two general perceptions. The first one views globalization as a process in which the existing hierarchy of power relations between states on the international level is reproduced (that is, a powerful core of 'Western' nations versus a weaker periphery of the 'Rest'). In this case, democracy is undermined by globalization. The second perception views democracy as a process by which power is redistributed and de-centred to the disadvantage of authoritarian regimes and the advantage of civil societies in these countries. In this case, globalization is regarded as enhancing democratisation (Pratt, 2001).

Quan Li and Reuveny (2000) found that the group of scholars who adopted the view that globalization has a positive effect on democracy established their argument on the following propositions: 1) Economic growth resulting from globalization would increase the level of education and the size of the middle class, which in turn, would help to promote democracy. 2) The focus on international business would increase interdependence among states, and this would enhance the demand for political stability, and boost a regime's interest in democracy. 3) Through increased competition, globalization will reduce the state's capacity to exercise full control over rent and economic revenue. This, in turn, would make authoritarian leaders less likely to want, and be able, to cling to power. 4) Globalization will enable democratic states to transmit the values and culture of democracy to autocratic governments, and this flow of information would foster democracy. 5) Globalization helps to improve and to strengthen the domestic institutions by putting pressure on them, to exercise accountability and transparency. Globalization also supports the role of civil society and the citizens' involvement in the governance of their countries.

Quan Li and Reuveny (2000) further identify a second group of scholars who argued that globalization hinders democracy, basing their arguments on the following: 1) Globalization would lead to the increase in income inequality, and class polarisation within

society, as local producers are incapable of competing in international markets. They will lose more from economic openness, and this could lead to instability, social upheavals and the emergence of radical groups challenging state authority. In such cases, the state usually resorts to coercion and suppression to restore order and preserve its authority. The result would weaken any opportunity for democratisation. 2) Globalization leads to the intervention of international finance organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in a state's economy and may result in the imposition of austerity measures. This, in turn, would increase income inequality further. It will also make a state's regime more accountable to external parties rather than its people. The regime will care more about satisfying the demands of international financial institutions and donor countries rather than fulfilling the demands of its people. This can alienate people from their state, and undermine a regime's legitimacy and accountability. 3) Globalization leads to cultural and social fragmentation within society, and this undermines the consolidation of society. This is a precondition for democracy to emerge. 4) The culture of a global market makes the individual citizen more interested in pursuing their ambitions, regardless of the ruling government's practices. This could lead to the gradual weakening of democracy due to lack of public concern in public policy, highlighted by the way in which citizens have gradually refrained from engaging in public activities. 5) Globalization widens the economic gap between the Global North and South, provoking social unrest and instability in the South, and causing the elite in the South to resort to authoritarian measures to preserve their economic interests and privileges. This causes them to unite with the elite in the North (the core), to jointly exploit the masses in the South (the periphery) (Quan Li & Reuveny, 2000).

There is another group of scholars who combined the previous two points of view as they argue that globalization can both help and hinder democratisation at the same time. Thus, globalization is regarded to be a double-edged sword when it comes to dealing with democratisation in the Arab World. On the one hand, globalization is deemed to be threatening democratic governance because it challenges state autonomy, social cohesion, and national development. These are considered to be necessary factors for successful democratisation (Teti, 2012). Also, the marginalisation of large sections of society through economic and social exclusion, a result of globalization, could, in turn, lead to instability and social disorder; which, in turn, would hinder the democratisation process. (Teti, 2012). Meanwhile, abandoning a state-led development model could lead to

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the decline of the middle-class due to loss of income due to the guidelines of economic reform, as enshrined in the Washington consensus of 1989, and adopted by the International Financial Institutions. They stipulate that the state should roll back control over the economy and leave everything to the market, encouraging the privatisation of state-public enterprises. This has resulted in shrinking public sector investments, which have not been substituted by the private sector due to the weakness of the national private sector, and the state's inability to attract foreign direct investments. This impacts the availability of jobs, leading to a rise in unemployment. Additionally, the economic reform programs of global neoliberal have led to the reduction of subsidies, and a limitation of the state's ability to support the poor and needy, which increases poverty rates and causes a decline in public services (Selim, 2015).

Aggravated social inequality, leading to socio-economic destabilisation and political radicalisation, is an expression of a growing sense of 'relative deprivation'; defined as any collectively-felt discrepancy between an expected and an attainable position (Gurr, 2011). Frustration and anger could be considered to be the main motive behind many current threats to international security, such as terrorism, internal violence, extremism and illegal immigration. Relative deprivation can perfectly describe the popular feeling in the Arab spring countries before the uprisings, where on one side lays a huge gap between people's expectations and aspirations, and on the other, their capabilities as well as their government's capabilities to deliver and satisfy such aspirations. The flow of information through globalization has raised people's aspirations for better living conditions. Meanwhile, neoliberal economic reforms have limited the state's ability to meet these expectations, unable to interfere to support the needy or to provide decent public services and job opportunities.

Another view suggests that globalization is not just hindering democratisation, but might also be enhancing authoritarianism. It can be argued that the dependency of regimes on external parties and markets makes them responsive to international demands over domestic ones. This dependency buffers the regimes from accountability towards their populations, and also drives the global powers to support these authoritarian regimes and thus keep them in power. Also, globalization and liberalism weaken local states; which urges ruling regimes to rely on authoritarian tactics and measures to remain in power and protect their interests. As a result, globalization could be argued to help entrench authoritarianism, rather than undermine it, in the Arab World.

In the meantime, globalization encourages democratisation in Arab countries, by trying to convince states to cede powers to the private sector and civil society, thereby forcing the state to consider the concerns of external actors concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms (Pratt, 2001). Also, the development of communication technology leads to the fast spreading of democratic culture and values in the Arab World.

Quani Li and Rafael Reuveny (2000), conducted empirical research to test the effect of globalization on democracy; selecting four national aspects of globalization: trade openness, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio (financial) investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. Their research covered 127 countries from 1970-1996. They found that:

“Trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy. The effect of trade openness is constant over time while the negative effect of portfolio investments inflows strengthens. FDI inflows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time” (Quan Li & Reuveny, 2000 p.2).

Their findings support the argument of the group of scholars who regarded globalization to be a double-edged sword that could help or hinder democracy at the same time. They confirmed the positive influence of the spread of democratic ideas, and, in the meantime, they emphasise clearly that the “economic aspect of globalization and the integration into world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance” (Quan Li & Reuveny, 2000, p.38).

The 2011 uprising in Egypt

Failure of development, on both economic and political levels, was one of the main driving forces behind the 2011 uprising. It was a deeply rooted feeling of collective injustice that turned hundreds of dedicated pro-democracy activists into millions of determined protesters, demanding the fall of the regime. Economic problems as a source of frustration and dissatisfaction of the people were deeply highlighted during the uprising, and were attributed to the failure of economic liberalisation carried out by authoritarian regimes. Neoliberal reform policies adopted since the 1980s, were designed and applied in a way that helped the concentration and centralisation of wealth into the hands of a minute group of the society, tightly linked to the regime. Thus, it led to the enrichment of a

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small sector of the society and the pauperisation of the majority, in addition to the degradation of public services, such as education and healthcare systems. The failure of this economic development to generate broader benefits is due to the implementation of particular macroeconomic policies, that resulted in declining investment rates in the productive sectors, accompanied by inequitable distributional arrangements and extremely high rates of unemployment (Gerges, 2014). Privatisation policy was implemented in a way that leads to the emergence of so-called crony capitalism (Dodge, 2012), and widespread corruption. According to the UN Human Development report for 2011, Egypt's ranking was 113, which indicates that Mubarak's regime did not achieve actual development; which is based on the mobilisation of resources and increasing productivity, and not just on money capital (Kadri, 2014). This is due to his focus on economic growth and GDP, rather than the mobilisation of real resources and productive projects. Given that the economic growth was concentrated in a minute group of the population, the benefits of capital economic growth did not trickle down to the middle and working classes. This led to deep inequality in wealth distribution, which affected the per capita income.

Politically, the regime gave way to the international pressures of liberalism, by adopting a system of "upgraded authoritarianism" or "Liberal authoritarianism," in which the state surrendered some of its economic roles, but only to consolidate its political position (Dodge, 2012). Liberal authoritarianism had falsely broadened the ruling coalition by bringing in the businessmen and the bourgeoisie; however, the main power was still preserved in the presidential palace. The bourgeoisie was dependent upon the state to maintain its privileges and retain access to public resources and services. As a result, it never really played its role in pushing for real democracy and changes in access to power and related clientelism. This system created inequalities of wealth distribution, government corruption and uneven economic growth (Dodge, 2012). Furthermore, the neoliberal economy had managed to create a crony capitalist coalition that excluded the labour from beneficiaries; driving a wedge between the middle class and the working class. This undermined the possibility of allying with the subordinate classes that could challenge the state and push for a consolidated democracy (Huber et al., 1993; Hinnebusch, 2015).

Based on the above, globalization's neoliberal economic policies hindered democratisation in Egypt. It assisted in concentrating the wealth and power into a particular group and alienated the majority of the remaining population. In this way, economic growth did not

lead to a shift in the balance of class power, which is necessary for successful democratisation. This shift in balance would entail the weakening of old aristocracies' power, while also producing a modern working class. However, on the contrary, the globalised neoliberal economy strengthened the power of the upper class, weakened the middle class, and marginalised the working class. Also, globalization influenced the dynamics among classes, as it facilitated a coalition among the ruling regime and the landlord class, while it hindered the formation of an alliance between the middle class and the working class which is essential for successful democratisation.

Since economic growth became less dependent on productive investments, it then became very difficult to empower the people and engage them in the development process. Also, the gap of income inequality has been widened due to the way that neoliberal policies were applied; this, in turn, provoked social unrest and political instability. As the empowerment of people, income equality and stability are deemed to be necessary factors for realising a consolidated democracy, the hindering of these factors, due to neoliberal policies inserted through globalization, have greatly complicated the democratisation process in Egypt.

Ironically, globalization enhanced the tools to resist, and to counter authoritarian regimes through social media, demonstrating the role of the internet and conventional media in connecting the world and accelerating the exchange of ideas and values among the youth.

In fact, globalization has raised people's aspirations for democracy, freedom, and better living conditions, and it provides people with the tools to resist authoritarian regimes. In the meanwhile, it creates the conditions that make the path to democracy unsmooth and very complicated. This proves the double-edged sword effect of globalization on processes of democratisation.

Conclusion

Globalization can both hinder and promote democracy at the same time. The empirical study of Egypt proved that economic globalization and integration into the world economy could help the decline rather than the rise of democracy.

The deceleration of globalization's rapid movement may be worth considering, through finding ways that help to narrow the gap of inequality between varying divides. This could

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be either globally focused, for example, on the North-South divide, or within individual states, such as between core cities and peripheries of towns and villages, as well as among various classes of society.

There is a pressing need to introduce a human dimension to globalization to address the fears that people in less developed countries have, especially in rural areas and villages. They regard globalization as a tool of exploitation, targeting their countries. Current political backlashes against globalization support this notion.

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WHY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CANNOT GUARANTEE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: A CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION STUDIES AND THE PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM

Andre Miquelasi

The European Parliament (EP) is the best existing example of a directly elected parliament above the level of the nation-state. The European Union (EU), however, has often been accused of lacking democratic legitimacy not only by political and intellectual elites, but also by the general public. Rising right-wing populist parties in Europe claimed that the only solution for “more democracy” is the empowerment of the nation-state, to the detriment of a global alternative. In times of Brexit, economic and migration crisis, it is crucial for the EU to set its democratic credibility straight, and show that effective democracy can be achieved at the international level.

This paper argues that the EU has consistently improved its channels for democratic participation and accountability, and that the EP has been central in this endeavour. However, improvements in institutional design have not been matched by a sociological consensus over the democratic credentials of the EU. This is because the democratic deficit is mostly based on psychological perception; it is more about the way people perceive the EU, rather than how its institutions work. This is also clear in the academic debate, in particular, within the field of European Integration Studies (EIS). This analysis points out that the academic debate is affected by the so-called “methodological nationalism”, which makes it difficult for the European society to see the EU as a truly democratic endeavour, and hampers the possibility of achieving democracy beyond the nation-state.

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To develop the above argument, this essay will be divided into the following parts: first, it will give an overview of the EP's historical evolution. To recognise its development is essential to understand how democratic legitimacy is vital for sustaining the European project. The second part will introduce the scholarly version of the democratic deficit debate. It will reveal how varied the discussion has been, with academics, often defending diametrically opposed views. The third part will offer a critique of the scholarly debate over the EU integration and political processes. It will elucidate how the national/international divide of Social Sciences leads to the weak prospect for the achievement of supranational democracy. In conclusion, this essay will suggest that it is necessary for the EU's leaders and elites to be clearer on the direction of the EU project, the cacophony of voices produced by academia is only a reflection of the different discourses that guide EU integration intellectually and in practice.

The Evolution of the European Parliament

Although the EP is often criticised for its lack of power in comparison to other EU institutions, it nonetheless has displayed an impressive historical evolution: from being considered as a mere “talking shop” (Rittberger, 2005, p.1), the EP has progressively evolved into “one of the most powerful elected assemblies in the world” (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2007, p.3).

It is a highly contested matter if within the blueprints of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the institution that gave birth to the EU – its forefathers had or not initially envisaged the creation of a parliament (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, pp.26-27). Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that to make the new community more democratic, a parliamentary assembly needed to be established and was, in fact, included in the Treaty of Paris signed in 1951, which marked the foundation of the ECSC. Later, with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Community, the Parliamentary Assembly became a shared parliament responsible for the three existing communities. It was only in 1962 that the Assembly started calling itself as the “European Parliament”, although the name was not formalised until the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p.35).

Originally the members of the EP were not directly elected, but were members of national parliaments appointed by their governments. It was a weak and ineffective institution, with almost no involvement in the legislative process – it could be consulted by the Council of Ministers, but it was not obliged to take the assembly's position in consideration. Besides, national parliamentarians with responsibilities at their national legislatures could not fully commit to the assembly, they had to share their working time between the national and the European parliaments (Burns, 2013).

Provisions, however, were made for the EP to draft propositions for direct suffrage, and finally, in 1979, the first elections were held. Smismans declares that when the European Commission (EC) was set up, “democratic accountability was not high on the Community's agenda” (2013, p.342). During that time, the main concern of the integration process was purely technical, to make the common market work. There seemed to be a kind of ‘permissive consensus’ where the elites were able to lead the integration process on their own will, without the true involvement of European citizens.

Nevertheless, despite holding its first direct elections in 1979, the EP's powers in the legislative process continued to be perceived as heavily restricted (Rittberger & Winzen, 2015). It was not until 1986, with the SEA, that the EP's influence *vis-à-vis* the Council and the Commission started to increase considerably. Subsequent treaties improved the EP's legislative leverage, especially with the introduction of co-decision, later called ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). The OLP made the EP an equal legislative partner with the Council, by extending the EP's right to hold up to three readings of legislation, and the power to reject it. Also, the EP's budgetary powers were considerably expanded, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon, which gave it the ability to make amendments to the budget in all areas, rendering the EP “an equal partner within the budgetary realm” (Burns, 2013, p.162).

Another significant change related to its role in the choice of the Commission's leadership was the treaty of Lisbon, which tied the results of the EP election to the choice of the Commission presidency. Now, the Council is obliged to take into consideration the election results, which means that in practice, the Commission's president “needs to muster the support of the EP's main party group” (Rittberger & Winzen, 2015, p.111).

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The EP was, thus, able to secure “incremental, pragmatic and ultimately vital consolidations of its powers through ‘small steps’ of inter-institutional agreement, informal compromises and the creative use of its own internal procedures” (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p.66). Such a remarkable evolution in the powers of the EP is the sign of the Parliament’s protagonist role in increasing the democratic credential of the EU. But what exactly triggered this remarkable progress of EP’s powers? Why did member states allowed this process to happen, given that most international organisations’ assemblies, such as NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, are merely consultative?

When the ‘permissive consensus’ started to be perceived as incapable of giving the European project the legitimacy it required, changes in the way that the EU was constituted became indispensable. Smismans (2013) cites, as a game-changer, the consolidation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) powers during the 1960s. The ground-breaking establishment of the ‘direct effect’ juridical principle – by which the ECJ ruled that member states were obliged to respect the rights granted to their citizens by Community Law – served as a basis for the doctrine of supremacy in the European legal order. It meant that, in practice, the EC was extending its power to policy areas that previously were under the sole authority of the nation-state. With the expansion of Community powers, it was essential that a Parliament should function as a guarantor of democratic legitimacy.

Pollack argues that the member states have continuously delegated powers to the EP, essentially in a quest for democratic legitimacy:

“Not because such delegation is likely to reduce the costs of policy making [...] but rather because the empowerment of a directly elected EP is seen by member governments and their constituents as normatively desirable and democratically legitimate” (Pollack, 2013, p.383).

In this view, European elites allowed the increase in EP powers, because it was normatively appropriate. Nonetheless, to put all the ‘legitimizing’ burden on the shoulders of the EP is unfair. As Judge and Earnshaw remark, a critical analysis of the role of the EP must be “inter-institutional, contextual, and interconnected” (2008, p.26). It is therefore important to note that the other main decision-making institutions of the EU are not completely devoid of democratic legitimacy and accountability channels. Most ministers in the Council are democratically elected and chosen from their national parliaments. Commissioners are also chosen by indication of elected national governments.

Despite all these facts, the notion of a democratic deficit still persists, and the fact that the EP has gained so much power throughout the years, does not fully give the EU incontestable democratic legitimacy. As Burns puts it: “increases in the Parliament’s formal powers have not been matched by an increase in popular legitimacy” (2013, p.159).

The Democratic Deficit Debate

This scholarly debate helps to understand why the perception of a democratically illegitimate EU perseveres. The EU is a contested polity that has been marred by controversies concerning its nature, current state and its future (Zimmermann & Dür, 2016). The democratic deficit is one of the central controversies that afflict the EU, and it can be broadly defined as “a gap between democratic aspirations (as reflected in a given set of democratic standards) and democratic realities” (Fossum, 2016, p.136). The problem is that scholars within the debate disagree over what exactly are the democratic aspirations of the EU, and to what extent it has been democratised.

Pollack (2009) explains that scholars diagnose the deficit fundamentally in three ways: irremediably undemocratic, potentially democratic, and democratically legitimate. The first two types are derived from similar empirical observations, although they are different in their normative propositions. Empirically, those who believe that there is a deficit often emphasise that EP elections are of a ‘second-order’ and irrelevant. Reif and Schmitt (1980) observed that the first elections in 1979 had a considerably lower turnout compared to national parliamentary elections – or, ‘first-order’. This phenomenon was connected to a series of factors. Most importantly, there was a widespread perception that less was at stake, and therefore EP elections were meaningless. Elections were dominated by factors related more to national issues, than with truly EU-wide issues; and many voters used the EP election essentially as a protest against the ruling national parties. More recent surveys showed that much of these findings are still true (Clark, 2014; Corbett, 2014).

The EU also is accused of failing to deliver social policy in favour of European citizens. This critique focuses on the outcome of policy, as a democratic legitimating factor, *i.e.*, ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999). This theory criticises the problem of ‘negative integration’, where the focus of EU policy is on deregulating the market; the side-effects are liberalising the job market and eroding social protection. It would require a more “positive integration” to safeguard the welfare of European citizens. At the same time, critics

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argued that the EU has weakened the ability of national states to keep up with the costs of welfare. The recent euro-crisis has only exacerbated this kind of criticism (Offe, 2013).

Other problems identified with the lack of democratic legitimacy are: the inexistence of an effective transnational public sphere (Müller, 2016), and a true party system at the European level (Mair & Thomassen, 2010); the absence of direct elections to the Commission's highest posts (Christiansen, 2016); lack of transparency within its decision-making processes (Christiansen & Neuhould, 2013); and a governance system that largely benefits big corporations (Horn & Wigger, 2016).

Those who normatively believe that the EU is irremediably undemocratic have a very pessimistic outlook. They considered the EU to be a force that undermines national democracies, without a perspective for offering credible participation channels and accountability. This line of criticism often relies on the idea that it is not possible for the EU to form a truly European *demos* (Grimm, 1995; Weiler, 1995). Therefore, even if institutional reforms are performed, a sense of democratic illegitimacy will continue. This view is largely *espoused* by eurosceptics (Holmes, 1996).

This pessimism is contrasted with a more positive outlook. Most contributions to the debate lie within this view, where scholars acknowledge the deficit, but devise strategies for institutional improvement, or even, construct new models for developing the democratic credentials of the European polity. There are those who argue that just relatively modest reforms are necessary (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). More substantively, there are those who claim that the EU should be reformed into one of these three categories: parliamentarisation, deliberation, and constitutionalisation (Pollack, 2009).

This classification is related to different models of democratic theory. Parliamentarisation usually involves the strengthening of the EP, greater accountability on the part of the Commission, and a stronger role for national parliaments (Hix, 2008; Schmitter & Trechsel, 2009; Auel & Christiansen, 2015). Deliberation relies less on representative politics, and more on Habermasian argumentative exchange for collective problem-solving (Joerges, 2001; Bohman, 2007). Lastly, the constitutionalist approach advocates the improvement of administrative law, and judicial review procedures for an increase in public accountability of executive governments (Majone, 2000; Shapiro, 2001).

Additionally, there are those who claimed that the EU ultimately does not suffer from a democratic deficit. For Majone (1999), the output of European policy is of regulatory nature. His rationale relies on the argument that regulating the market, harmonising product standards, and monetary policy have non-redistributive outcomes. In this way, the kind of policies under the auspices of the EU are usually considered better safeguarded by agencies insulated from democratic control. Regulatory policy requires long-term management that cannot be effectively guided by elected agents who tend to focus on short-term results. Furthermore, he argues that it is common for national democracies to delegate powers to non-elected institutions, such as central banks and regulatory agencies.

Moravcsik (2004), in the same fashion, indicates that national governments usually delegate issues of low-salience to non-democratic institutions. He argues that high salient issues, such as health, education, and taxation are still in the hands of the states. The EU, in turn, concentrates in areas that lack importance to the public, such as trade liberalisation, technical and environmental regulation. In terms of democracy, he does not see the EU as deficient:

“Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens” (Moravcsik, 2002, p.605).

Moravcsik (2002), a renowned inter-governmentalist, emphasises the legitimating role of national parliaments, but at the same time acknowledges the importance of the EP. He, however, opposes the idea that the EP elections have a low-turnout, because it is perceived as weak and distant from the citizen (Moravcsik, 2002). For him, it is the “lack of salience, not the lack of opportunity” that constrains public political participation (Moravcsik, 2002, p.616). Basically, for those who *espoused* the ‘democratic legitimate view’, like Moravcsik (2002) and Majone (1999), the EU offers democratic channels for public input, however, they are not seen as important by European citizens, because the outcomes of EU policy are not relevant enough for them.

The European Integration Studies and the Problem of Methodological Nationalism

Scholars have made important contributions to the democratic deficit debate, but overall, they still disagree empirically and normatively about this issue. This fact should not be a surprise, given that the Social Science is not an 'exact' discipline. The variegated scholarly discussion, instead of causing intellectual confusion, enhances students' ability to comprehend the complexity involved in democratic politics.

By analysing the deficit debate, it can be inferred that it hinges on two fundamental issues: the nature of the European polity, and the ideal-type of democracy that should be applied to it (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Fossum, 2016). While even national polities may be accused of a deficit based on different democratic models, the nature of the nation-state is much less contested. Thus, what makes the democratic deficit debate so unique is the unsettled nature of the EU polity? As Diez argues: "as long as there is such a proliferation of names, and conceptualizations of what the name 'EU' means, the EU remains beyond the framework of our political knowledge" (2001, p.85).

EIS and its theoretical framework is the main focus of study about the nature of the EU. EIS can be defined as "the field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, as well as on its outcome" (Wiener & Diez, 2009, p.3). Thus, it is all about the process of integration and its 'end product'. The two most well-known theories of European integration are Neo-functionalism and Inter-governmentalism. Neo-functionalism grew out of research on the early developments of the European project. The key to this theory is the process of spillover, where integration in one area leads to further integration in related sectors. Haas defines Neo-functional integration as:

"whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the existing one" (Haas, 1958, p.16).

What is clear from this definition is that the outcome of Neo-functional integration is a supranational polity, where the authority lies in supranational institutions.

The Neo-functionalists' view is often contrasted with Inter-governmentalism, which posits that the EU is an intergovernmental organization: it "treats states, and national governments in particular, as the primary actors in the integration process" (Rosamond, 2000, p.200). While for Neo-functionalists is the supranational institutions that lead the process of integration; for Inter-governmentalists, it is the member states. These different views heavily influence the debate over the democratic deficit. In the 'supranational view', the EP is considered as a vital element for legitimising the union, while for Inter-governmentalists, power should be given back to national parliaments.

A third theoretical approach that has gained currency is that of Multi-Level Governance. It is weak in explaining the process of integration, but offers a well-constructed view of the nature of the EU. It is defined as:

"A metaphor, used to depict the mature stage of the EU polity. Authority is dispersed rather than concentrated and political action occurs at and between various levels of governance. The idea also implies that the number of significant actors within the EU has multiplied" (Rosamond, 2000, p.201).

Despite the existence of distinctive theoretical efforts, some critics accused EU integration theories of being limited by its ontological assumptions, centred on the state. In this view, the problematic over the nature of the EU is due to an inescapable 'methodological nationalism':

"Europe can become neither a state nor a nation – and it won't. Hence, it cannot be thought of in terms of the nation-state. In fact, advanced research on Europe has scarcely dared venture beyond the conventional basic pattern of nation-state thinking [...] Even at higher levels of complexity, when speaking of "governance" or a "multilevel system", the legal and academic parlance of research on Europe remains biased toward organizational and regulatory systems designed to conceive of and cast the EU in the image of the nation-state" (Beck, 2008, p.109).

Methodological nationalism can be defined as: "a set of beliefs about the empirical reality" where the "dichotomy of national and international" is always entrenched (Beck, 2003, pp.454-455). It affects not only the academia, but also political elites, the media and the public in general. Indeed, most debates about the democratic legitimacy of the

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EU hinges around what 'Paris' or 'Berlin' (the state) may think. It disregards completely the democratic clamour, not only of European citizens in Malta and Luxembourg, but also for those in France and Germany.

Methodological nationalism is even more evident in the field of International Relations (IR), where EIS originated from. Traditionally, IR has depicted international relations as the interaction of black-boxes (states) rationally interested in power and survival, a view that permeates the works of realists such as Morgenthau (2006) and Waltz (1979). IR has for a long time snubbed democracy. Hazel Smith (2000) has asked - why there is no "International Democratic Theory?" She struggles to understand why IR has disregarded the interrelationship of democracy, democratisation and the international system. For her, to ignore the importance of democracy is to ignore "the complexity and significance of transnational and globalised politics" (Hazel Smith, 2000, p.8).

It does not mean that integration theories are not able to perceive the EU as transcending the nation-state model. In fact, much of the literature over the EU, describes it as more than a traditional intergovernmental institution. However, these theories usually fall into the intellectual trap of methodological nationalism. It is through the national standards of democracy that the democratic deficit of the EU is assessed. But, is it possible to overcome methodological nationalism?

For Rosamond, overcoming methodological nationalism is "well intentioned and quite compelling", but "might be incautious and hasty" (2008, p.612). In his opinion, EIS and its inherent methodological nationalism are "still highly capable of building upon classical concepts as a way of delivering meaningful empirical research" (Rosamond, 2008, p.612). Indeed, the theoretical diversity enriches, rather than limits the complex understandings of politics. However, methodological nationalism stimulates, rather than attenuate, the central problem of International Relations, European integration studies, and the democratic deficit debate: the split between national and international.

This split has political consequences, especially in an age of rising nationalism. Theories of European integration are not politically innocent (Diez, 2001). They replicate the dichotomy between the state and the supranational, into the hearts and minds of the people. All the increase in the EP powers is not sufficient to convince that the EU is, or can be, democratically legitimate. Rather, the issue of democratic deficit becomes 'politicized'.

As De Wilde and Zürn (2012) points out. European integration has been politicized, in the sense that it is dividing the political spectrum into those who support integration and those who do not. Analogously, the democratic deficit debate has been divided into those who believe or not in the deficit, and if the EU should or not be democratized. The problem is when this ‘politicization’ generates further dissension in a society already worryingly dissatisfied with its political system.

It is not that academics should be blamed for the ‘nasty’ politicisation of EU integration. It should be highlighted, that academics endeavour to explore the different views and discourses that permeate EU integration. The problem, though, is the inefficiency of European political leaders, and elites to set a straight discourse over the nature of the EU. Recently, the EU Commission (2017), has published a white paper, proposing five different scenarios for what kind of polity it wants to become until 2025. It is a significant step to set straight, especially for the European society, what ‘kind of monster’ the EU is. Nonetheless, academics should be more critical about methodological nationalism, because academia and EIS have a responsibility as the main repository of information for those who want to know more about the EU.

Conclusion

This paper argued that over the years, the EP has displayed an impressive institutional progress; from a mere consultative forum, to a central piece in the decision-making machinery of the EU. As a directly elected assembly, its success is essential for democratically legitimizing a highly contested polity. However, even if we consider it as a successful story, the perception of a democratic deficit persists. The scholarly debate makes a great contribution to better understand the complexity of the deficit problem. However, the European integration studies, the main intellectual *locus* of the debate, stimulates a methodological nationalism that accentuates the political divide between those who prefer a supranational EU, and those who defend a return to stronger state sovereignty. Any institutional development towards a more democratic EU will always be overshadowed by the national/international divide.

The EP should be considered neither as the greatest inspiration, nor the saddest delusion for the prospects of a global democracy. Rather, the EU’s case shows that the possibility for democratizing the international has become a politicized matter. The recent events of

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Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the rise of populism in Europe, are all signs that the chasm between nationalism and globalization is becoming a dividing issue for contemporary societies. Academics also share the blame of building intellectual walls – the persisting barriers between the domestic and the international – that constrain the prospects for developing worldwide democratic governance. While methodological nationalism remains ingrained in the consciousness of modern society, it will be difficult for a truly global democracy to develop, beyond the nation-state.

Returning to the problem of the EU democratic deficit, it appears to be an unsolvable issue. There are, of course, democratic deficits, also inside the nation states; but in the EU, it is more accentuated, due to its contested nature. Nonetheless, in such difficult times, where the future existence of the EU has been questioned, there are measures that could be taken to attenuate the democratic deficit conundrum. The question is however: is it possible? Whether it is or not, every attempt to reduce the cacophony involved in the examinations over the EU's nature is valid, especially in an ever more complex political world.

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5

FEDERALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEPARATISM: THE CASE OF CATALONIA

Irene Queralt Santamatilde

Introduction

Europe has witnessed a revival of nationalism and separatist movements in countries like Great Britain, Belgium and Spain. There are around one hundred groups seeking secession in Europe (Campanella, 2017). The support to these groups in the European Union (EU) has increased, due to the Euro crisis, globalization and regional tensions (Campanella, 2017; Borrell & Llorach, 2015). Scotland and Catalonia, being the most notable stateless nations within Europe, are centred in this debate around secession in multinational states.

Catalonia, the object of study in this paper, has experienced an increase in the support to secession since the early 2000s (Guibernau, 2013). Catalonia is located in Northeastern Spain, and has a long history of struggle for independence (Canal, 2014). Nationalist parties play an important role in the region, and in the overall dynamics of Spanish politics, as proven by recent elections. Both the desire of Catalan separatists to hold an independence referendum in September 2017 and the current campaign for the diffusion of Catalan aspirations amongst international actors, turn Catalan separatism into a topic of increased interest and relevance for the study of nationalism in European states.

As these nationalist movements tend to portray secession as a panacea for the national question, much literature has been developed around who, and under what circumstances, has the right to become independent (Buchanan, 1997; Patten, 2002; Seymour, 2007; Beran, 1984). However, it is important to broaden this debate, and to consider whether secession is possible, or even desirable.

The aim of this paper is to analyse, whether federalism constitutes an alternative to independence for stateless nations in European multinational states, using the case of Catalonia.

The development of this practical response, constitutes a theoretical critique to the approaches developed within the field of nationalist studies. Unlike most theorists have argued, federalism does not require congruence between the “national and the political unit” (Gellner, 1983, p.31).

The first section of this paper aims to reflect the current situation of the so-called *Catalan question* within Spain. The lack of recognition of Catalan claims by the Central Government of Madrid, and the consequent lack of dialogue between them and the Catalan regional Parliament, have led to a constitutional crisis (López-Aguilar, 2016). This illustrates the problems which could arise when central governments neglect minority nationalisms and their claims.

It is important to determine what nations are, and how these emerge and develop. Do they arise naturally as a consequence of certain primordial elements, or are they imagined? The second chapter will answer these questions by critically examining the aforementioned theories and applying them to the multifaceted portrayals of the Catalan nation.

This paper argues that nations rely on a number of primordial elements, but that they do not emerge naturally from them. Concluding that, nations are invented as a consequence of convergence of education, mass literacy and other manifestations of print capitalism and the industrial society. Hence, although it is important to recognise the existence of different nations within the state; this recognition needs to acknowledge the fact that not all the population shares the same national consciousness or the goal of independence (Linz, 1997; Metroscopia, 2017).

The final section presents Federalism as a third track to solve this confrontation. Firstly, by examining the concept and its application in multinational states. Secondly, by providing three main arguments to establish a Federal Republic as an alternative to answer the national question and thus, solve the constitutional crisis in Spain. These arguments will focus on: the survival of Catalonia and Spain after a possible independence declaration; the difficulties of the political process to gain international legitimacy; and the need of rupture with a system that, according to certain sections of the population, perpetuates a dictatorial past (Iglesias, 2014). This paper will conclude that Federalism constitutes a beneficial alternative to separatist claims in European multinational states.

A Hard-line Approach: the Spanish Constitutional Crisis

*“The ‘fitting of Catalonia in the Constitution’ always reminded me of buying furniture in Ikea and getting a loose piece. At first you try to fix it secretly with a hammer, but eventually you will say, ‘I couldn’t assemble it properly’”.*¹

Gabriel Rufián, 2016

These words from Gabriel Rufián, spokesman of *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia; ERC), are a good reflection of the constitutional crisis that Spain faces. The environment of political tension and discontent with the so-called Regime of ‘78, which makes reference to the system established with the 1978 constitution, is, to a great extent, a consequence of the Catalan question (Iglesias, 2014; López-Aguilar, 2016).

This section will aim to show, through the case of Catalonia, the consequences of adopting a hard-line approach towards nationalist and separatist claims in multinational states. To do so, it will firstly engage with the current situation of the Catalan question. Secondly, it will focus on the main events that have defined the Catalan struggle for independence since the Catalan regional Government (*Generalitat*) held an unofficial and non-binding referendum on independence in 2014. This referendum thus evidenced a crisis of the *Sistema de Autonomías* (system of Autonomous Communities), set up in the Spanish Constitution in 1978. Furthermore, it intensified the Catalan civil society’s support to the nationalist movement. This will lead to conclude that such an approach does not contribute to solving the national problem and, indeed, it amplifies it leading to situations of crisis like that of Spain.

The Catalan Question Today

The rise of secessionism in Catalonia and the calls of the Catalan civil society for the right to decide have entered into conflict with the policies of the Central Government in Madrid, unsympathetic to recognise Catalonia’s claims. This has led to a climate of tension and confrontation between the two governments (Tortella, 2016).

One of the main issues behind these increased tensions is the holding of a referendum to secede from Spain. Carles Puigdemont, president of the *Generalitat*, has repeatedly assured that Catalans will “freely decide” about the future of Catalonia through a “legal and binding referendum” (BBC, 2016). He has vowed that it would take place during the month

of September 2017, the latest. However, the Central Government in Madrid has refused to allow the holding of that referendum and has firmly opposed to it (El Mundo, 2017).

The confrontation between the Spanish Government and pro-independence parties was thus inevitable. A number of different protests, institutional and cultural acts, as well as political and legal measures continue to increase the tension between the nationalists and Madrid. Recent events, like the trial of Artur Mas, former president of the *Generalitat*, shows these tensions. Mas was put on trial, accused of civil disobedience, following the non-binding independence referendum held in 2014. He was the President of the *Generalitat* at the time, and assumed the responsibility of the initiative, despite the warnings from the Central Government and the Spanish constitutional court. It is also worth noting that aside from Mas, there are around 300 Catalan politicians and civil servants who faced similar charges, and were banned from public office (The Economist, 2017).

Furthermore, at the institutional level, the Catalan Government has taken a number of measures, to show its rejection to the unitary model of the State, and to some policies regarding the territorial administration of Spain. For instance, Puigdemont did not attend the last Conference of Presidents, where representatives of each Autonomous Community meet with the Prime Minister to discuss relevant issues and enhance their cooperation. This is not the only time when one of the sides has rejected dialogue and negotiation. In fact, when Mariano Rajoy addressed the media after his appointment as Prime Minister in 2016, he referred to the Catalan problem, by assuring that he would not “negotiate the unity of Spain nor its national sovereignty. I can’t, I don’t want to, and I shouldn’t” (Rajoy, 2016).

This lack of will to dialogue and to find a common agreement between the two positions has led to an untenable situation of increasing political, economic and social tensions. Some have argued that this constitutional crisis could have disastrous consequences for Spain (López-Aguilar, 2016). As mentioned before, different attempts to solve this discontent have been blocked and considered unconstitutional. Hence, due to this hard-line approach to nationalism, Spain’s democracy has lost credibility both at a national and international level, and some, such as Rufián (2016) and Revenga-Sánchez (2005) have labelled it as a militant democracy.

Moreover, it is crucial to understand the large contrasts between the political nature of Catalonia and that of the rest of Spain. As shown in the map below, in the last presidential

elections, the most voted party in the majority of Spain was the *Partido Popular* (People's Party; PP), a conservative party. However, there are a few provinces where this is not the case. In Catalonia, *Unidos Podemos* (United We Can; UP) and ERC were the parties with the majority of the votes. They are both part of the few political formations that include the nationalist issue on their agenda, and vow for a constitutional reform towards a more decentralised state.

Figure 1: 2016 Presidential Elections Results




Source: RTVE, 2016

In fact, the regional Government of Catalonia is constituted by *Junts Pel Si* (Together for Yes; JxSí), a coalition of four pro-independence parties aimed at declaring Catalonia's independence. The government has put forward many initiatives directed to independence, like the previously mentioned referendum.

As for the economic situation of the region, we must note that Catalonia is the main contributor to Spain's GDP, with a share of 18.9 per cent (204,666 million euros in 2015), followed by Madrid (18.8 per cent; 203,626 million euros in the same year) (INE, 2016).

Regarding the GDP per capita, Catalonia ranks fourth (INE, 2016; see Figure 2). Both Catalonia’s industrial capacity and the revenues that it generates has positioned it as one of the main international tourist destinations in the world. It has further reinforced the idea that the region could be economically independent from Spain (Generalitat, 2013). At the same time, a discourse has emerged around the idea that Catalonia’s fiscal contribution to Spain is bigger than its benefit from public services and funding. The widespread belief *Espanya ens roba* (Spain is stealing from us) has been used as one of the central arguments in favour of secession. Despite Catalonia’s important economic role, it should be noted that the region is also the Autonomous Community with the highest debt and debt per capita. Such debt represented a 35.5 per cent of its GDP in 2015 (Banco de España, 2016).

Figure 2: GDP per capita, by Spanish region, 2015 (in euros)




Source: INE, 2016

Additionally, the imminent threat of secession has led to uncertainty and fear of fiscal, juridical and political instability. This has had a negative impact on Catalan economy. As

seen in Figure 3e, many companies that used to be located in Catalonia have transferred their headquarters to other areas of Spain (*Expansión*, 2017). This has left the Autonomous Community with a net balance of - 271 companies in 2015, the lowest one in the country (*Expansión*, 2017).

Figure 3: Net balance of companies, by region (2015)



Source: *Expansión*, 2017

The Referendum

The holding of an unofficial referendum in 2014 is key to understanding the current situation of Catalonia and the Catalan question. The Catalan's will to hold a referendum, and the opposition from Madrid triggered the support to separatism (Guibernau, 2013).

At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to set the starting point of the process towards the referendum at the ending of 2013, when a number of civil society movements started pushing for the holding of a vote on self-determination. Resulting from this popular will, the *Generalitat* announced an agreement on the date of the referendum and the content of the question.⁴

In January 2014, the Catalan Parliament requested the necessary power from the Spanish Central Government, so as to hold a legal and binding referendum on Catalonia's future.

This was according to Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, the 18th time that the request was posed in history (DiploCAT, n.d.).

Nevertheless the Spanish Congress did not approve this transfer of power to Barcelona, rather, a negative response was issued with 86 per cent of the Chamber opposing the proposal (Congreso de los Diputados, 2014). This decision did not stop the former President of the *Generalitat* in approving a popular consultation on November the 9th, the 9N. Only a few days earlier, 1.8 million Catalans celebrated Catalonia's National Day with a peaceful demonstration seeking their right to vote on the streets of Barcelona (The Guardian, 2014).

Two days after, the Constitutional Court suspended the popular consultation in response to a request from the Central Government, which considered it illegal (Diplocat, n.d.). Once again, in October, Mas called for a public participation process, as an alternative to the popular consultation. This was also banned by the Central Government, five days before its celebration (Kassam, 2014). Hence, official institutions were not able to get involved in the organisation of the vote, and a number of volunteers coordinated the referendum, but was still considered illegal by the Spanish Government (Diplocat, n.d.).

The results were highly favourable to secession: 80.8 per cent supported a new independent Catalan state, 10.1 per cent opted for a third track solution, or a new constitutional arrangement, and only 4.5 per cent voted for the existent arrangements to remain unchanged (BBC, 2014). The outcome of the vote was extremely politicised, and used to emphasise Catalan's will to secede from Spain. Nevertheless, only 2,344,828 people voted in the referendum (Generalitat, 2014). There was no official voting registration in advance, and thus, no official census of the people who were eligible to vote. However, it was estimated that there were approximately 6,180,000 potential voters (Cocero & Barros, 2014). The reason behind this low participation, which did not reach half of the census, was the boycott campaign of those who did not support independence. They called for abstention as they considered the referendum an "act of political propaganda and a useless farce" (Rajoy, 2014).

Resulting from the *Generalitat's* optimistic interpretation of the results, Artur Mas called for early elections. The Catalan elections were set for the 27th of September, 2015 and conceived as a *de facto* referendum. Due to the plebiscitary character of the vote, there was a high interest in this electoral process, leading to a turnout of 74.95 per cent. The

most voted party was *JxSí*, whose main goal was to establish the Catalan Republic and to acquire complete sovereignty, should they achieve a “clear and vast majority in the *Parlament*”⁵ (*JxSí*, 2015, n.p.).

JxSí obtained 53.8 per cent of the votes (*Generalitat*, 2015) and 62 seats in the Parliament – out of 138. This led to an ambiguous interpretation of the result, as they were the most voted party, but still there was not an ample majority. Nevertheless, the Government has aimed many of its policies at the celebration of a referendum in September, 2017; and the creation of a Catalan independent state. It has presented secession as the panacea for Catalonia’s problems.

Conclusively, it is arguable that the lack of dialogue and will to solve the Catalan question has triggered a constitutional crisis in Spain, where political tensions are rapidly increasing. This situation reflects the controversies of adopting a hard-line approach towards an independence movement in a multinational state (Campanella, 2017). Trying to boycott the region, threatening with juridical or military intervention, or overlooking the issue does not contribute to a resolution of the conflict. In fact, it increases the discontent and triggers a situation of crisis like the one in Spain (Guibernau, 2013; Campanella, 2017).

Theorizing the Catalan Nation

As argued in the last section, in order to avoid critical situations, it is important to address the claims for increased levels of self-governance and independence posed by stateless nations. In Spain, as in most multinational states, these claims are rooted in the existence of a distinct nation-people. Hence, to be able to recognise this distinctiveness, it is important to determine the nature, origin, and development of nations. In this case, we must also establish whether there is a Catalan nation or if there is only a Spanish one. We must bear in mind that the lack of a homogenous Catalan nationalist movement has led to different interpretations of the history of the Catalan nation (Keating, 2001). Consequently, there are different discourses that offer different representations and images of the aforementioned issues (Guibernau, 1997).

This section will engage with three main theories of nationalism to answer these questions. Firstly, it will analyse Joseph Stalin’s (1936) idea of nations, showing how it resembles the idea of the Catalan differential trait, which has been used to legitimise the existence of a

Catalan nation-people, on the base of a number of symbols that are inherent to the nation. Nevertheless, this assumption can be challenged by the idea that the Catalan nation acts as an imagined community that emerged as a cultural artefact. Therefore, the second part of this section will mainly focus on Benedict Anderson's postmodernist cultural theory together with a brief analysis of the *Renaixença*, a movement of revival of Catalan national consciousness and culture. There is, however, another aspect that could be deemed more relevant to determine why a nation was invented in Catalonia, and not in other Spanish regions: industrialization. The third section of the chapter will discuss how this, according to Ernest Gellner, encouraged the creation of a nation.

This section will conclude that nations are not the natural outcome of a number of primordial elements, but an invented entity instead. Additionally, it will stress the roles of capitalism, industrialisation and the elites' will to install universal education in this process. Conclusively, it will emphasise the importance of acknowledging this imaginary element when addressing the practicalities of separatist claims.

Stalin: The Irony of a Catalan Right-Wing Nation

The portrayal of Catalonia as distinct from other regions of Spain has always been part of the nationalist discourse. In fact, there are continuous references to the so-called Catalan differential trait, which focuses on the particularities of the Catalan language, history and culture (Llobera, 2004). This Catalanism usually seeks the recognition of these singularities by the Central Government, and emphasises those elements that are said to constitute the Catalan national identity (Guibernau, 1997).

Despite the difficulty in defining Catalan identity and the potential problems of exclusion involved in such a task (Guibernau, 1997), Pujol defined a Catalan as someone who "lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be a Catalan" (Pujol, 1980, p.20). This conceptualisation is founded on the basis of three different variables: territoriality, economy, and will. In addition, Pujol has described Catalan identity in terms of the existence of a distinct "language, culture, social cohesion, collective consciousness, common project and country pride, opposing absorption and homogenizing policies" (Pujol, 1991, p.18 in Guibernau, 1997, p.101) of the Spanish state.

These definitions of the Catalan nation and identity echo Stalin's theoretical approach to nationalism. In *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin (1936) describes a number of elements that, if all present, make nations arise as part of the natural order. To put it in Stalin's words, a nation is a "historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Stalin, 1936, p.5). Hence, whenever a group shares all these elements, a nation-people naturally arises. This vision, categorised as a 'primordialist' approach (Brown, 2000), stresses the idea that nationalist movements express the solidarity of a group – the nation – tied in terms of linguistic, historical, racial and cultural resemblance (Brown, 2000). Independence is the ultimate logical goal of these national groups (Stalin, 1936).

However, this theory should not be taken as a paradigm to determine whether the Catalans – or any other group – constitute a nation. There are several limitations and examples that challenge this theory; Switzerland, being one of them. Due to the limited scope of this paper, it is not possible to provide an in-depth analysis of the Swiss case. Nevertheless, it is important to note how this case points out the limitations of Stalin's theory, and how nations do not emerge as a natural consequence of the aforementioned elements. As argued by David Miller "the Swiss today share a common national identity as Swiss over and above their separate linguistic, religious, and cantonal identities" (Miller, 1995, pp.94–5). Why did minority nationalisms not emerge in Switzerland? This may lead us to think that nations do not arise naturally. Instead, as Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983) argued, there are other elements involved in their emergence.

Anderson: The Imagined Catalan Community

Benedict Anderson, a post-modernist author, challenges the idea of nations as a natural and an innate result of shared primordial components. He believes that nations are constructed, "cultural artefacts" (Anderson, 1983, p.4) created during the eighteenth century, that gave place to an "imagined political community" (Anderson, 1983, p.6).

Consequently, by understanding the emergence of nationalism in Catalonia, we may find that both the Catalan nation and the Catalan national consciousness were invented through 'vernacularising' print-capitalism that led to cultural movements such as the *Renixença*. Some of these elements are still present in today's Catalan imagined community.

Nevertheless, Anderson's theoretical approach fails to explain a key issue: why was this community imagined in Catalonia and the vernaculars did not arise in other regions of Spain instead? Gellner offers a possible answer to this question.

Gellner: The Industrial Catalan Nation


Gellner considers industrialisation as the driving force of nationalism, he argues that nations arise as a consequence of the latter in industrial societies (Gellner, 1983). For Gellner, nations are "invented" (Gellner, 1964, p.168) – rather than imagined – relying on a pre-existing culture, which is transformed into a national myth. This is linked with Hobsbawm's (1938) idea of invented traditions, practices accepted by the society with a symbolic meaning that attempt to create a sentiment of continuity with an invented past (Hobsbawm, 1938). He stresses the role of education in the construction of this national consciousness.

However, Gellner's idea of a unique form of modern state where every state holds a single nation – at risk of "expelling" or "killing" non-nationals (Gellner, 1983, p.2) – has been challenged by federal and multinational states. In these, several national units conform a single national unit, and nations are able to resist homogenisation and cultural assimilation, while at the same time they constitute a strong and united political force.

A Third Track Solution

Catalonia constitutes a nation that has recently acquired a certain degree of political legitimacy, but was invented as a consequence of the convergence between an industrialising capitalist economy and the spread of mass literacy, education and other cultural movements, promoted by the elites. This has two main consequences. On the one hand, due to the imaginary force underlying these nations, it is a mistake to assume that all the population who shares a number of the primordial characteristics described previously, shared their conception of national identity; thus, the common goal of secession (Linz, 1997). In fact, a recent opinion poll showed that 46 per cent of Catalans would prefer a third track that increases the autonomy of Catalonia within the State through a constitutional reform (De Miguel, 2017; Metroscopia, 2017).

Figure 4: Voting intention in a potential referendum



Source: *Metroscopia*, 2017

Additionally, it should not be forgotten that the invented dimension of the nation has been legitimised and constitutes a strong political and social movement, as shown in the first section of this paper. Moreover, Catalan nationalism has become an important element of the identity for many. In fact, 24.9 per cent of the population of Catalonia identified themselves as only Catalans in 2016 (CEO, 2016, p.29). Therefore, it is illogical for the Central Government to keep denying the existence of a Catalan nation. However, it is also irrational for the Catalan Government to focus on secession as a panacea for the problems faced by the Catalan people.

This section thus argue that secession may not be the best way to respond to the constitutional crisis, as the source of the problem resides in the current Spanish political and administrative system, considered a “federation without federalism” (Arbós-Marín, 2013, p.357). Therefore, this chapter presents a reform of the 1978 constitution, and the establishment of a Federal Republic, as the most desirable solution. This political solution can also be considered a theoretical critique of the theories of nationalism analysed in the previous chapter, as it argues that the unity of territory and nation is not essential, and that separatism is not always the solution for the problems that arise in multinational states.

Thus, the first section of this chapter will briefly analyse the concept of federalism and its role in multinational states. The following sections will examine three main arguments

that support the main hypothesis of this dissertation: firstly, the assurance of the survival of both Spain and Catalonia; secondly, the legitimacy of the causes alleged for these demands; and lastly, the need of rupture within a political system, as still containing certain degree of legacy of Franco's dictatorship.

Federalism as Recognition in Multinational States

There is not an agreed definition of what federalism is (Kymlicka, 2001), or how a federal state should look like. In fact, there are different ways in which federalism is implemented. However, federalism can be defined as a system of political organisation based on negotiation and agreement, in which there is a division of power between a central government and two or more highly autonomous federal units with different competencies and sovereign authority on particular affairs (Kymlicka, 2001; Maíz, 2003; Linz, 1997; Dahl, 1983). Federalism is a system believed to promote solidarity and equity between the different units while maintaining social cohesion amongst the population (Maíz, 2003).

In multinational states, the existence of one or various minority nationalisms leads to the necessity of accommodating them and facilitating their coexistence. Federalism is believed to be the best solution for this by many (Patten, 2002; Linz, 1997; Moreno, 2009). It is foolish to avoid the recognition of minority nationalist movements, and the nations that they claim to belong to (Patten, 2002). Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the existence of various forms of national identity to allow individuals to participate in self-government (Patten, 2002). This recognition should not be detached from political arrangements and limited to the civil society (Patten, 2002; Bauer, 2000). The full expression of national identity "cannot be achieved in civil society, but requires political recognition" (Patten, 2002, p.572).

Multinational unitary states fail to acknowledge this variety of national identities and are unable to ensure the fulfilment of the nations' cultural needs, to maintain their differential trait (Bauer, 2000). This situation leads to a confrontation between low cultures – as the cultural needs of one nation cannot be satisfied without threatening those of other nations – and to their hostility towards the high culture (Bauer, 2000). Hence, there is a need to move beyond the unitary model in multinational states.

The idea of establishing alternative models of political and territorial administration in multinational states, to integrate different nations under an only state is not new. In fact, Otto Bauer had already rejected separatism as a solution for this recurring national problem (Bauer, 2000). He proposed a system based on the idea of national cultural autonomy, which allows the survival of low cultures and minority nationalisms by avoiding the confrontation for power – amongst each other and with the high culture – that they experience in unitary states (Bauer, 2000).

Federalism can also help to achieve this. It arises from the need to maintain the unity of a multinational state, and constitutes a “more constructive and often more democratic” (Linz, 1997, p.14) way to respond to the claims of minority nationalist movements. This is because this structure allows the recognition of the minority nationalist culture, which becomes a high culture within the limits of its unit. At the same time, it allows the population who is not identified with this minority nationalism to be still recognised and represented by the Federal Government (Linz, 1997; Patten, 2002). Thus, in multinational states, federalism allows the recognition of a national distinctiveness and grants autonomy to national groups while simultaneously recognising an inevitable tie between each other regarding economic and political interdependence (Kymlicka, 2001).

This system resembles the one established in Spain in 1978. The territorial, political and administrative division of the Spanish state does not constitute a *de jure* federal state – it is considered a decentralised state with high levels of devolution in favour of the Autonomous Communities, regulated through a Statute of Autonomy (BOE, 1978). Nevertheless, its *de facto* functioning resembles one. Consequently, many have argued that Spain constitutes a quasi-federal state (Boix & Major, 2014)

However, this *de facto* federalist-like regime has failed to address some of the main issues that trigger the constitutional crisis nowadays. These include: lack of recognition of in-state nations which are equated to other regions that constitute a merely political-administrative division of the territory without a national sentiment; the absence of fiscal autonomy and sovereignty, which leads to an incomplete process of devolution (Serrano, 2009); and the constitution of the state as a parliamentary monarchy, that many reject because of its ties with Francoism. Therefore, the establishment of a federal republic that addresses all these issues, *de jure* and *de facto*, is a logical step towards the solution of the constitutional crisis.

Survival After Independence

Many have argued that the eventual independence of a territory usually causes a domino effect on other territories (Patten, 2002; Buchanan, 1997). Therefore, being mindful of the existence of other Spanish regions that imagine themselves as nations, it is highly likely that after an eventual secession of Catalonia such territories would also start seeking their own independent state. This could imply the disintegration of Spain, and the revival of separatist movements in other European states like Great Britain, Italy or Belgium. The resurgence of these separatist movements may threaten the stability of these states, as outbreaks of violence often accompany these movements (Patten, 2002). From an economic point of view, Catalonia's secession would also constitute a big threat to the survival of Spain. As seen in the first section of this paper, Catalonia is central in the Spanish economy, and its independence could negatively impact Spain's economic performance.

Moreover, a Catalan independent state may also face some issues that could threaten its survival. Firstly, it is important to note that the Catalan separatist movement is not homogeneous (Keating, 2001), and there are different streams that present different conceptions of the Catalan nation, the motivations behind secession, and, thus, the form that a Catalan independent state must adopt (Guibernau, 1997). This suggests the necessity of a long and complex process of negotiations to build a stable state with effective and strong institutions. This would contribute to an initial period of instability and uncertainty that will not benefit the emerging state and would have an impact on its economy (Campanella, 2017).

Second, we must remember that the separatist movement in Catalonia is as the Scottish National Movement, and a pro-EU movement. All nationalist parties in Catalonia understand the benefits of remaining part of the EU and, thus, do not conceive the possibility of an independent Catalan state that is not part of it (Puigdemont, 2017; Rufián, 2016). The EU still represents a federal-like union, with the difference that it is not a horizontal union as a federal republic would be, but one with hidden hierarchies instead (Schmitter, 2009).

Therefore, if Catalonia remains part of the EU after independence, its power of influence and negotiation would be shortened due to its relatively small size and recent creation (Campanella, 2017; Borrel & Llorach, 2015). This would be reflected in, for instance,

the allocation of parliamentary seats in the EU parliament, which is “degressively proportional” (Europa, 2007: np) to the population of a state. This also constitutes a potential threat to the survival of Catalonia in a system where an external political sphere – Brussels –, will influence and determine most Catalan policies and political decisions; and where this young state will have few – if any – power for negotiation and influence.

Hence, as argued in this section, a Federal Republic that relies on an agreement through which Catalonia can exercise a greater level of autonomy constitutes a more beneficial alternative to secession. It would allow Catalonia to have a more direct impact on the political and economic decisions of the EU. At the same time, it would avoid the uncertainty and instability linked with an emerging state like Catalonia and it would not pose a threat to the integrity of Spain. Survival is a common interest that Catalonia and Spain would achieve better through a federal pact.

Legitimacy: the ‘*Neverendum*’

Although, as mentioned, identity is central to claims in favour of secession, there are other arguments that separatists have used to legitimate the creation of an independent Catalan state. These justifications emerge from a rejection of the establishment and a profound discontent with the economic, social and political situation that Spain currently faces (Borrell & Llorach, 2015).

Economic recession and austerity policies have had a big impact in the population of regions like Catalonia, and this has translated into a number of movements denouncing the situation and calling for change (Campanella, 2017). Nationalist parties have been able to incorporate these sentiments of discontent into their discourse, and they have presented secession as a panacea that promises to address them. One of the main claims of the separatist movement is the need to gain more control and autonomy over fiscal matters. This is because of a general belief amongst Catalan population that the unequal distribution of taxes is damaging Catalan economy in favour of that of other regions of Spain (Borrell & Llorach, 2015). Thus, in an independent state, separatists argued that Catalonia would count with around 16,000 million euros to invest in policies addressing social and employment issues (Borrell & Llorach, 2015; Rufián, 2016). However, this belief has been proven to be mistaken (Borrell & Llorach, 2015). This shows how the growing discontent has been channelled through the Catalan separatist movement, and secession has been

portrayed as the solution for a confrontation that is not only rooted in identity, but also reflects an environment of discontent (Lluch, 2015). The so-called instrumental separatist parties have used this as a political tool to increase their electoral capability (Lluch, 2015).

This explains why the Catalan nationalist movement has mainly relied on civil society movements – demonstrations, protests and human chains –, but have never made any significant political effort, aimed at achieving an independent state (Lluch, 2015). There is a recurrent call for a referendum to decide on the future of Catalonia that never takes place. The so-called *neverendum*⁶, falls into this trend aimed at engaging the electorate with the nationalist cause.

We can deduce that part of the population does not conceive independence as a matter of identity, but as a way to improve their economic, political and social situation and to reject the establishment (Borrell & Llorach, 2015). It is thus important to question whether this constitutes a legitimate reason for secession, or if an agreement with the Central Government that regulates, not only identity issues, but also fiscal autonomy would solve this problem. The reform should aim to break with the establishment, through a reform of the bicameral system and the Senate's role as a chamber for territorial representation. The perception of these arguments as lacking legitimacy is a matter of special relevance at an international level. Other states must recognise the Catalan state as such, and this involves a political process that needs to portray the national cause as legitimate for the creation of a new state.

Rupture: Franco

The aforementioned discontent does not only revolve around economic and fiscal issues, but also around the political system and establishment. The 1978 constitution installed a parliamentary monarchy, replacing Francisco Franco's dictatorship (BOE, 1978). It was successful at addressing the tensions and main political dilemmas that democracy faced and it signified an important development during the period of the transition (López-Aguilar, 2016). Nevertheless, this constitution has experienced minimal changes -only two reforms in a period of 39 years (Congreso, n.d.) - and it fails to acknowledge and address the changes of the political and social reality of Spain (Rufián, 2016).

Consequently, many do not identify themselves and, indeed, reject the regime emerging from this constitution, which is seen as a legacy of Franco's regime and Spain's dictatorial past (Rufián, 2016). This is mainly because of the role that Francoist leaders played during the drafting of the constitution, and the appointment of Juan Carlos I, his successor as Head of State. Juan Carlos I abdicated in June 2014, in favour of his son Felipe VI, who is currently the King of Spain. Hence, many seek the rupture with this system (The Guardian, 2014; Ramos-Fernández, 2013). This is the case of ERC, which vows for the establishment of a Republic and considers the independence of Catalonia, the only way to do so (Junqueras in El Objetivo, 2016).

The establishment of a Federal Republic through a constitutional reform would therefore address this discontent that affects, not only the population of Catalonia, but also large sectors of the rest of Spain (López-Aguilar, 2016). The widespread desire to “break the constitutional padlock of the 78” (Iglesias, 2014) was proved by the demonstrations that took place all over the country after the abdication of the former King of Spain, Juan Carlos I (The Guardian, 2014).

After the previous discussion, we have come to understand that there is a need to acknowledge the existence of a Catalan nation. However, not all the members of that imagined community pursue the common goal of secession. Hence, accommodating the Catalan nation within the Spanish state by reforming the constitution is considered to be the best option.

In a multinational state like Spain, separatism should be rejected in favour of a Federal Republic, because of these three main reasons: firstly, the survival of both Catalonia and Spain; secondly, the lack of international legitimacy of some of the causes alleged for independence; and thirdly the need of rupture with the institutions – monarchy – that are seen as a continuation of Franco's regime.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed the possibility of presenting federalism as an alternative to separatist claims of emerging nationalist movements in Europe through the case of Catalonia and Spain. When answering this question, others regarding the nature, origins, and development of nations, and the different approaches adopted towards separatist movements, have emerged.

In the context of the current constitutional crisis in Spain, it is important to question the nature of nations, their origin and development. Nations do not naturally emerge but are rather a construction based on a number of pre-existing primordial elements. These elements are elevated to the category of national myth by complex processes where mass literacy, education, and printing capitalism play a key role. This does not mean that nations do not exist nor their claims illegitimate. Instead, it is important to look for an alternative to both secession and a hard-line approach, to assure the inclusion of all citizens and their representation.

This paper argued that federalism can be an alternative to secession: it integrates claims for increased autonomy and recognition meanwhile preserving the territorial integrity of the state and the representation of those who do not share separatist goals.

In the Spanish context, this paper offered three additional arguments in favour of a Federal Republic. The first one is about survival. The independence of Catalonia could open the Pandora box of secession for other regions in Spain and the EU (Campanella, 2017). On the other hand, the period of uncertainty and instability that would follow a declaration of independence – especially if it is unilateral – would have a negative impact on Catalonia.

The second one is about addressing the general discontent of the population with the political, economic and social situation. This has been incorporated in the separatist discourse by presenting secession as a panacea for these problems. At the same time, a newly created state may not be able to provide a solution for these problems.

Finally, Spanish society feels a need to break with the establishment, as the current political system is perceived as a continuation of a dictatorial past (Iglesias, 2014; Rufián, 2016). The monarchy is seen as an institution that still reflects Franco's regime, and thus many people reject it and see Catalonia's independence as a means to break with it and install a Republic (Junqueras, 2016).

Hence, this paper may serve as the starting point to reopen a debate around the advantages of federalism in European multinational states, by looking at other states like Great Britain or Belgium. This debate at a State-level can be raised to an international level, and contribute to consider the process of federalisation of the European Union as an alternative to current trends that reject European integration and threaten its survival (Freund, 2015).

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6

POWER POLITICS, THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT, AND POPULIST BACKLASH TO THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME: THE RATIFICATION OF THE CETA

Mackenzie Macleod

Introduction

Despite the significant controversy, Canada and the European Union (EU) have signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The CETA is the largest bilateral free trade agreement that Canada has negotiated since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The label 'trade agreement' is misleading, however, CETA covers a wide range of areas beyond the jurisdiction of trade. Europe has been considered an important potential counterbalance to US influence in Canada since the 1970s, but this relationship has not been significantly developed. While Canada is attracted to the EU's market, the EU had considered the CETA as a test run for a similar preferential trade agreement (PTA) with the United States.

While negotiations for CETA were completed in 2013-2014, protests and surprise election results in Europe, and the US provided significant obstacles for ratification in 2016. The US has elected a nominally 'protectionist' government, as have several EU member states. This possible turn towards isolationism, and it seems to have come to an end, following the UK's exit from the EU (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). While xenophobia may have fuelled the isolationist stance of many referendum voters, there was also a widely held scepticism of the benefits of EU membership. This doubt is in some ways fair; the EU has been fraught with challenges since the 2008 financial crisis, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, and has proven relatively unresponsive to criticism. Despite these warning signs, Euro-scepticism has not yet made its way to Canada.

Why would Canada concede to deeper economic integration with a trade partner that is structurally unstable? Why would the European Council ratify a treaty, despite charges of unaccountability and lack of stakeholders' engagement? This paper will argue that Canada's pursuit of an agreement with the EU was a product of a rational attempt to diversify trade, away from the US. However, the pursuance of the CETA agreement following widespread democratic opposition reveals a bias towards competitive liberalisation and lack of engagement with citizens. Since the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods system, the world has undergone an accelerating rate of 'hyper-globalization.' However, further efforts to liberalise are being met with increasing opposition from civil society. Here, we will attempt to understand the reasons behind the state's pursuance of liberalisation policies, despite public opposition; as well as the reasons behind public opposition to further liberalisation. Opposition to competitive liberalisation is manifesting as democratic opposition, the mobilisation of union groups, protectionist economics, or more disturbingly in ethnocentric and nationalistic xenophobia. With all of these manifestations are examples of society's attempt to protect itself from what Polanyi (2001) calls the 'dis-embedding' of the market.


It must be noted that globalization is a phenomenon with many cultural, economic, and political implications. Theorists differ on globalization's causal factors, as well as the relative importance of related aspects. Furthermore, some theorists dispute whether there is a quantifiable new phenomenon that could be identified as globalization, or whether this is a continuation of existing processes. This paper will draw on theories of globalization, paying particularly close attention to Drezner (2007), Helleiner (1995), Polanyi (2001), Ruggie (1982), and Rodrik (2011). The most noteworthy theoretical assumptions of this paper are that globalization is a state-led phenomenon, that globalization has a capitalist underpinning, that financial liberalisation is of importance, and that the pace of globalization is accelerating unevenly, creating a societal backlash against market liberalisation.

Theoretical Tensions Underlying Global Economic Policy

It seems logical to start with exploring the tension in the global economy. Rodrik (2011) traces various forms of international capitalism, from the mid-nineteenth to early 20th-century gold standard, and to the 'shallow' economic integration of the Bretton Woods trade regime. The eventual abandonment of Bretton Woods led to a more ambitious form of

globalization in the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on ‘economic liberalisation and deep integration,’ which Rodrik (2011) refers to as ‘hyper-globalization’. Hyper-globalization impinges on domestic policies, through the removal of capital controls, which current trade agreements take advantage of, by putting ‘severe [competitive] pressure’ on markets to open to ‘foreign trade and investment’, making ‘economic globalization an end in itself’ (Rodrik, 2011: xvii). This is an inversion of the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the 1930s—competitive liberalisation, in the place of competitive protectionism. According to Rodrik (2011), there is an unresolvable tension between hyper-globalization, democracy, and the autonomy of nation-states. This tension creates a ‘political trilemma of the world economy’ (Rodrik, 2011), modelled after Mundell’s (1963) famous ‘impossible trinity’, where only two of the three policies may successfully coexist.

Figure 1: The political trilemma of the world economy



(Source: Rodrik, D. 2011)

The political trilemma of the world economy leaves three policy options according to Rodrik (2011). Either ‘restrict democracy’, thereby leaving states to only provide the ‘smooth functioning of international markets’, or ‘limit globalization,’ as under the Bretton Woods to compromise, or ‘globalise democracy’, creating a supranational form of democratic global governance (Rodrik, 2011, pp.200-205). Rodrik (2011), asserts that we currently have a world economy that restricts democracy “the Golden Straightjacket,” and

that the alternative of “Global Governance” is untenable, as nation-states continue to assert their autonomy—even regional governance has proven challenging in the EU. The economist advocates a return to the Bretton Woods compromise, preserving democracy and sovereignty, by moderating globalization. This could be achieved through social movements or policy changes, including rolling back existing trade agreements, capital controls, tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers, or restrictions on immigration. Note, these policies are not necessarily progressive, they are merely defensive against the excesses of the market.

Of what particular importance is the notion that the social dislocation was caused by globalization, thereby creating a backlash from civil society. Polanyi (2001), calls this backlash the ‘double movement,’ whereby markets that have been ‘dis-embedded’ from the state to cause social dislocation, which society attempts to redress by ‘re-embedding’ the market in protective social institutions. Embeddedness refers to the extent to which a market is a product of, and in service to, society. Markets are social institutions which serve as a means to an end for society, not an institution can govern a society. Market liberalism holds that markets are self-regulatory, and should be free of intervention, but for Polanyi (2001), this is an impossibility. Any attempt to dis-embed markets from other social structures is a ‘utopian endeavour’ that will be met with resistance from social groups, as dis-embedding markets destroy ‘the human and natural substance of society’ (Polanyi, 2001, pp.3-31).

Central to Polanyi’s (2001) contention is the notion of ‘fictitious commodities.’ Land, labour, and money/capital are ‘vital parts of the economic system,’ but these vital constituents are patent, ‘not commodities’ because they have not been produced for market sale. For a self-regulating market to exist, these ‘fictitious commodities’ must be treated as genuine commodities; things which are created to be bought and sold. Not only is self-regulation impossible, labour, land, and capital exist independently of markets, and are only commodified through state intervention. Polanyi (2001, p.147) turns the liberal creed on its head by asserting that the restriction of *laissez-faire* activity in fictitious commodity markets was ‘spontaneous’, compared to the creation of *laissez-faire* itself. Much of this builds upon Marx’s work on the commodification of land, labour, and capital via enclosure, expropriation, and exploitation. However, Polanyi (2001) argues that commodification has never, and can never, be realised:

“Social history in the nineteenth century was the result of a double movement: the extension of the market organisation in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction regarding false ones” (Polanyi, p.79).

In essence, *laissez-faire* is ‘enforced by the state’ against more traditional societal structures (Polanyi, 2001, p.145). Additionally, Polanyi (2001) notes that with the enforcement of *laissez-faire*, and resulting alienation and exploitation, there is a corresponding counter-movement to re-embed the market within society. The same state that enforces *laissez-faire* is petitioned by ‘those dislocated by the market [who] will use of the state to protect themselves. The consequence is large-scale institutional change’ (Blyth, 2002, p.4). The notion is that the state should leave the free market unfettered, for the sake of efficiency and liberty. It is consequently a utopian liberal fiction. Without state enforcement, land, labour, and capital markets would cease to exist.

However, while Blyth (2002) concedes there is merit in the double movement, he is critical of the interest-based argument. The double movement is an ‘interest-based explanation of institutional change,’ which sees ‘change as a problem of comparative statics’ (Blyth, 2002: 7). The comparison of these two statics does not necessarily suggest a causal relationship, and this comparison is therefore indeterminate. Institutional ‘destabilization can be exogenously driven,’ but institutional transformation and reconstitution must be explained endogenously (Blyth, 2002, p.8). This paper maintains an interest-based, rather than an idea-based analysis, and will use Rodrik’s (2011) political trilemma to explain endogenous change. Where Polanyi (2001) takes the state and democracy to be coterminous. Rodrik (2011) argues one can exist at the expense of the other. If only two of three are compatible between hyper-globalization, democratic politics, and national sovereignty, then the third will be the source of the double movement. Polanyi (2001) would not quite allow for this in his analysis, but he admits that even business interests lead counter-movements against the market mechanism. For instance, in times of financial uncertainty, petitioning the state to protect the domestic market from international inflationary and deflationary pressures (Polanyi, 2001, p.138). Following this logic, we can argue that some interests will benefit, in the short term, from dis-embedding the market, and we can therefore recognise globalization as a contested ‘political struggle between disembedding and re-embedding the market’ (Blyth, 2002, p.4).

Characterising the Global Trade Regime

Before focusing on CETA specifically, it is essential to lay out some basic terminology for the sake of context and clarity. Categorising the global trade regime requires a typology of its agreements: at its most basic level, this is often broken down by some actors into bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements. Modern multilateral agreements begin with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), guaranteeing Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment. The GATT was later superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which continued to remove tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, like quotas and subsidies, technical barriers to trade. This quickly expanded into regulating commerce in services, protection of intellectual property, and trade-related investment (Cohn, 2012).

Bilateral or regional agreements in trade (FTAs), or international investment agreements (IIAs), including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), to attract foreign direct investment, and double taxation treaties (DTTs), have increased since multilateral negotiations have broken down. There were nearly 5,500 active IIAs at the end of 2005, but there were still 3304 active IIAs at the end of 2015 (UNCTAD, 2006, p.26; 2016, p.101). Further complicating matters, most FTAs, such as the NAFTA and the CETA, include provisions which protect investor's rights as IIAs do, these have also been referred to as 'treaties with investment provisions' (TIPs). For the sake of simplicity, agreements which are not multilateral are referred to here as preferential trade agreements (PTAs).

Bhagwati (1991), famously dubbed the interlinking and tangled web of agreements between countries - the 'spaghetti bowl effect,' which creates unintended complications around rules of origin. When applied to investment, this 'unintended incoherence' could create problems for states. Investment liberalisation can be 'top-down,' as under the NAFTA, or the CETA 'bottom-up,' as under the GATS—the degree of liberalisation for an economic activity 'may be unclear' if it is covered by multiple 'agreements in the same host country' (UNCTAD, 2006, p.29). This complexity creates real costs for contracting states. For instance, the MFN clause of one IIA may also create 'unintentional coherence' with another treaty, granting investors 'procedural and substantive rights,' beyond the signatories' intention, including the right to investor-state arbitration (UNCTAD, 2006, p.29).

Competitive Liberalisation and The Role of the State in Globalization

Bearing in mind Rodrik's (2011) trilemma of the world economy, we should analyse more closely the role of the nation-state in globalization. Drezner (2007) posits a variation of globalization that emphasises the role of 'great powers.' Great powers set regulatory frameworks that determine the pattern of integration between other states. Drezner (2007) defines great powers by their market size, which is their key means of exporting regulatory pressure. Only the United States and the European Union currently have the means of exerting this pressure, as measured by their unparalleled capital markets. From this analysis, one can see that the national interests of these great powers determine the extent to which the world 'globalises.' Nevertheless, the EU and the US have grown frustrated with emerging markets muddying their influence in the multilateral sphere, exemplified in the failure of the Doha negotiations. This, in some ways, explains the proliferation of PTAs as a way for great powers to put pressure on holdouts in multilateral trade negotiations, lowering the bar for future agreements.

The strategy employed aggressively by the US, is called 'competitive liberalisation,' where the PTA liberalises as much as possible (Sinclair & Traynor, 2004, p.3). The preferential access between the parties increases economic integration between them, and distorts trade away from holdouts. However, NAFTA also gave the United States leverage in the Uruguay round negotiations, which established the WTO. If multilateral negotiations do not take account of US preferences, the US shows it is willing to opt for a bilateral or regional alternative—and 'NAFTA being served to reinforce the credibility' of this threat (Deese, 2008: 119).

With emerging market economies, frequently availing themselves of the 'international governance structures' established by the Global North, trade leverage is becoming more diffuse as Doha round has illustrated (McGuire & Lindeque, 2010, p.1332). Mignolo (2000) and Amin (2006) see 'polycentrism' as an alternative to globalization. Amin construes a decentred world order through regionalisation like the EU, NAFTA, or Mercosur. However, the EU and the US have used the new regionalism to 'consolidate their positions' as the dominant global market actors (Pomorska & Vanhoonacker, 2015, p.220). By withholding or ceding market access 'through a complex web of preferential trade agreements,' the EU has been able to wield considerable 'leverage in respect of other trade partners' (McGuire & Lindeque, 2010, p.1329-1330). The US and the EU can disregard short-term

economic gains or losses for long-term political positioning. Regionalism is, therefore, not an alternative to hyper-globalization, but rather a form of competitive liberalisation.

The Doha round failure provided time for a reassessment of global trade strategy, and competitive liberalisation was not the only strategy on the table. Former EU Trade Commissioner, Lamy (2004), championed multilateralism and ‘managed globalization.’ Lamy argued for social responsibility and a moderated form of globalization, echoing the logic of the political trilemma, that ‘national democracy and deep globalization are [fundamentally] incompatible,’ (Rodrik, 2011, p.188). However, despite support within the EU and national governments (Meunier & Jacoby, 2010), Lamy’s successor ‘abandoned the policy of managed globalization’ in favour of competitive liberalisation and deep integration, to ‘remain competitive’ with the US (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2011, p.289). Here we see an expression of the political struggle between disembedding and re-embedding the market that is influenced by international politics. Globalization is not a neutral economic force; it is shaped by the action and inaction of major state actors. Nevertheless, competitive liberalisation is cyclical, if one actor is successfully employing the strategy, it behoves other states to compete. Liberalisation happens on the terms of great powers, by exerting leverage through ceding or withholding market access to smaller states. If one great power refuses to liberalise, then the other will cease the opportunity to control the regulatory environment.

We need to consider where further liberalisation is desirable, and ‘for whose benefit’ it is (Rodrik, 2011, p.288). Failure to engage with citizens on these issues is a symptom of the political trilemma, as maintenance of the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ continues to dominate policy objectives. The US and EU member states are now actively grappling with these issues, as the democratic deficit has manifested in resurgent populism. While alarmed by radicalised politics, the European Council and the Canadian government have redoubled their efforts to liberalise, by ratifying the CETA while neglecting democratic engagement competitively. To understand why, it will be useful to understand the motivations for ratification concerning broader foreign policy objectives.

The CETA and the Global Trade Regime

The idea of diversifying Canadian trade with Europe evolved alongside the European Common Market itself. Canadian policy makers paid surprisingly little attention to ‘European’

trade until they realised the United Kingdom was poised to join the European Community (EC). Almost simultaneously, came the realisation that the US could not be relied upon for the ‘post-war benevolence’ that Canada was accustomed to, as the Nixon administration was not exempting Canada from the ‘economic and financial protectionism’ it employed in 1971, to counteract the end of dollar-gold convertibility (Mahant, 1981, p.273). The prospect of marginalisation within a North American regional trade bloc compelled Canadian policymakers to pursue a Canadian-EC agreement aggressively. Five years later, the EC and Canada signed the ‘Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation’ (Mahant, 1981, p.263). Perhaps paralleling recent events in the US, the EC was ‘alarmed by some of the economic decisions’ taken by the US, and welcomed Canada ‘as a reliable partner in international economic institutions’ (Dolata-Kreutzkamp, 2010, p.34).

The Framework Agreement was part of a broader strategy pursued by the Trudeau government, the so-called ‘Third Option policy,’¹ which included Europe as a counterweight to US influence on Canada. The Framework Agreement, and more broadly the Third Option policy, failed to generate additional trade between the EC and Canada. One of the key reasons for this failure is that Canada has its relationship with the EU, as a principally economic one, while the EU has viewed it as principally political (Long, 1998; Pentland, 1992). Throughout the 1980s, there was a turn toward greater regional integration in both Europe and North America, and this further dampened economic cooperation between Canada and Europe. Ironically, according to Ethier (1998), though Canadian policymakers had hoped to avoid marginalisation within a North American trade bloc, this is precisely what took place under NAFTA.

Though Canada hopes Europe will act ‘as a counterweight’ to US influence (Dolata-Kreutzkamp, 2010, p.41), from European standpoint, the CETA is best understood as a template agreement for the more ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US (Deblock & Rioux, 2011). The political significance of CETA is easier to understand, when we contextualise it as a TTIP template. According to Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, the TTIP:

“is a clear illustration of how trade agreements can also serve political purposes. . . [TTIP] is considered an instrument that can further strengthen the position of the west. The vast

1 The Third Option was a 1972 pronouncement by the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs Mitchel Sharp, calling for a lessening of US economic and cultural influence on Canada.

new market [it would create] would serve as a pole of attraction for third countries, provide leverage in international trade negotiations and give a boost to the western economic model” (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2015, p.221).

The combined leverage of an integrated EU-US market would have enormous influence in future multilateral agreements, and would undercut emerging powers. Menon (2014), refers to the TTIP and the recently abandoned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) as ‘mega-regionals,’ unprecedented attempts to merge regional blocs. This would be, perhaps, a means of regaining the ‘co-leadership,’ with which the US and the EC successfully negotiated through the WTO (Deese, 2008, p.118). Perhaps if the great powers agreed on major regulatory trade issues through TTIP, this would disrupt the cycle of competitive liberalisation, and restore a measure of democratic accountability.

However, there are challenges to this scenario. The growth of ‘mega-regionals’ will do nothing to prevent large and growing ‘current account imbalances’ between the US and Japan, Germany, and China (Blecker, 2013, p.190). Canada runs a persistent ‘bilateral trade surplus’ with the US, but this surplus ‘with the United States [is] offset by deficits with the rest of the world’ (Blecker, 2013, p.191). Consequently, any major shift in US policy that affects Canada’s bilateral trade surplus with the US will throw the Canadian economy into deficit. Though ‘global [trade] imbalances’ are primarily a phenomenon of the US and East Asia, within the EU, there are ‘secondary imbalances of smaller magnitude,’ between Germany and peripheral countries (Blecker, 2013, p.191). Globalization is a ‘public good,’ and not an irreversible process; instead, it ‘depends on the community of nation-states continuing to value it and pursuing policies consistent with it’ (Oppenheimer, 2001, pp.43-45). Fragmentation of the global trade regime, the growth of global trade imbalances continues, and populist backlash from marginalised citizens represent a severe challenge to globalization.

Regulation and Trade—Resolving the Imbalance

Proponents of the CETA view it as a step back towards the Bretton Woods, compromised by enshrining environmental and workers’ rights in international trade. Opponents see it as a continuation of hyper-globalization, serving elites and corporate interests. The controversy over the CETA is whether it represents a continuation of a ‘corporate version of globalization, based on [FTAs] and capital account liberalisation that . . . limits macroeconomic

policy options,' or a version of 'managed globalization,' which 'embeds global labour and environmental standards' (Palley, 2012, pp.142-147). Critics of the CETA argued that it privileges investor and corporate rights. Proponents of the CETA argue that its prudential carve-out allows governments to regulate against market excesses. As noted, however, ratification of the CETA is also an expression of Canada's geopolitical political concerns, and the European Council's contested legitimacy as a democratic institution.

Since the passage of the WTO and NAFTA, the notion of ensuring the right to regulate within a PTA appears intrinsically inappropriate. Considering that the broad aims of these agreements are entirely at odds with domestic regulatory legislation, prudential organisational space has been of secondary concern compared to further trade liberalisation. For instance, prudential regulation is enshrined in the GATT (and carried forward in the WTO). GATT Article 20 allows for prudential regulation for environmental management, or for 'the protection of public morals,' provided that these measures are the 'least restrictive means' to trade (WTO, 2018). The threshold for 'least restrictive means' is extraordinarily high, given that the purpose of the GATT is to facilitate, not restrict, trade (Gaines, 2001; Sykes, 2003). There is no evidence that the CETA reconciles these conflicting goals, or establishes an international regulatory environment that would not further be competitive to liberalisation.

Crucially, the CETA follows the template of most modern PTAs, such as NAFTA, by including Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision that allows foreign investors to sue governments in arbitration. According to Van Harten (2016), this aspect of the CETA gives preferential treatment to foreign investors, and has proven to be one of the most controversial elements of the agreement, sparking protest in Europe. States are not allowed to sue investors, and domestic investors do not have access to ISDS arbitration. Conversely, James (2001) has argued that part of the failure of multilateral negotiations was the inclusion of environmental and labour standards, which overburdened trade talks. From this perspective, environmental and labour standards are trade externalities that have no place in negotiations. Even proponents of liberalisation are sceptical of regulation in PTAs. Indeed, if the NAFTA experience is any indication, the inclusion of these provisions in the CETA may not lead to credible labour or environmental protections.

The Clayton/Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada case in 2016 is a particularly compelling example of the inherent tension, identified by Rodrik's (2011) political

trilemma. In Clayton/Bilcon, an investor wanting to build a quarry and marine terminal in Nova Scotia sued the Government of Canada under NAFTA's ISDS provision. The investor claimed that the federal and provincial government's 'environmental regulatory regime was applied to the project, in an arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory manner.' The government's environmental assessment was subsequently forwarded to a Joint Review Panel (JRP), which determined that the project would undermine 'community core values,' and on this basis, the project was rejected. The community core values argument against this unpopular project was a clear expression of the double movement, reasserting societal control over market forces. However, the Tribunal found that the Government's actions were discriminatory and had breached its National Treatment and Minimum Standard of Treatment obligations to the investor. The Tribunal found that since 'community core values,' (Clayton/Bilcon, 2016) are not defined in Canadian law, the JRP violated the investors' right to due process.

In *Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada*, the governments of all three NAFTA signatories criticised the Tribunal's award in Clayton/Bilcon. This is an example of unintentional coherence, as investors had been granted rights beyond the signatories' intentions. The signatories were concerned at the precedent is set for setting environmental regulations, under agreements with ISDS provisions. These concerns seem to be centred on improper recognition of sovereign intention, rather than in concern marginalisation of democratic politics. Nevertheless, the decision is a poignant expression of a moderate form of globalization, along with the lines of the Bretton Woods compromise, being rejected. Administrative rights need to stand on their own, not as amendments to trade facilitating agreements. Also, trade agreements between asymmetrical powers, like the EU and Canada, will not substantively change the international regulatory climate. In the absence of an agreement between the great powers, and a genuine commitment to a shared regulatory framework, agreements like the CETA appear to simply contribute to competitive liberalisation.

The End of the Globalization—Again?

If sensible alternatives to excessive liberalisation are proposed through democratic engagement, consultation are rejected; then the tension between hyper-globalization and democratic politics is heightened. We have been witnessing the backlash to globalization since

Seattle, 1999. However, this has become more prominent, since the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the turn towards protectionist policies in the EU and the US. These events have made the chances of achieving a shared regulatory framework through the TTIP increasingly remote. I have identified barriers to the ratification of the CETA, and why the parties considered passage of the agreement necessary, despite these obstacles. Now, I would like to put forward two interpretations of the opposition to the CETA, the growing prevalence of 'protest votes,' and more broadly, the return of radical politics. This will hopefully give context to the events that are to come; whether we are experiencing new phenomena or whether there is historical precedent for upcoming events.

Why did some Europeans and some Canadians oppose the ratification of the CETA? In the first interpretation, protest is a sign of the limitations of democracy in a modern, complex world. However, this is the 'elites' view, and its dismissive sentiments arguably engender more outrage than the content of the PTAs themselves. The anti-democratic environment is the only one in which national sovereignty and hyper-globalization can coexist. So, it is understandable why some policymakers would focus on the limitations of democracy, amid growing tension. The second interpretation is that there is a growing, and quite predictable reaction to control the growing excesses of hyper-globalization. Goodwin and Heath (2016) classify Brexit voters as those 'left behind' by globalization, including 'blue-collar workers,' who felt that political elites did not 'represent their interests' or understand their 'intense angst about rapid social, economic and cultural change.' This parallels rather closely with the narrative surrounding the 2016 US presidential election, where voters in traditionally 'blue-collar' areas voted against traditional political elites and PTAs. This move against hyper-globalization has been complemented by an unhealthy dose of xenophobia in both instances. The fact that the response to the negative consequences of competitive liberalisation is often unfocused and reactive, it means that elites can describe voters as ignorant, irrational, racist, or extremist.

Political and economic elites have fundamentally different experiences of globalization. Cox (1996) argues that global elites shape the global order, and increasing structural inequality that is creating a global North in the global South, and a global South in the global North (see, more recently, Milanovic, 2016). We should, therefore, be sceptical of 'the 'globalization as it changes everything'- literature of the 1990s and early 2000s (Blyth, 2002, p.263). The 1990s and 2000s saw an intensification of interdependence.

Technological progress has notably quickened, ‘transport, information and communications technology have produced the shrinking world phenomenon,’ (Oppenheimer, 2001, p.34-35), and multinational corporations have had a dominant role in creating and benefiting from this progress. This notion of a world shrinking through temporal and spatial compression is a central aspect of contemporary globalization. However, Baumen (1998) notes that this compression of time and space has primarily affected a global elite, while most populations remain territorial or local. James (2001), argues that identification with national identity or territory is not a programmatic response to globalism. This may be true, but these identities do not need to be a programmatic response to be effective catalysts for social and political movements. In a hyper-globalised world, elites become increasingly de-territorialised, while the majority remain territorialised, with substantially less physical or financial mobility. From this view, globalization never took hold for large populations and changed very little about traditional territorial or ethnic-based identity.

Crucially, this is not without precedent. Bordo et al., (2000) argued that rapid trade expansion before the First World War led to an early ‘globalization backlash,’ which manifested as public pressure to ‘raise trade barriers, halt immigration, and stifle capital flows’ (Bordo, 2000, p.27). James (2001), also identifies trade, capital flows, and migration as the key components of both eras of globalization—though with an increased degree of mobility and depth of integration. Bordo et al., (2000) claimed that the current wave of globalization, while creating social dislocation, has not created such a pronounced backlash, because of continued economic growth, low unemployment, and the provision of social insurance. These factors are holdovers from the Bretton Woods compromise. However, what is increasingly clear is that the causes which Bordo et al., (2000) have identified as preventing a backlash against globalization have been systematically dismantled since the late 1970s, with the rise of neoclassical economics and neoliberal political ideology. Additionally, growth has been stagnant in advanced industrialised countries. Unemployment has been high particularly among youth, and changing demographics, as well as fiscal austerity have put additional strain on social programs (Palley, 2012). Ruggie (1981), identified the post-war period of ‘embedded liberalism,’ a compromise between business and labour which was meant to ensure rising living standards, wages, high employment, and social protections from the market. Thus, the ameliorating influences that Bordo et al., (2000) identify to distinguish modern globalization from early 20th-century globalization have mainly been dismantled by competitive liberalisation, since the 1970s.

Therefore, all the familiar signs of instability and uncertainty, such as public pressure to raise trade barriers and control immigration have become much more than historical anomalies. Polanyi (2001), identified the inevitability of this cycle, noting that ‘running society as an adjunct to the market’ will inevitably create this backlash, as vulnerable groups attempt to protect themselves from social dislocation. This is the double movement in action. In street protests, this may manifest as peaceful marching, civil disobedience, rising protectionist sentiments, or through increasingly violent Antifa, and far-right clashes. In policy responses, the double movement may manifest through a reimplementation or expansion of past welfare provisions, or through punitive and retaliatory tariffs, capital controls, or tighter immigration laws. The reassertion of societal control over market forces has led to outcomes as divergent as popular fascist movements, and post-war embedded liberalism.

Our growing sense of uncertainty and unease has more than market dis-embedding as a cause, including the proliferation of information technology, and disinformation campaigns which are beyond the scope of this analysis. Canada is caught in the same unenviable position as many of the world’s smaller powers: attempting to navigate between two of the world’s most prominent markets, as they turn towards protectionism. Until recently, the US and the EU were the leading globalising powers. Recently, however, their citizens have begun to react against the compounding social dislocation caused by hyper-globalization. Canadian foreign policy is confused by this turn towards protectionism. While China has made overtures to continue the globalising project. This claim is at odds with simultaneous heavy-handed state intervention in the economy. This leaves substantial uncertainty for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and many other small advanced economies. Additionally, both elites and radicals have begun to recognise the limitations of the democratic process. These restrictions, if the above analysis is accurate, are not inherent but self-imposed through excessive liberalisation. It is *naïve* to assume that discontent will disappear just because it cannot be expressed democratically. The increasingly radical expression of political discontent is likely to continue until democratic institutions are reinvigorated. This is only possible by curbing *laissez-faire* globalization, if Rodrik’s (2011) trilemma is accurate. Our rather bleak alternative is to allow democratic legitimacy to erode further, thus emboldening radical politics we have not experienced in generations.

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POWER POLITICS, THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT, AND POPULIST BACKLASH TO
THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME: THE RATIFICATION OF THE CETA

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7

RECLAIMING THE GLOBAL: A WORLD ASSEMBLY

Megan Jessie Asplin

Introduction

Many newspaper articles have hailed Brexit as a rejection of globalization (Elliott, 2016). However, the consequences of globalization cannot be reversed. These consequences included interconnected economies, international crimes, such as human trafficking and tax avoidance, war and most importantly, climate change. All these issues cannot be solved by one nation alone, as they have neither the resources, nor the authority. This is where the calls for a World Assembly arise.

This paper explores the start of a proposal of a World Assembly. It outlines the structure and details of this type of Assembly, as well as examining matters of contentions that could arise. This comprises of State sovereignty, imbalance of power in the global order, and creating legitimacy and authority for this new Assembly. For simplicity, this paper will focus on climate change, as an example to emphasise on why an effective global governance is needed. It is important to note that this paper covers the basic framework of the proposal, and only begins to cover some of the numerous issues that could and would arise. Building a World Assembly will take a huge amount of people with different expertise, from all over the globe in order create a successful, effective and democratic institution.

The academic jargon for the idea of a World Assembly is a cosmopolitan democracy. It is a political theory which applies the norms and value of a democracy on a transnational and global sphere (Eckersley, 2007). It could include principles such as consent, sustainability, and collaborative action.

An institution that currently exists, which gets closest to the idea of a World Assembly, is the United Nations (UN). However, it is not an example of a cosmopolitan democracy, as it is not an elected body. Therefore, it does not source its power from the people. This

undermines the legitimacy and authority of the United Nations. It is also undemocratic, due to inequality of power between countries within the UN. This is most prominent within the Security Council, with its Permanent Five: the UK, USA, Russia, France and China. These undemocratic components are one of the reasons the UN is ineffective at fixing the consequences of globalization.

The United Nations: the Undemocratic World Assembly

Due to its undemocratic nature, the UN lacks accountability to the people. The UN does not have the authority and the legitimacy to dictate policies, nor implement sanctions, as the majority of governments do source power from their people; therefore, the various governments could refuse or accept the UN policy on behalf of their people.

Elections give the people the chance to hold the government/institution to account. The United Nations does not hold elections, so, it is not held to account. 'The UN doesn't have an effective system of checks and balances' in place, therefore, it could not be held accountable within the institution (Fasulo, 2015). This lack of accountability is not acceptable in a world where majority of countries categorised themselves as democrats. What this means is that if the UN did have more power and authority, it would have become tyrannical.

One, out of the seventeen goals of the United Nations attempts to tackle climate change. Over the years, the UN has held many conferences and treaties, surrounding global warming. The first and the most noticeable one is the Kyoto Protocol. The signatories agreed to cut human-made CO₂ emissions to 5 per cent, below 1990 between 2008 and 2012. This was a positive step towards change, however, the top two polluters, USA and China, did not sign the treaty. In 2012, Canada renounced the Kyoto Protocol as their Environment Minister, Peter Kent, stated that Kyoto's goals were unworkable, due the United States and China never agreeing to Kyoto (CNN, 2017). This is an instance of a likely solution failing, due to the lack of authority from international organisations, like the UN. If there were to be an institution in place to enforce the Kyoto Protocol, and in turn, force the top polluters to cut their emissions, the Protocol might have worked. However, it would be dangerous to give the United Nations any more power and authority, without the appropriate checks and balances and means to hold them accountable. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an elected body which could exert power and wield influence

on national governments, on global issues, such as climate change, whilst still being held accountable by the people.

The United Nations is also flawed due to the inequality of power within the Security Council. The 'Permanent Five' dominate the Security Council and the global stage. This is undemocratic, as it means power held within the few afforded the 'Permanent Five', the ability to push their own self-interest, rather than the common good. This elitism within the institution prevents change and is undemocratic. The 'Permanent Five' was created during the beginning of the Cold War, and was aimed to make sure the superpowers cooperated. However, in the modern day, it could be perceived that they are no longer global superpowers; as more countries are becoming emerging powers, therefore the 'Permanent Five' becomes out-dated.

The United Nations needs to be replaced with a system that is built with principles of accountability and democracy, which in turn would provide legitimacy and authority for the world government.

The Global Demos

Critics of cosmopolitanism state was flawed due to lack of a global demos. The people need a sense of belonging and similarity to form a coherent demos and also to buy into a representative institution. Nationalism helps form a national demos, however, it undermines the idea as a global demos; as it divides people by nationality. Another criticism is that you lose that sense of belonging and connection to the institution on a global scale due to the distance.

However, everyone has two things in common: we are all human, and we all live and breathe on this planet. This means that everyone would be affected by global warming or if there was a nuclear war. Therefore, there is one common interest and survival. In order to survive, we must communicate and coordinate at an international scale; to solve problems like climate change. When it comes down to life and death of both planet and human race, people's individualism is not a bad opportunity cost. After all, many thinkers surrounding social contract theory, for example Hobbes, suggests that we form governments and states and in turn give up our individual sovereignty, all in the name of survival (Hobbes, 1651).

The Proposal

A World Assembly comprised of a single representative from every country in the world. When deciding on how many representatives each country should have, the debate of which is fairer- number of representatives proportional to population, or having an equal number. Although a proportional system could be considered more democratic. The purpose of replacing the United Nations is to re-balance the power in the global order. This could be achieved by giving all countries the equal number of representatives. This is with the ultimate aim of putting all the countries on a level-playing field and giving all countries, no matter the size an equal voice within the Assembly.


The representative would be elected through free and fair elections. This would provide the assembly with legitimacy and authority, because they have been chosen by the people. It would also make the assembly accountable to the people for its actions and inactions. In countries that currently practice democracy, it places the representative within the assembly on similar status as the heads of governments, as they have both been elected by the people. This, in turn, would force the Heads of Government to listen to the Assembly, and do the biddings of their electorates. Therefore, synergy is expected between the Heads of Government and the Assembly on behalf of the people.

The major challenge with universal free and fair elections is that some countries are not democrats or/and illiberal democracies. What this means there might not be any elections in such country. In order to preserve the democratic principles of the World Assembly, all representatives must be elected. This would be enshrined in the constitution; so, in theory, no one can challenge it. In undemocratic countries, they would need to have an election for their World Assembly representative. However, *status quo* would prevail on not to elect their national government or national leader. This is to respect both the state sovereignty, and to avoid possible backlash that could arise from the idea of 'Western' principles being forced upon a country.

Like the majority of parliaments, the main Assembly would be accompanied with a committee system. The committee system would cover variety of issues in more depth. The most important committees would be the World Security Committees. There would be six regional committees. The countries' representative would sit in the correct committee in line with the geographical region. The regional committees would be inspired by

the commentary- “if Europe continues to forge a common security agenda, the British and French seats should eventually be consolidated into one seat for the European Union” (Bosco, 2009). Within the regional committees, they would elect a Chair to sit and represent that region on the Security Council. This would provide every country a voice within the Security Council, and prevent the ‘Permanent Five’ from dominating the Assembly. The theory behind the UN Security Council ‘Permanent Five’ was that it enables the superpowers to consider each other’s interests (Bosco, 2009). This committee system would encourage countries within close proximity to each to become allies in a bid to hopefully prevent conflicts. There would also be no *veto*, as there is no ‘Permanent Five’. Every member has equal say, therefore there is no need for the *veto*, within the system.

Figure 1: The Sub-regional committees of the World Assembly



In order to promote accountability and transparency, there would be freedom of information. All debates in the Assembly and within committees would be recorded and streamed live. This gives the people the opportunity to check up on what the Assembly is doing. It would also prevent corruption and tyranny, as the people are observant of the Assembly's proceedings. Both accountability and transparency earns the institution, the peoples' trust.

The Assembly would have a codified constitution that defines the structure and rules of the new World Assembly. It would layout the structure of the Assembly; the committee systems and elections. It would clearly define the jurisdictions of the Assembly, and the jurisdictions of the national States. It would contain the details of the checks and balances. The codified constitution should clearly define the whole system, and uphold its accountability and authority, as well as to tackle the issue of state sovereignty.

The Issue of State Sovereignty

In recent political events, there has been a bigger emphasis on state sovereignty. Especially, during Brexit, with the leave campaign slogan - 'Take Back Control'. The biggest issue with any international institution, whether it is on a global level or regional level, is undermining state sovereignty. During David Held's case for Cosmopolitan Democracy, he states that all nation states must subordinate to cosmopolitanism as globalization had broken down the necessary assumption between people, territories and states (Eckersley, 2007). Unfortunately, the majority of the world does not agree. How do you convince the people and the governments that have been protecting their various states sovereignty, to give some power to a World Assembly?

The answer to that question is to make sure the majority of state sovereignty is protected, whilst giving the World Assembly a small, but untestable power. The only way to do this is through a codified constitution. The concerns surrounding the possibility of a tyrannical world government could be addressed through checks and balances within the constitution. These issues are not new, in fact, they came up during the Constitutional Convention of 1776, whilst writing the American Constitution. Although, it was of a smaller scale, the founding fathers' solutions could be applied to the World Assembly.

The constitution would clearly define the jurisdiction of both the national state and the World Assembly. Any issue that is domestic and does not cross state borders, the Assembly

cannot rule over. If the issue crosses state lines and begins to threaten the security, stability and sustainability of the World, the Assembly would have the authority to step in. The Assembly cannot go to war, or order/have any troops. Only the nation states could go to war and command troops. This not only protects the people and nation states from a tyrannical supranational government, but it also prevents any state from using the Assembly to go to war.

Checks and balances would protect state sovereignty and reassure the people that there was not a tyrannical supranational government dictating everything. These checks and balances would be enshrined in the constitution, like the American system. The check and balance would be such that any policy passed by the World Assembly has to be approved by three-quarter of all countries' Head of Governments.

It is important to reassure the people that States sovereignty is protected and the World Assembly, like any governing body, will not become tyrannical. Once the people are happy and various government knows its domestic policies and power at home will not be challenged, everyone should hopefully cooperate.

Funding the Assembly

The main concern with any institution is how it will be funded. A national government is funded through taxes. However, taxation could be a controversial topic; therefore, it should stay within the jurisdiction of the national State. Also, people are often hostile to new taxes. In order for a World Assembly to be popular, it is best not to implement tax on the people at all.


The United Nation is funded through its members in three ways:

1. Mandatory payments into the regular budget.
2. Voluntary donations to the UN organisations, i.e. UNICEF.
3. Occasional Special assessments. i.e. paying to renovate the New York Headquarters.

Figure 2 below shows the top funders of the UN Peacekeeping budget, with the USA contributing the most. This is one of the arguments in favour of the 'Permanent Five'

within the Security Council. All the five ‘Permanent Five’ are in the top ten highest contributors to the UN. Therefore, they arguably deserve the right to control what happens to that money.


Figure 2: The top 10 contributors to the UN Budget



Source: United Nations, 2016.

Members also voluntarily donate to organisations set by and connected to the UN, such as UNICEF. The members who pay the most contributions into the regular budget, also donate the most as shown in Figure 3 below. Although, it is a positive that those with the most money donated and contributed to the United Nations and its organisation, often wields much power and influence.

Figure 3: Top 10 countries that donate to UNICEF, 2015



Source: UNICEF, 2015

In order to solve global problems, especially climate change, we need an effective form of global governance, with the authority needed to achieve goals that is compatible with the democratic principles of cosmopolitanism. This paper initiates this proposal, and there are numerous of issues that would arise when building a Global Assembly. It is impossible to be exhaustive in this in a single paper, nor do I possess the skills and expertise to solve them. Questions that need further answers include:

- How do we impose and implement the Global Assembly?
- How do we get all countries to participate?
- How do we divide the countries into the regional committee?
- Is there a full proposal needed on how to fund the Assembly?
- How do we preserve free and fair elections, in countries that currently do not have free and fair elections?

The list is endless. Many believe this is a utopian idea, and I would admit that the proposal for a World Government is not perfect yet. However, if we start working together to make this happen, we might be able to make the future better for us and the generations after.

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Inequality Makes the
World Go Round: Economics,
Trade, and Nation States

8

NEW VILLAGE, SAME INEQUALITIES? EXPLORING GLOBAL STRATIFICATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Selina March

Introduction

It is difficult, even when technology enables us to be more interconnected than ever before, not to see the world as divided. The populist movement in the West was built around protectionism, and anti-immigration sentiment is gaining support. This is evidenced by the success of candidates like Donald Trump and policies like Brexit, and the unease felt in other countries where elections are imminent. Much of this can be characterised as the West versus the 'Other' mentality, a facet of global stratification. Despite all of this, there is one aspect of society which is heralded as a great equalizer, bringing the world together: the Internet and social media.

In discussions about how and why this divisive mentality has taken root and spread, the Internet and social media seem to be almost immune. How could technology which allows us to connect with billions of people around the world play a part in this cultural backlash to globalization? This paper argues that there are certain features and structures of social media in general, and of Facebook and Twitter specifically, which could enhance the West versus the 'Other' sentiment, that is brought into the online world from the offline world. The result is a 'global village' online, which contains the same social hierarchies and power discrepancies as the offline world. This global stratification is enhanced through tragedy of normalisation and confirmation bias, which is then echoed back to the offline world, in the form of political views and actions.

Globalization and the ‘Global Village’

Although theories as to how and why the world is divided on a global scale differ, there is little doubt that global stratification exists in the international system today. There are definite discrepancies in power and influence between countries, and even entire regions of the world, which can be seen very clearly even at a glance. However, when discussion turns towards the advent of the Internet and ensuing technologies, there are many who see this unprecedented level of access to people, cultures, and information, as an opportunity for greater social equality across cultures and backgrounds. Often, McLuhan’s famous term ‘global village’ is invoked to frame these assertions.

In *Understanding Media*, McLuhan discussed the compression of the world as a result of new technologies, stating “As electricity contracted, the globe is no more than a village. Electric speed in bringing all social and political functions together, in a sudden implosion which has heightened human awareness and responsibility to an intense degree” (1964, p. 5). The world is more socially interconnected than ever, thanks to the Internet and social media, but it is essential to check any assumption that this interconnectedness implies equality. The Internet and its related advances in media and telecommunications are linked inevitably to globalization; therefore, like globalization, these technologies must be critically evaluated, regarding their impact on the world.

Valcanis, defines globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities, in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events, occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Valcanis, 2011, p.41). Although this definition is not all-encompassing, the social effect of globalization referenced here is particularly relevant for this discussion of global stratification in social media. Social media provides a forum where people across the world could interact and exchange information and knowledge, regardless of physical location. This, in theory, could enable the breakdown of divides based on geography that is inevitable in the offline world, by allowing users to self-select transnational networks, and create communities which are interest-based over place-based (Putnam, 2007, p.178). In practice, this phenomenon is occurring every day - Twitter and Facebook feeds are often an amalgam of updates, and users from all over the world, typically filtered more by content than by place. In this sense, social media is a truly global space. By Valcanis’ (2011) definition, truly globalised; however, this globalization cannot necessarily be equated with social equality.

The Internet, and social media are not immune to the social hierarchies and power discrepancies that exist in the offline world. These technologies did not simply spring into being - they were developed by government and, later, by the private sector (Barbrook, 2007). Because of this, a discussion of technology as a great equalizer is incomplete without a consideration of “the economies, voices, and agendas behind its infrastructural, social, political, or economic deployment” (Srinivasan, 2017, p.206). From certain perspectives, it is easy to think of the Internet and social media as a universal entity; but in reality, there are very real global disparities, not only in access but their day-to-day use. Failing to acknowledge these disparities and hierarchies undermines the experience of a significant portion of the world’s population, and risks further entrenching stratification on and offline.

All of this is discussed in order to frame the key concepts for analysis: what features and structures emphasised global stratification in social media, and how might this stratification influence political processes and actions? Social media strongly influences the way we view the world, and it is, therefore, essential to analyse the social hierarchies and power structures that exist within it. Claiming a universal digital experience, or the equalising effect of the Internet and social media, fails to consider how global stratification may influence, or present itself in the online world; this is in danger of perpetuating social inequality, under the guise of a ‘global village’.

Social Media and Worldview

McLuhan noted in *The Medium is the Massage*, “All media work is over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences, that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered.” (1967, p. 26). Since social media is an increasingly large part of the day-to-day lives of billions of people around the world, it is important to assess the impact it can have on the worldview of its users. For this discussion, I focus on Facebook and Twitter because both have received a great deal of international attention for their potential impact on political events across the world.

One of the primary reasons social media can influence worldview is its place in the lives of its users. In 2016, Facebook reported 1.86 billion monthly users globally (Facebook, “Company Info”), and Twitter reported 313 million monthly users (Twitter, Company About”). In the United States, 91 per cent of Facebook users and 66 per cent of Twitter

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users access the site weekly or more (Greenwood et al., 2016). Beyond statistics, it is not difficult to discern the importance of social media in the daily lives of many people - often, Facebook or Twitter are referenced in conversation, or as sources of information for anything, ranging from memes to politics, to protest movements, and many others.

Social media sites have evolved beyond their initial purpose of providing a forum for social networking, to becoming a sort of one-stop-shop for both social and information-gathering purposes. A study by the Pew Research Centre shows that among American internet users, social media is the second most common pathway to online news, at 35 per cent, compared to 36 per cent for news-specific websites or apps (Mitchell et al., 2017). Twitter, in particular, draws users for news-seeking purposes, with over half of users reporting they found news on the platform because they were looking for it. Facebook users, on the other hand, reported that they were more likely to come across news on the platform while doing other things online (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). With increasing numbers of users actively using social media sites, and encountering news and other information on sites such as Facebook and Twitter, it is easy to see why social media has the opportunity to influence worldview.

It's also important to examine how social media can influence worldview, considering how many people use it regularly for both social and news-related purposes. The speed and volume of information, the tendency for clustering or filtering, and "blurring weak and strong ties," influence opinion formation and spreading online (Pfeffer et al., 2013, p.121). These factors aid in the creation of "cyber cascades." These include informational cascades, where people form opinions and make decisions based on information from other people in their network, and reputational cascades, where people whose opinions vary from those of their network "go along with the crowd" to preserve a perceived reputation (Sunstein, 2017, pp. 99-101). Because people increasingly utilise social media as a news source, the power of these factors on influencing opinions is amplified - when the news is woven into and filtered through a person's social network, that network influences not only the news that is shown, but the lens through which it is interpreted.

Because of this, extensive analysis has been done on the echo chamber effect that exists in social media. Some assert that this effect can lead to homophily in ideology (Sunstein, 2017; Garrett, 2009; McPherson et al., 2001), while others argue that it is overstated and that social media does not necessarily intensify ideological grouping (Barberá et al.,

2015). While it may be true that social media is not inherently divisive along ideological or other lines, self-filtering behaviour alone does not inevitably lead to clustering; there is compelling evidence that hyper-personalisation creates an environment conducive to group polarisation. Google's Eric Schmidt has stated that with new and improving technologies, "It will be very hard for people to watch or consume something that has not in some sense been tailored for them" (cited in Jenkins Jr., 2010). This reflects the main pillar of consumer sovereignty, and makes sense as a guiding focus, considering social media sites are ultimately corporations whose primary responsibility is to their shareholders. The echo chamber effect results in polarisation which strongly influences the worldview of its users, and therefore extends beyond social media and the online world. Other news sources echo it in as effort to maintain readership and viewership, in the actions of politicians to maintain the favorability of their constituencies, and in social movements emboldened by a network of like-minded people.

Due to the increasing tendency of users to rely on social media as a news source, the influence networks can have on opinion forming, and the echo chamber effect, it is critical to examine the features and structures within social media which contribute to these factors. It is also crucial to understand how these factors may emphasise social hierarchies and global stratification. When these features polarise worldviews, social media risks recreating existing offline global stratification in the online 'global village'.

Global Stratification in Social Media

Certain aspects of global stratification in social media are obvious, including language use, the physical location of the servers that enable the technology, and varying levels of access. These disparities are important to note; however, extensive efforts are being taken to diminish them in an attempt to characterise social media as a great equaliser. Facebook and Twitter both allow users to self-select their language, and allow users to translate foreign-language posts right in their news feeds; Twitter also allows users to filter posts on any topic by language. There has been a push across the private sector and among some government agencies to connect the 'last billion' and increase access to these technologies. Although efforts are being made to level the most glaring examples of global stratification, it is crucial to note that "mere access to technology is not sufficient to reverse political or economic inequality, and indeed may even promote stratification" (Srinivasan,

2017, p.181). Even using terms like the ‘last billion’, carries with it an almost colonial attitude by presuming “that ‘our’ tools can edify the ‘other’” (Srinivasan, 2017, p.206).

This exemplifies why it is essential to refrain from generalising the Internet and social media as universal and equalising forces, and examining how social media emphasised global stratification. Although global stratification can present itself in many ways, I will focus primarily on the grouping of the world into the West versus the ‘Other’. This is an aspect of global stratification which is evident in the offline world, and which carries social as well as political implications. Within social media, tragedy normalisation and confirmation bias particularly help to perpetuate this worldview.

Tragedy Normalisation

Tragedy normalisation, in general, does not inevitably link to global stratification; however, seeing tragedy and violence is more typical in certain parts of the world, is a characteristic of global stratification. Certain aspects of social media previously discussed, contribute to tragedy normalisation; specifically, that the speed and volume of information spreading may increase desensitisation, and move discussions from a tragedy itself to the political reactions to the said tragedy.

One study found that, on Twitter, reactions to certain events may initially be more neutral as information is diffused, but become more polarised as the conversation shifts to policy (Barberá et al., 2015, p.1537). The structure of Twitter plays a role in general tragedy normalisation, in that the platform prompts succinct, immediate reactions to events, and such reactions are grouped using hashtags. Users can follow the narrative through the related hashtags which can bombard them with initial reactions. In the early stages when hashtags are more content-based than opinion-based, a user can see a more diverse range of reactions to the event before polarisation takes over. As hashtags become more opinion-based, tweets turn from recognition of the tragedy to statements and arguments on policy issues related to it; these often include divisive issues such as gun control, immigration, and foreign policy, among others.

Facebook, on the other hand, has rolled out features that contribute to more specific tragedy normalisation and global stratification. The most telling examples are the Safety Check feature, and the use of filtered profile pictures. Facebook created the Safety Check

feature in 2011, after the tsunami in Japan; so users could let those in their social network know they were safe. Until the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, it was primarily used following natural disasters; when the feature was activated for a non-natural disaster for the first time, the decision prompted heated discussions. Many wondered why the feature was activated for these attacks, but not for others that occurred in places such as Beirut or Ankara around the same time. Initially, Facebook indicated that rolling out Safety Check after the Paris attacks was a policy shift (Schultz, 2015), but ever since, it has not been completely consistent. Additionally, Facebook allowed users to overlay their profile pictures with the French flag in a show of solidarity; this was met with criticism for the option being offered for certain events or causes, but not others. By selectively activating these features, Facebook helped to perpetuate an idea that tragic events are more commonplace, and therefore deserve less attention and empathy, in some parts of the world than in others.

Personalisation and Confirmation Bias

Perhaps the biggest way in which social media enhances existing stratification is the dedication to personalisation, and the resulting confirmation bias. This is the primary focus of echo chamber arguments, which suggest that social media is complicit in the polarisation, that results from limiting users to echo chambers. In relation to global stratification, personalisation filters people into like-minded groups and communities which, while not inherently divided geographically, are still divided. In this, it is important to note that “geographies are not merely physical space, but symbolic, social, political, and cultural constructions” (Khiabany, 2003, p.150); sorting and filtering users this way can help to echo the West versus the ‘Other’ sentiment. This stratification is further enhanced when features which go beyond self-filtering, and limit exposure to diverse ideas are implemented.

On Twitter, when a user starts an account, they are prompted to tailor their feed based on recent website visits; the box is defaulted as ‘yes’, so a user has to choose to turn off this feature actively. This allows Twitter to filter a new user’s feed before their account has been fully set up by suggesting topics and users to follow. There is also an option to import contacts and find people a user knows who are already on the site, allowing for filtration based on existing networks. Once an account is activated, the Trends feature - a listing of topics currently being talked about - only shows the trending topics which the algorithm

has determined would be of interest to a user based on their location, interest, and followed accounts. A user can change their Trends feed to be based on location, but there is not an option to have a neutral Trends box which shows topics based solely on volume.

Facebook also employs similar features and algorithms to filter its users. One of the more blatant examples of this is the tailoring of advertisements based on a user's interests, and more notably, Facebook-identified political views. In the United States, Facebook tracks the activity and connections of its users to classify them according to how conservative, or liberal they appear to be. This allows for tailored ads and suggestions which can play a part in limiting exposure to alternate or opposing viewpoints. *The Wall Street Journal's* "Blue Feed, Red Feed" graphics illustrate how different self-identified or Facebook-identified political leanings expose a user to drastically different news sources on various topics (Keegan, 2016). This is important to note because, not only are users' feeds filtered based on their chosen connections, they are also filtered based on perceived political affiliation. Additionally, a Facebook-conducted study suggests that what a person is exposed to on social media influences not only thought but feeling (Kramer et al., 2015); this means that a filtered feed will not only influence exposure to particular topics and opinions on those topics, but also feelings about those topics. If a user's news feed is made up in large part of people reacting angrily to an issue, it serves to reason that, because that user's feed is already primarily aligned to their interests and opinions, there is a possibility to angrily react to that issue. This could lead to more heated debate, driven more by emotions than content, and can further entrench an 'us vs them' mentality.

Both Twitter and Facebook have a variety of features relating to personalisation, which ultimately create filtered communities based on location, interests, worldview and other factors. This means that, depending on what each site's algorithm identifies as important, users will primarily be exposed to topics and viewpoints which align with their own. This can, in turn, lead to confirmation bias because users are primarily exposed to information which they agree with, and can easily discount those they do not, which can further entrench previously held opinions. If it is true that geographies are more than physical space, it could be argued that these filtered, interest- and content-based communities can emphasise global stratification, in much the same way that it is emphasised offline.

Political Implications of Online Stratification

It is important to note that, in the analysis of social media features which may enhance stratification, there is no evidence which suggests that social media necessarily creates global stratification. However, there are features and structures within social media which do encourage clustering and polarisation, and which can enhance existing global stratification. Because the Internet and social media do not precede offline global stratification, it makes sense that the stratification which exists in the online world is an echo of the stratification, which already exists in the international system. This does not mean that global stratification in social media should be overlooked as unimportant; in fact, when global stratification is echoed in a space which is regularly used and filtered through a social network, it can bounce back to influence politics in the offline world. The social hierarchies that are brought into the world of social media from the offline world are enhanced and entrenched through the features and structures previously discussed, and then returned to the offline world in the form of political response and action.

Social media provides a forum for people across the world with drastically different interests and viewpoints, to find and connect with others who share similar points of view. Additionally, increasing dedication to personalisation by Twitter and Facebook means that, more than ever, users are seeing more of what is perceived to be of interest to them. This creates a tendency for clustering that goes beyond self-filtering, and sorts people into groups based on criteria such as interests, location, and political affiliation. The result is an online world filled with exceptionally diverse points of view, but a filtered one in which each user is primarily coming across opinions that align with their own; this can lead to more extreme viewpoints, and a disappearing middle ground.

Politically, this can have - and already has had - profound effects. The movement away from the middle ground is evident in increasing support for political candidates and policies to the extreme right or left. Sunstein points out that, in the United States, "both sides are worried about the effects of echo chambers - about an outburst of noisy negativity from segments of constituents, potentially producing serious electoral retribution. Social media increase the volume of that noise, and to that extent, heighten polarisation" (Sunstein, 2017, p.10). This movement away from the middle can also be seen in the increasing number of non-neutral news sources, with much of the media shifting to one side or the other in order to maintain readership and viewership. The filtered worlds created by

social media, which enhance polarisation, lead to an electorate with more extreme world-views, who will make political choices accordingly. A clear example of this is the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, which saw Donald Trump actively utilise social media, particularly Twitter, to stoke polarisation and ultimately win the presidency.

Throughout the West, a number of countries are experiencing surges towards the support of more extreme candidates and policies, which appeal to a populist mentality within their nation. There is a multitude of factors which have contributed to the populist surge in the West; and, while traditionally populism is thought of as a response to economic insecurity, it may not provide a clear answer to recent events. In a recent study, Inglehart and Norris (2016) suggest that the explanation for this most recent populist surge is not economic insecurity, but cultural backlash. Part of the backlash that is occurring, is evidenced by the rise of anti-immigration sentiment, which could be characterised by the West versus the 'Other' aspect of global stratification. Although this attitude predates social media, when certain features of Facebook and Twitter enhance this sentiment. It can become further entrenched, ultimately resulting in political activity, which aligns with such a worldview.

Conclusion

McLuhan's concept of a 'global village' is referred to a space in which people across the world are connected; if we take it at face value, the Internet and social media have accomplished that. However, there is a tendency to associate the 'global village' concept with a sense of equality and universality, and that presents a clear danger. If we continue to put the Internet and social media up on a pedestal as a great equalising force, we fail to consider the definite social hierarchies and global stratification that exist within these spaces. Although social media does not create the West versus the 'Other' worldview, structures and features within social media do help to enhance and further entrench this worldview among its users.

To a certain extent, self-filtering plays a role in defining the worldview we are exposed to on social media; it is inevitable, in the face of such a vast amount of information, for this to occur. Self-filtering alone, however, does not produce the echo chambers which lead to polarisation. The dedication to personalisation is a main pillar of the social media industry, and it leads to increased polarisation, and a movement away from the middle. When this occurs through a lens of global stratification, the result is a world which purports to

be an equalising force, but in reality, echoes and even enhances existing stratification and power disparities in the offline world. Because social media has a profound influence on the worldview of its users, this enhanced stratification in the form of the West versus the 'Other' mentality, which echoes back to the offline world.

It is crucial to move away from a narrative of social media as a great equaliser, and to further examine the very real social hierarchies and power structures within the online world. The mere existence of a 'global village' does not undo the global stratification that exists in the offline world, and sweeping claims of universality overlook this and in fact, play into the narrative of the West versus the 'Other'.

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9

LAND GRABBING AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Safa Nafi

Introduction

The historical experiences of Zimbabwe and South Africa have shown that the land issue has been a continuous manifestation of struggle. This issue reflects conflicting views between those who see land to generate profit, as opposed to those who rely on land for subsistence. A contentious aspect of this issue is that land deals are described as ‘grabs.’ Land grabbing describes a process by which large amounts of land are sold or leased by “transnational and national economic corporations” as well as “national governments and private equity funds” (Borras Jr et al., 2011, p.209). These actors look for land to invest in “as sites for fuel and food production in the event of future price spikes,” and to be set aside for commodity production (Borras Jr et al., 2011, p.209). The main disputes regarding land grabbing in Zimbabwe and South Africa take place when land is regarded as empty or marginal by official reports. This does not necessarily present an accurate reflection of the situation on the ground. In many cases, those who occupy the land do not have formal entitlements. Additionally, those with formal rights may not necessarily reflect the opinions of all populations that utilise the land for their livelihoods. This process, therefore, usually involves the subordination of a population that is rendered powerless.

As this subject has become of global concern, international organisations have suggested ways to combat the issues that affect different actors with interests in land. One of these organisations is the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), a United Nations (UN) agency. Its main objectives are to eradicate hunger and food insecurity; encourage sustainable management of natural resources; and promote economic and social progress for all populations (FAO, 2017). The FAO has produced various guidelines and principles which aim to ensure that ethical land deals take place. The institution can be somewhat contradictory in its motivations. It seeks to work with populations who are impoverished

or suffer from food insecurity. However, in frequent partnership with the World Bank, it advocates protection for suffering populations within a framework that has a globalised economic agenda. This framework recognises global capitalism and trade openness, which would contribute to economic growth and food security (FAO, 2003). It seeks to not only protect the worst-off populations, but to also assist governments in being globally beneficial economic actors. This poses a problem of conflicting interests. Global economic goals are achieved to the detriment of the world's disadvantaged populations.

This paper argues that currently, the FAO's guidelines for reducing land grabbing are not working. It looks at the various investment guidelines proposed by the organisation, and evaluates their ability to prevent land grabbing. It explores how its globalised economic agenda has affected the procedures through which governments have chosen to distribute land. Ultimately, it seeks to discover how principles need to be changed, so that it would be conducive towards non-exploitative actions in the cases of Zimbabwe and South Africa. The rationale behind this research comes from recognising opposing views about land grabbing. While there is an acknowledgement that this practice could be destructive, the FAO amongst other organisations, contends that the new land deals could be a "potential opportunity for rural development" (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010, p.509). It is suggested that this could be achieved by avoiding the negative social and environmental effects. Land grabbing is reframed as a "side effect of an essentially beneficial cure", and the risks are deemed manageable "to make possible a larger good" (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010, p.512).

However, there have been acts of defiance against established power structures which showed that efforts to 'help' the landless by state governments and the wider international community have been unpopular. There is a consistent focus on profits and monetary values, rather than the creation of a strategy that would satisfy and sustain the livelihoods of dispossessed populations. What is needed is a "human-rights framed, categorically pro-poor land policy framework" (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010, p.522). Fundamentally, the FAO fabricates the idea that investments in land could produce beneficial outcomes. There is nonetheless, an impossibility of favourable outcomes for communities that occupy land when their needs are not prioritised over the needs of the global market. The paper concludes by discussing how current systems may need to change for greater human rights protection.

The FAO and the Principles for Responsible Land Use

The notion of land grabbing has come under substantial academic scrutiny, particularly from those who have been harmfully affected. Greater public attention to this global issue has meant that development agencies have been inclined to act. As globalization has continued, international organisations have to increasingly respond to critiques of the “impact of transnational corporations in developing countries” (Borras Jr & Franco, 2012, p.35). The FAO, who focus their attention on global food security, has played a key role in adding to the discourse around land grabbing.

In 2010, in partnership with the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the FAO published “Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources”. Two years later, the organisation produced “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure” (FAO, 2012). Looking at the principles collectively, some assumptions could be made about their relevance in combating land grabbing.

Firstly, “the guidelines are voluntary” (FAO, 2012, p.1). They hold no virtuous weighting, as states or private investors, who might ‘grab’ land unethically; are not obligated to follow them. The FAO merely suggests that there should be a focus on “maximising security for investment and sustainable development gains” (Cotula et al., 2009, p.102). Action Aid, a global poverty charity, highlighted that these principles did not go far enough in protecting against land grabbing as they are non-obligatory. Subsequently, they have demanded an independent UN commission to authorise an enforceable code of conduct for land investors to follow (Hunt, 2009). Suggestions for protection presented by the FAO seem to be inept in protecting populations affected by land grabbing.

The Globalization of the Agricultural Sector

From the outset, the FAO concedes that the rights of land are an international issue, and present guidance for “internationally accepted practices” (FAO, 2012, p.1), regarding control over land. They disempower populations through the “disassembling of national territory”, in a strategy which gives rise to “non-national systems of authority” (Sassen, 2013, p. 25). Organisations like the FAO make claims on how systems should run. They further advocate the UN’s legitimacy through suggesting that conflicts regarding land should

be resolved by parties acting by “applicable international humanitarian law” (FAO, 2012, p.37). This internationalisation of localised issues could be problematic.

Firstly, it could be said that the international legal system may not be sufficient in protecting human rights. No overarching international legal authority can ensure human rights abuses are not committed regarding land grabbing, particularly when land users may not be formally recognised. Crucially, the UN’s makeup, who give themselves responsibility for maintaining international human rights protection includes the “permanent 5” (Weiss, 2014) global economic powers of the Security Council. These actors may not favour the protection of populations in the Global South at the expense of international investment. One of these members, China, is also South Africa’s largest trading partner (Smith & Talbot, 2009). With operations in many other African nations, it seems clear that a country with strategic economic interests in acquiring land, may not also be conscientious in safeguarding internationally accepted rights.

The use of international law is just one example of the problematic nature of the encouragement to disregard “parts of the state” once “designed to support the agricultural sector” (De Schutter, 2011, p.250). States could have a better understanding of their citizens’ needs than international organisations, and have greater responsibility to protect them, as part of their mandate to govern. A system whereby land issues are resolved through the international system has over time encouraged the removal of government’s support for farmers. These state functions have diminished within an era of globalised agrarian change.

The conception that the land rights issue is a global one suggests broader assumptions about the organisation’s framework, and the principles it works within. The FAO’s partnership with the World Bank, an institution that promotes the neo-liberal discourse of global free-market trade and investment, shows that the motivations of these principles go beyond the protection of land and those who use it. The World Bank, alongside other global financial institutions, set up structural adjustment programs, beginning in the 1980’s. These programs encouraged “universal agro-exporting” and required “states in the global South to open their economies to the Northern-dominated international food trade”, and “dismantle farm sector protections” (McMichael, 2012, p.682). Under these conditions, “the government of Zimbabwe was forced to liberalise markets by reducing state interference” (Zerbe, 2001, p.666), and government spending on subsidies, while promoting export industries such as agriculture. Bernstein (2008, p.247) highlights that the “rolling

back of the state” created a foundation where international institutions would take on the role of ensuring “good governance”, therefore having greater influence.

The principles promoted by these institutions, therefore, seek to maintain the *status quo* by globalising the agricultural sector, while supposedly providing greater ‘protective’ measures. The agenda seeks to consolidate “large-scale land investment, as a potential solution to rural poverty”, with a “seductive call for a ‘code of conduct’ to discipline big land deals and transform them into supposedly more ethical ‘win-win’ outcomes” (Borras Jr & Franco, 2012, p.35). FAO suggests that investments in land can be regulated, which would stop destructive practices like land grabbing. Through this regulation, the organisation shapes the discourse, which in turn frames investments as mutually beneficial for all involved.

However, within the guise of offering principles for more ethical investment in land, the FAO’s guidelines are centred around the investor as the beneficiary. Significantly, the FAO proposes that land investments are necessary due to “the 2008 price spike in food and fuel prices”, which has led to “a desire by countries dependent on food imports to secure food supplies in the face of uncertainty and market volatility” (FAO et al., 2010, p.1). The same organisation therefore implicitly suggests that it is the responsibility of the resource-rich countries to be global facilitators of food security. This ideology perceives land occupied by “smallholders and pastoralists” as “low-yield and underutilised”. With capitalisation, land can “address the global food security problem underscored by the current food crisis” (McMichael, 2012, p.283). This approach perpetuates existing practices and furthers the needs of international markets over the needs of deprived populations.

Zimbabwe and South Africa: Internal and External Land Grabs

The FAO (2012) believes that equal positive outcomes for all actors involved in land investment deals happen through the promotion of cooperation. However, what fails to be addressed is that cooperating with communities does not necessarily mean cooperating with those affected most by land deals. Societies, where investment takes place could be run by leaders who can be just as questionable and problematic in their motivations as outside investors. The FAO’s focus on localised communities in land deals, that implicitly embraces “elite local chiefs, corrupt petty officials, local bosses, local bullies, money-lenders, landlords and rich farmers” (Borras Jr & Franco, 2012, p.47). These viewpoints are usually opposed to those of landless individuals.

In Zimbabwe, the oil company ‘Green Fuel’, is run by elites from the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Langa, 2014). The government supports its operations, and yet it has been stated that their ethanol and bio-fuel project has created countless problems to 10,000 villagers in Chisumbanje, the region in which they operate. Also, the company legally acquired 5,112 hectares of land, but breaking an agreement, it grabbed more than 4,000 additional hectares of agricultural land from villagers without compensating them (Mambondiyani, 2016). There are fears that villagers will lose more land as sugarcane fields are slated to expand to 45,000 hectares by 2020 (Mambondiyani, 2016). This example suggests that elite owners could be destructive to the populations occupying the land. Since this is the case, cooperation must be inclusive of the whole communities, not just figureheads.

Land deals such as this one could be described as “internal colonialism” (Borras Jr et al., 2011, p.209). In a reflection of colonial times, “local people are almost never consulted” (Palmer, 2011, p.3). The cooperation between investors and farming communities fails to ensure justice when all views are not integrated. It is critical to have an “assessment of local contexts, as well as long-term engagement with local interests, not just elites” (Cotula et al., 2009, p.104). Data collected by Sithole et al. (2003, p.91), aiming to integrate the narratives of peasants in Zimbabwe, suggests that maltreated populations are starting to challenge the narrative whereby their interests are protected by political leaders. They reject the view that their interests can be represented by authoritative figures in investment deals.

The FAO fails to consider the role states play in destructive practices when they are complicit in land deals. Measures suggesting governments should begin land deals “with thorough vetting of the investor” (FAO et al., 2010, p.15) become irrelevant when states can be duplicitous actors. Evidently, “states are not simply passive victims”, but rather, “many states are calculating partners in land deals, negotiating the costs and benefits... to maximise returns on what are considered marginal lands or marginal communities” (Borras Jr et al., 2013, p.192). Advocating that investments are “vetted by local governments” (FAO et al., 2010, p.11) doesn’t ensure fair deals for all localised communities under these governments’ jurisdiction. As the example in Zimbabwe showed, states could encourage negligence towards their population, when securing economic benefits through investment.

Such suggestions also retract responsibility from corporations, and other investors who engage in malpractice. Within the discussed guidelines, “non-state actors should endeavour to

prevent corruption” (FAO et al., 2010, p.10) about tenure rights. This is the central principle attempting to discourage contentious investment deals. However, it seems that the FAO has failed to engage in the main differences in viewpoints between the actors that are allegedly involved in land grabbing, and the populations that they harm. To stop actors being exploitative, it needs to be understood why investors believe their actions are justified.

Emergent Asset Management, a private equity and hedge fund based in London, is Africa’s largest land acquisition fund, run by former JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs currency dealers (Vidal & Provost, 2011). It is “in the process of buying or leasing a total 50,000 hectares, equal to roughly 80,000 football pitches, in several African countries including South Africa”. The CEO argues, “in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, the cost of arable agricultural land that we are buying is one-seventh of the price of similar land” (Daniel, 2012, p.716) in regions such as South America. Governments in countries such as South Africa have encouraged low-cost foreign businesses at the expense of dispossessed populations.

An executive of Emergent Access Management, Susan Payne, argued that since many African countries such as South Africa are moving towards democracy, “their economies are much better regulated than in the past” (Hunt, 2009). The problem is that while a regulatory approach may seem present in official contexts, smallholders who do not have formal rights to land are suffering. A report by the Oakland Institute, an environmental think tank, says that Emergent’s funds are forcing small farmers off ancestral land (Farrell, 2011). Regarding the economic power of hedge funds like this one, “Harvard and other major American universities are working” with them, alongside “European financial speculators to buy or lease vast areas” (Vidal & Provost, 2011). The report also suggests “western hedge funds are said to be working with South African businesses to buy vast tracts of forest and farmland for investors in Europe and the US” (Vidal & Provost, 2011).

The same think tank reported that villagers at one of the farms operated by the company did not consent to the land transfer or were not even told about it. Subsequently, it became more difficult for villagers to feed themselves as their lands had been taken (Oakland Institute, 2013). This company is not the only one participating in harmful land deals. Similarly, the “UK-based Silver Street Capital is raising capital for the Silverlands Fund, a private equity fund that is investing in agricultural businesses... in Southern Africa” (Daniel, 2012, p.706). Investors are being attracted to countries where governments

have been encouraged to create hospitable economic conditions. Thus, it seems somewhat unsurprising investors may not take great consideration of communities they harm.

In the years after the FAO advocated “consultation and participation” (FAO et al., 2010, p.10) with affected populations, such measures are evidently not being considered by these non-state actors. Importantly, these land deals are merely ‘speculative’ acts, as part of a process “intensified in the mid-2000s as the real estate market crisis unfolded” (McMichael, 2012, p.689), and financiers looked elsewhere to seek profits from the investment. The process of speculation means that private financial players can bet on the food and agriculture prices and profit from “buying and selling food futures” which some have argued “inflated food prices” and partially caused the global food crisis of 2007/08 (McMichael, 2012, p.890). The discussed investments “are speculative... as private equity groups bet on the ability to invest and quickly increase the value of their target investments”, and they therefore “seek short-term financial gains rather than promoting long-term development for host countries” (Daniel, 2012, p.714).

The FAO suggests that “joint ventures with local communities, by leasing rather than acquiring the land” (FAO et al., 2010, p.1) could to stop speculative land investments. However, leasing oversimplifies the means to protect populations. In fact, long contractual leases often take place, “for 50 or even 99 years” which generally, “are unsustainable unless there is some level of local satisfaction” (Cotula et al., 2009, p.104). Fundamentally, local communities often do not have legal rights to land meaning that it falls to the state, making it easier to lease to foreign investors (Wily, 2012).

The South African government has formal rights to “state land” (Cross, 2017), which it plans to redistribute as remuneration for land alienated under colonialism and apartheid. However, during the apartheid system’s formation, The Natives Land Act was produced, meaning tribal groups were forcibly settled on a tiny per cent of agricultural land which became known as the homelands (Bell, 2013). This reality means that it is often difficult for poor farmers to prove they lost land during apartheid, as many were moved to homelands, and therefore had land but most of it was not arable. This has left the state in control of an abundance of land which it has not distributed to populations, who have not been able to prove their eligibility for being compensated. States, therefore, lease this land to investors to make a profit.

Regarding the legitimacy of land investment, the FAO advocate their guidelines be applied by “national legal systems” (FAO, 2012, p.2). They fail to appreciate that legality does not necessarily equate to fairness. Both South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s histories would suggest the opposite. The FAO advocate the recognition “and respect [of] all legitimate tenure right holders” (FAO, 2012, p.3). In Zimbabwe, the illegality of the “occupation of Zimbabwe’s commercial farms (largely) by poor people since 2000” may be unlawful, but justifiable, considering the previous colonial land occupation (Hall, 2011, p.199). Legitimacy is therefore contestable within this context. This blurred distinction between rightful ownership means clear guidelines advocating legality as a means of fairness are essentially flawed.

The FAO recognises that not all land users are “currently protected by law” (FAO, 2012, p.11), but it advocates that “safeguards” be established to stop infringing these land users. If states do not recognise land ownership, the legal information foreign investors receive will not reflect the situation on the ground. The guidelines are not followed by obligatory measures for support mechanisms that ensured the priority of safeguarding beyond legal recognition.

Reflecting on the Land Issue in Southern Africa

The FAO’s rhetoric propounds the idea that the current agricultural sector’s globalised nature is the potential solution to land grabbing, and not the problem. Despite evidence of harmful land investment deals, the narrative remains that “national capitalist economic development” should be the solution to food insecurity, “with an implicit belief that rural poverty is the result of poor developing countries’ failure to follow this path” (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010, p.511). This discourse perpetuates the concept of cash “as the currency of modernity” and consistent with this view, is the identification of “wealth with money”, rather than valuing the “intact habitats” of all populations (McMichael, 2012, p.694).

Land reform has been historical since gaining independence from Zimbabwe’s colonial occupation; as well as South Africa’s minority rule and apartheid. Both populations have continued struggles against the exploitative land use, in which views on distribution and use differs, and still face their lands being controlled “almost exclusively [by] white commercial farmers” (Hall, 2011, p.200). It is therefore imperative to look at resistance from both cases, against the ongoing “neo-colonial scrambles for land and resources conducted

by predatory investors” (Borras Jr et al., 2013, p.191), and whether alternative understandings of land use could be more effective.

Discursively, there has been a suggestion for “food sovereignty” (McMichael & Schneider, 2011, p.120), as an alternative to the market-driven approach where investors have adopted the process of land grabbing. This rejects land manifesting into “market commodity”, to satisfy “monetary demand, rather than social need” (Schneider, 2011, p.121). Since the retrospective formal recognition of the end of colonial and apartheid rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa correspondingly, governments have made efforts to reform land rights, while still prioritising the use of profitable land. However, communities deprived of land prioritise their livelihoods, over productivity, in continuing struggles to reclaim land.

Land Distribution after Colonial and Apartheid Rule

In both countries, land reform programmes seemed to carry a theme of a market-led approach. The Zimbabwean government opted for a “willing seller- willing buyer” (Ntsebeza, 2007, p.127) approach, which sought to give a broader range of investors opportunities to buy land. The African National Congress, South Africa’s governing party, was influenced by this land reform process, and advocated reversing the “nationalisation of land” (Ntsebeza, 2007, p.126). This meant that, like Zimbabwe, land could be bought by any investor. Ultimately, both governments trusted “the power of market penetration” (McCusker & Frazer, 2008, p.4) when attempting land reform. Intentions of both governments were not to simply return land to landless populations. Their motivations included opening “the market to a non-racial commercial agricultural class” (Walker, 2007, p.206). However, while ostensibly presenting sentiments of equality, they sought to create economic prosperity.

In South Africa, in 1994, “the Mandela administration proposed a land reform programme” (Baletti et al., 2008, p.133), constitutive of “land restitution, land redistribution and tenure reform” (Murray, 2010, p.133). The government sought to redistribute “30 per cent of agricultural land” after apartheid, to the deprived black populations. However, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations’ survey, only 41 out of the 63,000 claims made had been successfully dealt with by the government, four years after apartheid had ended (Moyo & Yeros, 2005, p.150). Likewise, a Zimbabwean ministerial statement

in 1988 showed that the resettlement of those displaced during the colonial period took place in 40,000 cases, as opposed to the 162,000 cases planned (Chikuhwa, 2006).

In both countries, the emphasis on retaining high agricultural returns for profit causes redistributive failures. The South African government “put land reform on the back burner”, as it was “unwilling to endanger the sector’s productivity which, according to the World Bank, accounted for 95 per cent of South Africa’s marketed agricultural output” (Zerbe, 2001, p.659). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, after independence, the government sought to sustain “large-scale (largely white) commercial farming” to avoid food deficits that would create vulnerability and instability in the economy. The 1965 Lancaster House Agreement, the contract that brings recognition to Zimbabwe as an independent nation. It included limitations to government actions in creating equal land redistribution. This aspect was incorporated to maintain economic efficiency. While focusing on economic stability, the revolutionary governments marginalised communities through inactive redistribution.

To integrate into the globalised economy with prospective liberal economic success, “the new government had borrowed heavily from the World Bank during the 1980s” and adopted “an Economic Structural Adjustment Program in 1991” (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p.8). Crucially, these programmes increased “interest rates and inflation” and therefore did not benefit populations already suffering from unequal conditions. The situation worsened for farmworkers in “their already precarious and poor working and living conditions” (Rutherford, 2014, p.225), since the focus on success was for foreign investment, rather than for localised populations. The populations valuing land for their subsistence and livelihoods, resisted this drive towards a capitalist functioning agricultural sector. In South Africa, the 1984 Landless People’s Movement was the largest domestic social movement in history at that time. By 2004, the group had 100,000 members, 90 per cent of whom were in rural areas. It aimed to challenge the “land reform policies, and to force land distribution into the national and international spotlight” (Baletti et al., 2008, p.133).

Since its formation, the organisation has used land occupations to show its discontent with unequal distribution, and to claim land useful to the dispossessed populations. These occupations have affected the Southern African region, having implications for Zimbabwe, where this form of action influenced the landless poor. Dissatisfaction with the post-independence President Robert Mugabe’s attempts at land reform, led many people to invade

“farms owned by White farmers” The occupations had a “local orientation” in that the community’s grassroots led them (Moyo & Chambati, 2013, p.84).

Although justified by many, occupations in both countries “resulted in a food crisis and famine in the region”, due to a sudden dip in productivity for exportation (Borras Jr et al., 2008, p.137). In five years, “Zimbabwe, once the region’s breadbasket, became commonly referred to as the region’s basket case” (Borras Jr et al., 2008, p.137). The occupations were contentious, particularly as those who “occupied farms in the early 2000s spent some years (re)building their livelihoods on them” (Hall, 2011, p.199). They may have implicitly been the cause of regional economic difficulties, but at a more localised level; the communities were reconstructing their lives after long-term injustices.

After the resistance movements from the poorer populations, they presented their discontent with the government actions. The Zimbabwean government did attempt to re-establish land reform as part of its agenda. With support from President Mugabe, war veterans of the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army, “launched a fast-track land redistribution programme, which is billed as an attempt to correct the colonialist legacy that left vast tracts of land in the hands of a complacent white minority” (Smith, 2013).

“Invasions by war veterans were a politically-motivated story crafted by the state” (Sithole et al., 2003, p.91). Some argued that as Mugabe was “at risk of losing his presidency, [he] condoned the invasions”, despite them being “militant”, “confrontational” and “aggressive” (Moyo & Chambati, 2013, p.84). The president glorified them, “as a blow to former colonial oppressors” (Baletti et al., 2008, p.133). They were promoted as being “socially inclusive” (Moyo & Chambati, 2013, p.84) and measures were presented to reclaim land.

However notably, the “several hundred thousand farmworkers” were not included in the program, and more importantly, many suffered from it: losing their jobs and being “driven from the farms where they work by violence, or laid off because of a collapse in commercial agricultural production” (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Instead, this could be interpreted as an act that encouraged keeping land in the hands of the new political elite, war veterans supporting the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union party.

The “international community” pressured “South Africa...to speak out against Mugabe’s actions on land reform”. Nevertheless, Nelson Mandela’s successor, President Mbeki, “did

not strongly criticise Mugabe's actions" due to feeling obligated to return the support given to South Africa during the resistance against apartheid Baletti et al., 2008, p.133). Critically, although the fast track land reforms mimicked the peasant populations' sentiments in the country, it seems their motivations were not inclusive and altruistic. Impoverished local communities were blamed by the international community for creating regional economic instability, and were "pitted against global capital", while their governments played "ambiguous [and] contradictory roles" (Hall, 2011, p.206). The government showed some level of support to the landless populations, but failed to advocate on extensive land reform, and equal land distribution.

Crucially, there has largely been a focus on land as a service to provide economic prosperity at national and international level, limiting top-down approaches to protecting individual communities. Instead, there should be a focus on prosperity for marginalised populations. The redistribution from governments still incorporated the need to create a "favourable climate for capital" (Sachikonye, 2003, p.232), rather than one which met the needs of the poorest populations. Movements from dispossessed populations seemed to be more successful, in that while occupying land, communities could refocus their attention on using it for their sustenance. It is merely their lack of formal land rights that limited their success. Governments and the international community continue to value land as a commodity, and a realm within which they can profit from. As this form of land grabbing continues, communities unofficially occupying the land remain unprotected.

Lessons Learnt from the Experiences of Zimbabwe and South Africa

In both cases, it seems that historical attempts to create a fair climate for effective land use for all has been challenging. On reflection, it has been suggested that government endeavours "could have been more participatory with the involvement of rural communities"; "could have been more transparent"; and should have ensured the beneficiaries were "those in greatest need" (Sachikonye, 2003, p.236). Movements by the dispossessed led to land occupations, but there is still no clear system that ensures that the land belongs to them (Krininger, 2015).

With 80 per cent of Zimbabweans living in poverty, and negative effects from violence; militant land reforms led around 300,000 black farm workers to lose their jobs without receiving any compensation. A continuing focus on productivity as a priority exists as

farmers lack skills and are not able to purchase the equipment they need to create high yields for profit and exports (Krininger, 2015). Productivity is important to reduce poverty, however, focus on sustaining livelihoods rather than the economy should be paramount.

Small-scale farming could have purported benefits. Subsistence farming can reduce the “dependence and burden of acquiring food from the market, in some cases making up 90 per cent of all the food consumed by both rural and urban households” (Baiphethi & Jacobs, 2009, p.476). In South Africa, the association, Abalimi Bezekhaya, provides support and equipment for small-scale farmers, and with 5,000 members, the organisation focuses on agroecological approaches to farming (Wan, 2015). This means, with greater awareness, communities can focus on sustainable use of crops suited to their environment, bringing long-term solutions to food insecurity. Agroecology shifts the focus from seeing agriculture as a mode of capital production. It recognises that this can be destructive to environments, and the people relying on them when high yields are prioritised.

The FAO et al. (2010, p.1) encourages “investment to increase productivity of smallholder agriculture.” This is flawed, given that productivity for profit is not the main agenda of many communities. They champion this viewpoint to justify the continuation of exploitative investment. Elsewhere in the organisation, they have upheld a view that small-scale farming is a practiced which “may mediate the impacts of the markets”, in the current system where “capitalist production has become generalised” (Bush, 2016, p.4). There is therefore inconsistency in the organisation’s advisory principles of how small-scale farming can be beneficial, without the need for outside involvement.

A persistent theme throughout land reform, resettlement and support from international agencies has been a “top-down, directive, controlling approach, which assumes officials know best and peasants or pastoralists need to be told what is best for them” (Palmer, 2000, p.19). While claiming to consider livelihoods at all levels, the underlying rhetoric remains that communities can benefit from strengthening the economy with greater guidance from external bodies.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the FAO is not successfully curtailing land grabbing in Southern Africa. While identifying some key issues in the debate, their

guidelines for responsible investments do not offer any viable solution. Recommendations are proffered to actors, including governments and private investors, without implicating and identifying them specifically as those who initiated the problem. Mere suggestions are used as to how those involved in land grabbing could act more virtuously when engaging with populations. They failed to look deeper at the embedded causes of land grabbing, how it was made possible, and why it continues, despite wide-ranging opposition. This leaves no actors feeling accountable for the actions that could destroy indigenous populations and their livelihood. More fundamentally, the FAO's guidelines seem to retract culpability from harmful investors, by framing investment as a potentially beneficial practice.

The FAO seems to ignore the critique suggesting that international organisations such as themselves, are promoting the neo-liberal, market-based approach to the agricultural sector, and therefore perpetuating land grabbing. To entirely end this practice, there must be recognition that dispossessed populations will never truly be protected by any measures, aiming to sustain the actions of profit-seeking investors. In Zimbabwe, grassroots efforts from communities to resist these ideological policies were followed by intra-state conflicts between military elites from historically dispossessed populations. However, by taking control of this land, the 'new' elites within the governing party have been able to work with investors and propagate new forms of exploitation. Fundamentally, they have further exacerbated the problematic nature of hierarchical structures that can harm communities in less authoritative positions, even though attempts initially sought to create fairer conditions for land users.

In both countries, actors at the state level are removing historical power structures, and are creating their own, whereby through economic liberalisation, new forms of elites stand to gain. If states abstain from non-exploitative practices, a depletion of influence from international organisations, encouraging global market-based outlooks is necessary.

In this context, FAO fails to recognise that investment may not be the most beneficial option for all farming communities. They acknowledged the success of small-scale and subsistence farming for the food security of communities. While doing so, they seem to contradict their principles that suggested that low yields are not beneficial for meeting needs at a national and international level. They contended that small-scale farming provides communities with direct incomes, but inexplicably fail to look beyond the capitalist views that values prosperity, equating it to economic productivity and monetary outputs. By

internationalising the agricultural sector, they deem their role as a body, capable of transforming any land into a more 'globally' beneficial entity.

Intrinsically, land must 'belong' to those who work on it, and those who value it for their livelihoods. The existence of populations who rely on land must be recognised. If this means working within current state systems, whereby legitimacy of land ownership is granted with formal land rights, then it is essential that this takes place. Greater efforts from Southern African officials are needed to carry out effective land redistribution. No community using land should be seen as marginal or less legitimate than others, based on their productivity or economic output.

It is imperative that further research questions, whether fair land rights should necessarily mean private property rights. This evidence suggests that private ownership, when it involves corporate investors, it has mostly been exploitative. Equally, government-owned lands have not met the needs of all populations, and in many cases, have served the needs of elites. In Southern Africa, dispossessed communities chose to show their disapproval of their current situation, by occupying lands 'illegally', asserting that they did not need formal land rights to rebuild their livelihoods. The FAO suggests that there should be alternative protective mechanisms put in place for communities that do not hold private ownership rights of land. Within the current national system, the issue of ownership seems to be the only presented solution to protect populations. There needs to be greater investigation into land users, not needing a prerequisite of formal entitlement to land, to ensure they are not deprived. Support must come from concerted actions with communities at all levels.

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10

HOW CAN THE POOR BE EMPOWERED TO FIGHT CORRUPTION?

Rohan Seth

Introduction

Corruption is a political, social and economic phenomenon that undermines the democratic institutions, slows economic development and causes political instability (UNODC, n.d.). Mark Warren defines corruption as “departures by public officials from public rules, norms, and laws for the sake of private gain” (Warren, 2004). Although Warren’s definition is broad; this paper will build upon it. As Warren states “departures from public office” does not specify the scale of corruption, as it could potentially occur at different levels. Transparency International (TI) argues that corruption which is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, could be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amount of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by small and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access essential goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies (Transparency International, n.d.). Unfortunately, the finite scope of the paper does not allow us to examine all these scales of corruption in depth. As a result, this paper will focus on the impacts of petty corruption faced by the poor with income below the poverty line. Considering petty corruption, like its larger counterparts, it treats different income levels differently. In other words, Warren’s departures from public rules and laws for the sake of private gain could also apply to multi-million dollar scandals as well as bribery of relatively meagre amounts.

Identifying the Problem: Petty Corruption Faced by the Poor

The choice of focus within this paper is on small-scale grassroots corruption targeted towards the poor. It is motivated by two factors: firstly, as indicated by Thi Ninh (2014), “petty corruption is more dangerous than massive one. This is because... [it] takes place

everywhere and it has been normalized in [countries such as] Vietnam”. Secondly, the paper will focus on the effects of this corruption on the poor. This is so because the poor have the least amount of financial resources to deal with this prevalent corruption, but are widely exposed to it. For instance, consider India, the world’s largest democracy where corruption runs rampant in the system, and is a major problem. Securing a score of 38 on the ‘Corruptions Perceptions Index’ in 2015 — ‘0’ meaning ‘highly-corrupt’ and 100, ‘highly-clean’. India is arguably among the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2017). A significant portion of this corruption occurs in the grassroots and inhibits the life of the poor. In 2007, of the 5.6 million households below the poverty line that interacted with the police last year, a whopping 2.5 million people paid \$33.83 million as a bribe for some work, or the other (Transparency International, 2008). Putting this into perspective, India’s poor population of 360 million approximately amounted to almost \$3,440 paid in bribes for a family of 4, not even earning a dollar (\$64) per day (Biswas, 2012). The poor cannot afford to send \$3,440 on bribes without putting survival at risk. Furthermore, the effects of corruption are not just limited to quantifiable numbers, as it also tarnishes the society’s outlook towards the government after being normalized. Corruption has been creating an aura of helplessness in India. 96 per cent of Indians interviewed said that corruption was holding their country back, and 92 per cent believed it to have worsened in the past five years (Economist, 2014).

Left untreated, petty grassroots corruption has the potential to eat away the credibility of democracy, governance and hinder its development. How then can this socio-economic bane be tackled? Literature on this subject hints at the capability approach, which would be explored further in the next section.

Taking into Account the Perspective of The Poor: Employing the Capability Approach to Re-Examine Poverty as Capability Deprivation

Amartya Sen’s (2001) capability approach consists of two concepts: ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’. Considering the former, functionings are potential achievements of a person; what he or she manages to do or to be, and any such functioning reflects, as it were, a part of the state of that person (Sen, 2001). Capabilities are the various combinations of functionings (doings and beings), a person can achieve. In doing so, capability reflects a person’s freedom to choose between different ways of living (Sen, 2001).

Defining the capability approach brings us back to the question of how this approach could help us to fight petty grassroots corruption faced by the poor. In order to answer this question, let us re-examine the notion of poverty itself using capability approach.

Traditionally, poverty is viewed as lack of income. Logically, this view is not ill founded. Income does have an enormous influence on what an individual can or cannot do. While there is an excellent case to begin viewing poverty in terms of income, there is an equally compelling case to not end with an income analysis (Sen, 2014). Income is not an end itself but a means to live an acceptable life (Sen, 2014). In other words, a means for individuals to fulfil their capabilities. When capabilities are restricted, the ability to achieve an acceptable life becomes limited, which ultimately makes poverty to stem.

The perception about poverty allows us to identify the essence of poverty. Defining poverty as deprivation of capability helps us to realize that corruption is the cause and consequence of poverty, as well as the failure of capability (Daojiu, 2014). The consequence reverts back to being a cause, making for a vicious cycle where capability is a casualty. Lack of income, when viewed as an intermediary, albeit causal element allows us to see how it develops the different aspects of poverty. It allows us to see that poverty is actually not just lack of income, but more importantly, illiteracy. Illiteracy restricts capability to be engage politically, by limiting awareness about legislations, resulting in an unequal access to institutions. The deprivation of these capabilities silences the voice of the poor on relevant platforms and makes them vulnerable to corruption.

This brings up the question of how this vicious cycle of grassroots corruption should be tackled. Enhancing restricted capabilities would allow the poor to take institutions into account. Thus, this paper will focus on how the poor could be 'empowered' by expanding and protecting their capabilities to participate in, negotiate with, influence on, control over, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives (World Bank, 2002).

Using the capability approach to develop a more holistic perspective of poverty, which helps us to realize that the poor are not as capable of battling corruption as other members of the society. Thus, in order to battle petty corruption faced by the poor, it is essential to expand their capabilities. Identifying what must be done in order to tackle grassroots corruption targeted towards the poor, presents us with another problem which the capability approach did not address. This problem is that of implementation. Sen's capability

approach does not present us with a path suggesting how we can accomplish the same. As a result, the paper will look at how different forms of policy implementation which could be used to implement the goals identified by the capability approach, i.e. fighting grassroots corruption by expanding the capabilities of the poor.

Attempting to Expand Capabilities Through the Top-Down Approach of Policy Implementation

Richard Matland (1995) defines the process of top-down approach as the act of carrying out a court decision, statute or executive order taken by 'central' actors who seek to produce the 'desired effects' on the citizens through changes in public administration.

Matland's definition highlights two major aspects about top-down policy implementation. Firstly, it highlights that the top-down approach sees 'statute and law framers' as key actors in policy formulation. Secondly, it establishes that the top-down approach relies on legal methods and structures for policy implementation. Consequently, the approach has three stages, namely, formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Sabatier, 1986).

Paul Sabatier, (1986) argues that the top-down model requires clear and consistent objectives; devised during its articulation. This implies that any top-down initiative is based on sufficient causal belief. In other words, the objectives devised during the articulation of top-down initiatives are based on implicit ideas about how to accomplish desired social change (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Moving on to implementation, the top-down method relies on a legal structure to pursue the objectives articulated during formulation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). This is followed by evaluation where the success of initiatives is judged on the basis of the extent to which the objectives are achieved (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Thus, the objectives set during formulation not only define the goals, but also serve as a yardstick for its evaluation.

Applying the Top-down to Anti-Corruption Policy: Introducing the Right to Information

The Right to Information (RTI) act is one of the most prominent examples of the top-down approach being employed to fight corruption. Introduced across India in 2005, RTI aims to 'empower citizens, promote transparency and accountability in the workings of

the government, curtail corruption, and make India's democracy workable for the people in the real sense' (RTI, 2015). Under RTI, individuals are entitled to demand desired information from government institutions, simply by the virtue of being citizens. The application form fee costs a meagre \$10, and once submitted, the query is liable to be answered by the government within 30 days (Conversationindia, n.d.). The enquiry could either be submitted online or in person.

RTI is a typical example of the top-down approach. As required by the top-down approach, RTI is an act formulated by 'central' actors in the system. Secondly, RTI is based on clearly defined objectives and goals of increasing transparency and accountability. Thus, it is based on the causal belief that increasing transparency would eradicate corruption from the various layers of the society. Thirdly, RTI relies heavily on the legal structure of government institutions for its implementation.

Accessible transparency, the goal of RTI, enables the poor to take governmental institutions into account. However, while this idea is noble, results mentioned below, proved that it was unable to effectively tackle grassroots corruption. In order to understand why this is so, it is essential to understand criticisms of the top-down approach itself.

The Failed Quest of Adapting to the Periphery: Failure of the Top-down Approach

The top-down approach has a flawed structure because the approach tends to start from the perspective of the (central) decision-makers, and it neglects other important actors, or views them as impediments in the process (Sabatier, 1986). Doing so is particularly problematic when the approach is employed to fight petty corruption. This is so because it could overemphasize the centre over local actors, and more importantly, the people being affected by the policy process (Politicalpipeline, 2013). This could result in the initiative never adapting to the periphery. Top-down initiatives that do not adapt to the periphery are unsuccessful in utilizing their potential, as is evident in the case of RTI.

RTI tilldate, still remains underutilized in India. This is so because central actors involved in its formulation were not fully aware of peripheral conditions in public administrative institutions around India. Few years after the launch of RTI, reports began to emerge that government authorities were reluctant to release information to the public,

pleading a clause in RTI that exempted releasing information in undefined 'exceptional' cases (Pandharipande, 2015).

This reluctance to release information is down to the fact that that public authorities believed that the introduction of RTI would lead to unnecessary hassle, as they now had an additional charge or responsibilities of responding to applicants with information (Pandharipande, 2015). Statistics do back up this claim. Over the years, the requests pending under the RTI act have risen greatly. An estimated 100,000 requests were pending under RTI at the start of 2014-15 (Nayak, 2016). Moreover, not only has the administration proven to be reluctant and inefficient to make RTI underwhelming, a number of RTI activists have also been attacked. A report claims that 39 RTI activists were killed by 2015, while 279 were assaulted, (Chauhan, 2015). Numbers which in all likelihood have risen at the time of writing was as a result of the high number of attacks on the activists has been stated as simply the filing of RTI applications (Pandharipande, 2015).

Moreover, the poor too, have found it difficult to use RTI to fight corruption. This is so because RTI is formulated by the central actors, and only takes into account how corruption is exercised and not how it is experienced. As a result, it fails to acknowledge the fact that the poor do not have equal capabilities to fight corruption. This is evident in the wordings of the law that states that every citizen is given an equal platform to demand their right to information. Establishing that each citizen is given an 'equal' platform essentially establishes that each citizen requires an equal platform to fight corruption. This is unfair to the poor as the lack of income eats away at their capabilities, causing illiteracy and unequal access to institutions. As a result, the poor have been unable to fight off corruption in government schemes and programs that are supposed to benefit them.

For example, consider the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India (NREGA). NREGA is an employment scheme launched by the Government of India that aims to provide skilled and unskilled opportunities of employment to labourers for 100 days (Roy Chowdhury, 2010). However, the scheme is so riddled with corruption such that it was only able to provide one-fifths of the funds allocated to the poor, its intended beneficiaries (Jagannathan, 2014). And while most of NREGA's corruption can be cured with the usage of RTI by the poor demanding transparency regarding the public funds, the measure has rarely been employed, leading to the sad state of the program. The underutilization of RTI to cure impairments surrounding NREGA and other programs, tells us that

the poor have not been employing RTI as a tool to battle corruption. This underutilization is down to the equal platform provided to them by RTI, which plays to their disadvantage in battling corruption as it does not take into account their restricted capabilities.

Considering the aforementioned assassinations of RTI activists, the prevalence of grassroots corruption in programs such as NREGA, the ever-increasing rise in pending RTI requests, compiled with the collective ambiance of frustration towards the act, it is safe to conclude that RTI has not lived up to its potential due to the structure of the top-down approach. Formulation by central actors makes it difficult to adapt to local conditions, and does not take into account the restricted capabilities of the poor, leading to policy failure (Matland, 1995). Thus, in order to battle grassroots corruption and empower the poor, top-down initiatives must realize the importance of adapting themselves to local conditions and the plight of the poor.

Attempting to Acknowledge the Poors' Perspective: the Bottom-up Approach

Definitions and Characteristics

A 'bottom-up' method of policy implementation could be a substitute to the top-down approach. This is so, because the bottom-up approach tends to take into consideration the perspectives and the strategies of actors in the periphery; making initiatives more adaptable, by taking into account the perspective of the periphery. By basing its implementation structure around peripheral actors, it takes a positive stride towards the empowerment of the poor against grassroots corruption. In order to understand how this works, let us first examine the three stages of the bottom-up approach, i.e. formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

Considering formulation, the bottom-up approach takes a 'grassroots stance'. Bottom-up initiatives begin by identifying the problems being faced by local level implementers. Local implementers are unelected government officials present in the periphery, and are in charge of the execution of the programs in question; for example, street level bureaucrats. In doing so, the approach would be able to identify problems ignored by the top-down approach, mentioned in the previous chapter, such as the unwillingness of the local actors to implement RTI. Thus, the first step is to determine perceived problem of actors and the strategies developed to deal with them (Hanf, 1982).

Moving on to implementation, once the perceived problems are identified, the bottom-up method argues in favour of building an implementation structure (Hjern & Porter, 1981). The approach is implemented through specifically designed 'policy networks'. These policy networks built from the previous step, and use actors already identified as a vehicle to identify the local, regional and national level actors involved in the planning and execution of the programs in question (Hjern & Hull, 1982). This nature of the approach, in moving from the local level actors to higher officials, is a considerable strength. Initiatives that adapt poorly to local conditions are likely to fail.

Thirdly, considering evaluation, assessing the impact of bottom-up initiatives is significantly more complex than its top-down counterpart. This is so because the bottom-up approach does not begin with set policy objectives and it uses the perceived problems of local implementers to identify objectives. Because of this, initiatives based upon the approach initially lack a predefined yardstick. Once the problem has been identified, a parameter for evaluation is set.

In order to understand how the bottom-up approach functions when employed in the context of anti-corruption, let us use an example of 'community monitoring' undertaken by The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, India.

Applying the Bottom-up Approach to Anti-Corruption Policy: Social Auditing in Rajasthan

MKSS social audit is a typical example of the bottom-up approach being employed to fight grassroots corruption. In order to understand why this is so, let us consider the three stages of the bottom-up approach, formulation, implementation and evaluation. Considering the former first, Hjern's bottom-up methodology argues that in the formulation stage, it is best to begin by identifying how actors (local implementers) aim to implement strategies to achieve their goals (Hanf, 1982). In doing so, it better enables initiatives to adapt to the local conditions. The MKSS initiative followed suit and identified local implementers of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) present in Rajasthan using the Right to Information. Several instances of worksite corruption emerged in the program. The MKSS, focusing on Rajasthan, identified local implementers of NREGA and took note of instances of worksite corruption. Identifying these

officials, led MKSS to determine how aforementioned officials practiced different strategies to exploit the poor for their own personal gain (Afridi, 2008).

Once the initiative had identified local implementers and their strategies, they moved on to implementation. Before we can go on to examine how the initiative performs in the second phase of the top-down approach, let us first look at the bottom-up anti-corruption conundrum. The bottom-up concept of a policy network poses a problem, as is evident by the paradox that the MKSS faced. Once MKSS identified the strategies of the local implementers to achieve their goal, they realized that it would be self-defeating to ask the same local implementers to build a network to curb the very corruption they practice. This paradox is likely to be inherent in most bottom-up anti-corruption initiatives, as it will tend to produce a conflict of interest. This conflict will stem from the fact that the implementation structure, aimed at curbing corruption cannot be formed of the same officials that practice the same corruption; as such, a structure is unlikely to be effective due to personal interests.

MKSS seems to have adapted their policy network to the paradox mentioned above. Instead of relying on local implementers to form an implementation structure, they built a policy network using members and officials from MKSS and other civil society organizations (Ramkumar, 2008). These members took action to curb corruption being practiced in worksites. The first step of this corrective action was to acquire records of NREGA projects that had been carried out by the *gram panchayat* (block-level modular government) of the block in question. Obtaining these records helped the MKSS in identifying the network in charge of NREGA implementation. Moreover, this list of records also goes on to serve the purpose of mapping out the expenditures made on activities such as wage payments and acquiring and providing worksite facilities.

After collecting data on the expenditure on each worksite, the policy network chose by random sampling, one project per block to be audited (Afridi, 2008). In cases where the records and reality did not match, for instance, discrepancies in wage payments, the labourers, being the intended beneficiaries, were asked to provide testimonies.

Once these testimonies had been collected, the policy network then opted to present them to the public and high-level government officials through '*jansunwais*' (public hearing). Several activists and government officials were invited to witness these hearings (Afridi,

2008). After the discrepancies and testimonies of the labourers were presented to the public, the process is moved on to naming and shaming of the public officials that were involved. This helped fight corruption in NREGA in two major ways. Firstly, it set an example for other officials in charge of conducting NREGA projects by acting as a warning. Secondly, denouncing these implementers in the public eye, made the poor aware of the different kinds of corruption involved in service delivery and providing them with courage to demand entitlements that rightfully belonged to them in the first place.

In sum, it is evident that the social audit is a model example of the bottom-up approach. Given that MKSS social audit should be considered a textbook bottom-up initiative, as it raises the question of to what extent is the bottom-up approach better than its top-down counterpart at battling corruption and empowering the poor. In order to answer this question, let us evaluate the bottom-up approach.

Overemphasizing the Capacity of the Periphery to Frustrate the Centre: Perennial Failure of the Bottom-up Approach

The approach has one major structural shortcoming, i.e. its tendency to overemphasize the periphery to frustrate the centre (Sabatier, 1986). This overemphasis leads to the bottom-uppers not establishing a concrete link from the periphery to the centre in order to implement changes. This is best illustrated by comparing two stages of the MKSS initiative. In the initial stages of the initiative, members of the MKSS are to use RTI to gain governmental records from the centre. In doing so, they are exercising a clear legal tangible link between the periphery and the centre in RTI. RTI is a link that ensures that the centre is liable to answer to the periphery. However, the centre is not liable to answer or take action in case of every public hearing. Thus, there is no guarantee that the centre (higher level officials) will attend or respond to these hearings. This raises the question of potential effectiveness. If the hearings fail, there is little the periphery can do in this case to gain attention from the centre. Thus, because of its overemphasis on the periphery, this approach is not particularly effective when it comes to communicating these problems to the centre.

Synthesizing the Approaches: the Promised Land

Evaluating the policy implementation approaches stated above, we realized that both approaches have inherent flaws that made them unsuitable to expand capabilities of the poor. This brings us to the impasse of what course to take to battle grassroots corruption and expand the capabilities of the poor.

It is in response to this question that we are implored to consider the possibility of a synthesis. Combining the two approaches is arguably the best way to battle grassroots corruption. This is so because a synthesized approach embodies Aristotle's principle of, 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts' (Powers, 2015). A combination of the two approaches leads to overcoming the shortcomings of both of these approaches when implemented individually. This is best illustrated by the example of an anti-corruption undertaking in Rajasthan, India that combined the two approaches to battle corruption.

Applying the Synthesis to Anti-corruption Policy: The Consortium of Groups for Combating Corruption

Few anti-corruption initiatives have as been as successful as 'The Consortium of Groups for Combating Corruption' (CGCC) model in Rajasthan. Beginning in 2007, the model lasted for six years and facilitated an 'intervention' against corruption in the grassroots (Arya, 2014). Designed by the Consumer Unit Trust Society (CUTS) and the Partnership Transparency Fund (PTF). The CGCC model-based 'intervention' on corruption enabled hundreds of citizens to expand their capabilities and successfully battle corruption. In order to understand how the approaches were combined, the chapter will divide the intervention into two phases: (i) planning and organization (ii) implementation.

The planning behind the initiative was intrinsically top-down in nature. CUTS and PTF identified grassroots corruption, delivery of service, and entitlements as the problem. This identification was reliant on central actors who were entities away from grassroots, and themselves were not users or beneficiaries of RTI. After identifying corruption in delivery of services and entitlements as the problem, CUTS and PTF selected NREGA as the government program to battle corruption. Once the problem and the scope of the issue had been identified, the initiative sought to battle the same, using RTI, a textbook top-down strategy.

Learning from the failure of RTI implementation, the initiative sought to correct this by supplementing the top-down mechanism of RTI with bottom-up implementation by intensifying their methods of execution.

This bottom-up organization complemented the already existing top-down mechanism of RTI. In order to form this policy network, CUTS recruited a number of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in close geographical proximity. 42 NGOs and CSOs were recruited and divided up into consortiums to take into account the perspectives of the periphery (Resolis, 2014).

This bottom-up policy network then set out to assess the perceived problems of the poor. In order to accomplish this, a 'corruption vulnerabilities survey' was conducted to identify the weak points in service delivery in targeted areas. The consortiums then tackled these vulnerabilities. For instance, upon finding out that the citizens below the poverty line were not familiar with RTI, and how it could empower them against corruption, CUTS held workshops addressing the same. This raised awareness and fostered an environment to tackle corruption. This stage was largely successful in achieving its goal. By the end of the stage, awareness about the RTI increased from 40 per cent to 85 per cent (Arya, 2014).

Thanks to the previous stage of the intervention; the improved awareness of RTI resulted in increased utilization of RTI. A total of 779 applications were filed by the people in the targeted area (Arya, 2014). The increased use of RTI forced new problems to come into light. These were problems that might have remained undetected in top-down implementation alone. For instance, continual interaction with the periphery helped CGCC to find out that citizens had not been filing RTI applications due to fear of retribution from government officials. In order to counter this, CGCC organized workshops based on practical aspects of filing an RTI application. Citizens unable to attend these workshops could also reach CGCC via mobile phones to gain assistance. This phase saw 100 per cent of RTI applications being successfully resolved without the payment of a bribe. A total of 210 calls were also received by the department, and their problems were resolved without the payment of a bribe (Arya, 2014). In sum, the initiative proved to be a success in Rajasthan as it showed the world's largest democracy a viable means of fighting corruption and empowering its poor.

Learning from the Synthesis: Analyzing the Factors Behind the Success of the Intervention

In hindsight, we can come to conclusion that the success of the intervention was down to two major factors, namely: the synthesis of the two approaches and the special assistance to the poor while battling corruption. Should anti-corruption initiatives seek to achieve their goal? It is highly recommended to learn from these factors.

Considering the former, synthesizing the approaches overcame the shortcomings of each approach when implemented individually. RTI's top-down tendencies were corrected by keeping close proximity to the grassroots and taking into account the perspective of the periphery.

The initiative also went a long way to correct elements in the bottom-up approach. Synthesizing the approaches helped correct the overemphasis of the bottom-up approach on the periphery instead of the centre. This overemphasis is corrected by expressing problems of the citizens through RTI. By virtue of being a law established by the centre, RTI enquiries were liable to be answered by the government within a limited amount of time. Thus, using RTI as a link between the centre and the periphery ensures that the periphery and its capability to frustrate the centre is not overemphasized, making for legal effective changes. Thus, combining the approaches helped to make a method of policy implementation that battled corruption in the grassroots more effectively.

Additionally, initiatives should acknowledge that the poor have restricted capabilities, in order to fight corruption. This enables initiatives to treat the poor accordingly, making for more effective expansion of capabilities. CGCC recognized the same, and provided special consideration to the poor; as this is evident throughout the initiative. This led to increased capabilities that ensured that the poor were enabled to take the institutions that affected their lives through RTI. In other words, tangible action to support the acknowledgement of the poor's restricted capabilities goes a long way in expanding the capabilities of the poor.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to examine how the top-down and bottom-up approaches could be successfully combined and accentuated to the benefit of a synthesis. These benefits have

established that a combined approach is the best method to fight corruption. Moreover, not only is a synthesis arguably the best method to battle corruption, any initiative to battle corruption in the grassroots must consider the fact that not all individuals need equal amounts of empowerment. Citizens living below the poverty line have limited capabilities that make them more vulnerable to corruption. Consideration to both factors is bound to make a better and achievable anti-corruption front.

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11

HIRED GUNS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Aanchal Mann

Introduction

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) are far from a recent phenomenon. Historically, the term ‘mercenary’ was used to describe soldiers for hire, however today; there stands a legal grey area of the difference between mercenaries and PMSCs. Mercenaries and private military companies are differentiated based on their respective structures and contractors (Singer, 2008).

International efforts to regulate the industry have failed to effectively deal with issues that have arisen as a result of contracting these companies. Ratified under the Geneva Convention, the International Convention on the Use of Mercenaries has failed to address the prominent issues of regulation and accountability, as it is based on the definition of mercenaries rather than PMSCs.

This paper aims to explore the role of PMCSs in contemporary international relations, arguing the re-emergence of the privatisation of war, more prominently since the War on Terror. The role of PMSCs diminished significantly during the 19th century, as the use of force was gradually consolidated by the system of nation states. As the modern state developed, citizen armies became the norm. The re-emergence of the industry at the end of the 20th century is worthy of further exploration and explanation. On 20th October, 2001, the United Nations set out a treaty (United Nations Mercenary Convention) to prohibit ‘the

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recruitment, training, use and financing of mercenaries' (UN.org, 1989). Although this convention was ratified by 35 states, these did not include the United States or the UK.

The work of Singer (2008), provides an important contribution through his categorization of different type of PMSCs. These companies have been categorised in three ways: companies that 'provide implementation and command...advice and training...[and] military support' (Singer, 2008, p.87). The dynamics of military and security privatization are far more pervasive and these companies' duties range from the provision of training and advice to combat-active duties.

The War on Terror altered the way PMSCs were contracted. In other words, it brought PMSCs to the forefront of battlefields, directly contracted by leading governments and corporations (Hughes, 2007, p.100). The occupation of Iraq in 2003 consisted of a considerable number of contractors: it has been estimated that there were 100,000 contractors compared with 140,000 US soldiers (Hughes, 2007, p.134). Moreover, before the occupation of Iraq, this substantial number of contractors was not seen for over a century (Hughes, 2007, p.134), it is for this reason that this paper will use the case of Iraq to provide concrete evidence throughout. The occupation of Iraq revealed a new set of circumstances in which national forces were accompanied by national and multinational corporate actors (O'Brien, 1998; Isenberg, 2007). Moreover, PMSCs were contracted in order to protect their corporate assets in the country. This occupation of Iraq is argued to have an overt imperial strategy and an evident doctrine of instituting neoliberal capitalism on a global scale.

Since the prevalent acceptance of national sovereignty and democracy in Western states, imperialism has been condemned as oppressive and exploitative. This paper will be using the term imperialism as a theoretical concept and seeks to go beyond drawing comparisons between 21st century American empire, and the Roman empire.

Several theories of imperialism need to be considered to understand the concept of neoliberal imperialism. Realists contended that imperialism is a manifestation of the balance of power. Assuming a perspective of analysis at the state-unit level, their focus of imperialism is premised on the idea of nations striving to achieve a favourable change in the *status quo*. Realists such as Morgenthau argued that the purpose of imperialism is to reduce the political and strategic susceptibility of a state. On the other hand, Liberalism advances

the idea that imperialism is a choice rather than a consequence. Furthermore, they suggest that they result from disturbances in the global capitalist system. Liberal empire is best characterised as a contradiction between Wilsonian aspirations to legitimise states, free markets, and undermining of the market forces by sovereignty. Finally, the central idiom in the analysis of contemporary imperialism has been the Marxist school of thought. For Marxists, imperialism is grounded in the idea that political phenomena reflects economic forces; and Marxist scholars argue that the fundamental causes of contemporary imperialism is parallel to those of classical imperialism of the early 20th century. Although they acknowledged that the outcomes and conditions may differ.

The first section seeks to situate the use of PMSCs in the context of contemporary international relations. The second section explores the two central conceptual issues that arise when discussing the privatisation of war; power and legitimacy. The last part uses the analysis formed in the first two sections to analyze the case of Iraq, and to establish a relationship between PMSCs and the state. This paper will finally argue that the regulation and accountability structures should be improved, and that states should be held to higher standards of reasons and mechanisms of outsourcing.

PMSCs: Context, Neoliberalism and Supplementing for the State

This section aims to provide the context of private military and security companies (PMSCs), and use the existing literature to provide a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon.

Contextualising the Private Military and Security Industry

The privatisation of violence has evolved into an industry that provides specialist military, security knowledge and services. Contrary to widespread belief, the privatisation of violence was a standard dimension of international relations before the 20th century (Jeffery Herbst in Mills & Stemplau, 1999, p.117). The state monopoly of violence is the exception to history, rather than the rule. Historically, 'Empires from ancient Egypt to Victorian England were notorious in their use of private force' (Singer, 2008, p.191). Corporate soldiers were employed to build the empire, such as the East India Company; however, this mode of contracting was aborted. This distinct and discernible shift from mercenaries to the modern-day nation state system took place over centuries. According to Charles Tilly (1975), the reason for this transformation occurred as states could 'utilise the men,

machinery and money required to take full advantage of the tools of warfare' (cited in Singer, 2008, p.196). Moreover, the introduction of the Westphalian system of states, which transferred the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence to the state, rendering the privatisation of violence almost obsolete.

Since the beginning of The War on Terror, the use of PMSCs has increased to such a vast degree, that the industry is now worth hundreds of billions of dollars (War on Want Report, 2016). Some of the research suggests that the privatisation of military services produces benefits for those contracting out their services, such as improved effectiveness and efficiency (Singer, 2008, p.191), and this is often the main explanation used to explain the re-emergence.

For this reason, Avant (2008), labels those who favour the rise of PMSCs as 'optimists', i.e. those who value the efficiency provided by PMSCs. However, this efficiency cannot always be guaranteed when contracting out PMSCs, and on certain occasions, conditions placed on PMSCs impede cost-saving (Avant, 2004, p.153). Hughes (2007), labels Iraq as the privatisation experiment. The US and UK administrations proposed that PMSCs in Iraq would offer efficient and creative help to its occupiers, and that the superiority of the market would ensure this. However, there are those who have demonstrated how privatisation, in fact obstructed the occupation: 'contractors brought corruption, failure and violence' (Hughes, 2007: 133). Furthermore, PMSCs played a significant role in the break-down of the Iraqi state, leaving Iraq's economy and government fragmented; bringing light to Machiavelli's (1532) argument that mercenaries would 'deliver a military disaster or failure' (cited in Hughes, 2007, p.95).

Moreover, it can be argued that this tends to imply that PMSCs are 'messiahs', only intervening in situations when the state is unable or unwilling to, for example PMSCs played significant peacekeeping roles in Rwanda after the genocide in 1994, and in Somalia since 1997. This is only a small percentage of the roles played by PMSCs in contemporary global politics. However, Avant (2004), argues that PMSCs could provide 'a platform that competes with the UN as a "tool" of international force (Avant, 2004, p.155).

Thus, this paper echoes the argument of Abrahamsen and Williams who suggest that the rise of the private military and security industry is similar to that of a 'new medievalism' (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007, p.134). In other words, the current use of PMSCs

reflects a diffusion of power and violence that looks very much like it did in the medieval period (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007, p.134).

Neoliberalism: Profit and Power

The rise of neoliberal modes of government is one of the key developments that have driven the rise and re-emergence of the private military and security industry (Johnston 2003; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007; 2009). In the case of Iraq, the occupation brought with it series of privatisation restructures that the London Economist called: 'A Capitalist Dream' (cited in Harvey, 2003, p.215). This involved:

'The full privatisation of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits...the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies...and the elimination of nearly all trade barrier...only oil was exempt' (Harvey, 2003, p.215).

Additionally, the status of PMSCs as a key actor in the market has been developed through the increase of neoliberal economic policies over the last few decades. This has meant that PMSCs now provide a 'service' that has been commodified to consumers on the free market (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007,p.141). Therefore, this market-based approach towards military and security services can be considered 'the ultimate representation of neoliberalism' (O'Brien 1998, cited in Singer, 2008,p. 197). This can be problematic, as the commodification of military and security is no longer rendered as politically neutral, and PMSCs can take advantage of the logics of free trade to 'expedite their entry into new markets' (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p.5).

Furthermore, neoliberal economic policies constitute violence as a private commodity, rather than a public good, which could result in defence policies, shaped by 'the profit motives and egos of a small group of hard-liners' (Silverstein, 2000, p.4).

The rise of PMSCs in an era of neoliberal ideology and practices has enabled these companies to effect conflict in two distinct ways: by creating it, and by magnifying it. It is argued that personal profit is generated through PMSCs' use of violence, and can cause war to become self-perpetuating (Singer 2008). In other words, privatisation has enabled international PMSCs, with various levels of perceived legitimacy, to make use of opportunities

in conflict. For example, PMSCs thrive in profit-motivated climates, such as: civil conflicts in Colombia over the last twenty years, and in the Republic of Congo from 1999, where they are employed by these groups, or responding to humanitarian crises. By instituting themselves on both sides of the network of supply, it is argued that PMSCs help to create these conflicts over resources, rather than ideological motivations, and can be used to generate further profit (Singer, 2008: 196-7), and to ‘fuel new wars’ (Kinsey, 2006, p.114). As a result, many argue that privatising war has magnified many conflicts, such as the new wars of the 1990s (Kalder, 2001; Duffield, 2001). It can then be argued that PMSCs play a vital role in contemporary global politics, in which they use profit motivations, based on a neoliberal system, to alter and fuel conflict environments.

This could be problematic, as the capacity to derive force from money, reflects the re-emergence of Kantian fears, over the perils of lowering the cost of war. Although liberalism acknowledges the benefits of profit-motive, and determines that neoliberal economic policies reduce the incentive for conflict, the privatisation of military and security services, which also prompts the increase of potential threat from economic power. This is an issue in contemporary global politics, as it challenges core liberal values as ‘economic threats can now be transformed into military threats’ (Singer, 2008, pp.209-10). This is similar to that of 16th century imperial military strategies, where military proficiency is synonymous with wealth, and so it can be argued that although neoliberalism has facilitated the re-emergence of the industry, it is also enabling larger issues such as conflict and war to be undermined.

Supplementing of the State

The large majority of the private military and security industry’s growth is achieved through the supplementation of the state through the subcontracting of state military activity. Other ways that PMSCs are used by states include, substituting for states with insufficient military capabilities. However, this analysis will only determine the ways PMSCs are subcontracted by states, as anything else is beyond the scope and intention of this study.

There are several reasons for the state to contract PMSCs. Firstly, there are those who argue that this increase of private military and security contracting has had no profound impact on international security (Krahmann, 2009). Next, it is thought that the privatisation of military and security services could ‘offer new tools of security’ (Avant, 2004,

p.153). For example, in 1994, the US contracted PMSCs to train the Croatian army, and to influence the balance of power in the Balkans. Furthermore, PMSCs could also act as a tool, which the global community of states can utilise to overcome any shortcomings in tackling conflict (Shearer, 1998). In this sense, private contractors have acted on behalf of nation states in roles previously occupied by national armies, and have also been contracted to work alongside national armies. For example, in 2004, private military and security company Kellogg, Brown and Root secured a contract worth approximately \$5.6 billion to provide logistical support to the US army (Kinsey, 2006).

Existing evidence suggests that there are also numerous negative consequences for state-contracting of PMSCs, namely, the ability to constrain them on accountability structures, and on democratic procedures. This means that governments are unable to limit its mechanisms and constraints companies to engage in appropriate conduct under government-approved contracts (Leander, 2004; Singer, 2008).

Secondly, one can argue that the privatisation of violence erodes government's accountability, as Avant and Sigelman suggested, the role of PMSCs in Iraq prompted the need to reassess the relationship between 'citizenship, public consent and the human cost of war' (Avant and Sigelman, 2010, p.260). The contracting of knowledge and services require less structure of visibility, accountability and regulation than national armies. As a result, information about contractors such as: the size, location and under what capacity, is limited. Although, this can be seen as a negative consequence There are those who argued that this is a tool that states have utilised. In other words, governments can evade public knowledge about casualties by contracting PMSCs. (Avant & Sigelman, 2010, p. 260). More than that, governments who contract out these companies, even go so far as restricting information according to their own needs, and Avant (2008) argues that this process has often been abused by governments.

The third consequence of contracting PMSCs is the effect on democratic procedures. Percy suggests that the use of PMSCs by Western governments leads to 'a reduction of democracy...by diminishing democratic oversight of decisions to go to war' (Percy, 2006, p.65). However, this research makes the case that, PMSCs, in this manner act as a tool by which Western governments could use to evade democratic practices. Moreover, the privatisation of military and security services transfers power to the executive, rather than the legislative branch in democratic countries. Avant and Sigelman argues that the US contracts

the services of PMSCs, so that the executive branch could utilise advantages over the US congress, in decision-making area of military services, as well as influence foreign policy matters (Avant and Sigelman, 2010, p.249). Percy (2006) also suggests that, without appropriate democratic oversight, the use of PMSCs could encourage and covert wars (Percy, 2006, p.38). Although power will be discussed in more details in section two. It is important to note that negative consequences do not prevent governments from using PMSCs; rather there are reasons *to* use them. The last point uses this analysis and the example of Iraq to demonstrate why governments outsource for several reasons, such as efficiency; there are larger reasons at play which enable them to use the negative and positive consequences for their own advantage.

Outsourcing has been most visible in recent years during the two post-invasion conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Raphael and Stokes contracting out of 'stabilisation operations', which was claimed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is a distinct element of US coercive strategy, which is explicitly designed to increase 'regional security and stability for the purposes of resource extraction' (Raphael and Stokes, 2010, p.75). It is for this reason that this paper argues that states have more to gain by contracting out PMSCs. In addition, the third section will further highlight how imperial strategies such as this are key reasons for the subcontracting by Western states.

Conceptual Issues

This section lays the foundation of conceptual issues, by exploring the notions of legitimacy and power. The first part identifies the ways through which power is being redistributed by states and PMSCs for the advantage of states. The second section will ascertain issues of legitimacy, using the concept of state sovereignty, and how legitimacy is being reshaped.

The Redistribution of Power

In order to establish the power that PMSCs yield today, and the role they play in contemporary global politics, this section will begin by addressing larger issues such as the balance of power, and build on neoliberal concepts established in the previous section. To fully comprehend the complex multiplicities between power, PMSCs and the state, this research then explores three dimensions of power: a thin account, dependency, and a thick account.

It has been argued that the use of PMSCs undermine the legitimacy of concepts such as 'the balance of power'. This is because sovereign states do not hold military power exclusively, but include, 'interdependent players caught in a network of transnational transactions' (Jean-Marie Guehenno, 2000, p.6). In this way, Isenberg argues that the use of private military and security contractors has 'thwarted civil-military relations' (Isenberg, 2007, p.24). While this may hold true, it is necessary to uncover the ways in which this balance and these relations have been challenged, which this study aims to do in the upcoming part of this section.

'Power is more fungible than ever', as military resources are now available on the market, and the barriers to acquire military capabilities are lowered, as discussed in section one (Singer, 2008, p.209). This means that PMSCs are now in a position where they are able to purchase substantial amounts of power. The next section will explore the three dimensions of power to illustrate what type of power this involves.

The thin account of power relates to the formal capacity to decide over the use of force, and is based on the centrality of the state. It suggests that as contractors are still in the control of states, as states retain partial ownership. The contracts of PMSCs are approved subject to home-state authorisation. PMSCs also deny any 'independent agency', and argue that they merely supplement state's capabilities and 'function as multipliers, while all important decisions are taken by public authorities' (Leander, 2010, p.490).

However, this argument has limitations, as it is based on a state-central account and it is insufficient in being able to express the full degree of PMSCs' power. To put it differently, given that the thin account focuses only on the formal capacity to decide over the use of force, it simplifies the argument to suggest that if states can preserve this formal power, the contracting of PMSCs will be inconsequential. Leander argues that PMSCs 'are not mere arms of government policy', they 'must follow a market logic' (Leander, 2004, p.819).

The second dimension of power shall be discussed, and thus, another capacity in which power is being redistributed, is through a dependence on contracting out private military and security companies. Leander (2004) illustrates in her work how contracting out services from PMSCs creates a by-product, a dependence on their services. Furthermore, 'if a company sustains a monopoly on a particular service, this dependence is increased' (Leander, 2004, p.821). Finding a replacement, in both cases, is notoriously difficult and

expensive. For example, in Iraq, even though extortionate costs provided unsatisfactory results, intelligence services provided by PMSC Titan and the training of Iraqi soldiers by PMSC Vinnell proved extremely difficult to replace.

Finally, the thick account of power that will be discussed embodies the capacity of PMSCs, to affect the meaning in security discourses, or as Leander (2004) labels it: 'epistemic power', this includes the effects that PMSCs can have on the interests of other actors, through their capacity to influence these actors' understanding of security. Epistemic power of PMSCs directly affect security discourses, through 'the gathering, selecting and analysing of intelligence'. It indirectly affects security discourses as contractors take on the roles of lobbyists, trainers and hired consultants (Leander, 2004, p.821). For example, PMSCs were first contracted out to gather intelligence and ascertain potential threats. PMSCs would then advise the contracting party on how to respond, and what actions to take, regarding these threats. It could also involve 'constructing a security picture' and 'suggesting security enhancing measures' (Leander, 2004, p.822). This can mean that some contractors 'find themselves obtaining important positions in policy formation' (Avant, 2004, p.60).

In the case of Iraq, PMSC DynCorp provided a 'package deal' (Leander, 2004, p.813). It was contracted out to assess threats on the national, provincial and municipal levels; to train Iraqi police and military officers, and to advise on the reorganisation of the Iraqi justice system. As a result, this paper argues that the privatisation of intelligence contracts through PMSCs, allows them to shape security discourses and policy formation, by selecting and structuring information, and profiting from action taken accordingly.

Avant (2004), acknowledges how the industry operates today, by stating:

'privatising conflict alters the means by which force is controlled, resulting in a redistribution of power over the control of violence, a dispersal of that power within states and the enhancement of influence over individuals and groups beyond the bounds of the state' (Avant, 2004, pp.156-7).

In addition, Leander (2004) has argued that private military and security companies can be considered 'secondary international actors'. In order to fully comprehend the extent of the power they possess, they must be considered as a 'weapons system used to shore up fragile state structures', and acknowledged as a robust tool utilised by powerful states

(Leander, 2004, p.804). Thus, this section argues that rather than giving away their power, states have redistributed power in contemporary global politics. Moreover, states are using the power possessed by PMSCs to increase their own power. Therefore, it can be argued that PMSCs act as a tool for states to indirectly obtain more power.

Reshaping Legitimacy

Weber (1919), defines a state as a ‘human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (Weber,1919, p.13). Based on this, with Weberian concept of statehood and sovereignty, many theorists argued that the privatisation of military and security services erodes state sovereignty, as the state is no longer the only unit that possesses the ability to use legitimate force. As a result, the re-emergence of the industry is readily interpreted as an illustration of the weakness of a state, and the allocation of power from the state to private actors. This section will discuss the idea that the state’s monopoly on violence legitimises PMSCs to serve its own interests.

The state’s monopoly of violence functions in two ways by legitimising the operations of PMSCs: negatively, by excluding rogue firms, and positively by actively bestowing legitimacy on firms that value and reinforce the state’s monopoly on violence, i.e. contracting them out. Some theorists argued how the norm of the state monopoly of violence is being undermined in practice, rather than in principle. Firstly, Krahmman (2009), argues that the contracting of PMSCs by states, indicates a change in the behaviour of states and ‘... in the international norm of the state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence’ (Krahmann, 2009, p.54). Additionally, she argues that it is through discourse that encompasses a changing understanding of the state monopoly on violence, that makes the legal and practical progress accepted (Krahmann, 2009, p.55) This can be illustrated through the decreasing role of government functions.

Furthermore, this has been justified through the concrete distinction made between the control over the legitimate use of armed force, and its exercise. Therefore, theorists often make the argument that if the state is the contracting party, it could regulate the deployment of privatised force, then, PMSCs do not affect the monopoly of violence (Patterson, 2010; Krahmman, 2009, pp.64-5). It is important to note, however, that ‘the private military industry is an independent global supplier that operates beyond the domain of any one state’ (Singer, 2008, p.208).

HIRED GUNS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE MILITARY
AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Aanchal Mann

On the other hand, rather than eroding a state's control of violence, a state's use of PMSCs poses new compromises for states (Avant 2004). Leander (2010) suggests that PMSCs function within settings where 'the state's monopoly on violence is a fundamental social, political and legal institution' (Leander, 2010, p.481). Furthermore, she argues that the legitimacy of these companies is contingent on the understanding that they 'operate in ways that respect, and reinforce this monopoly, albeit, perhaps transforming, perhaps improving, its shape and functioning' (Leander, 2010, p.481).

However, Machiavelli (1532), is strongly opposed to the use of privatised violence, and argued that 'effective mercenaries would feel their power and act in their own interests' (cited in Hughes, p.95). In other words, he stated that a mercenary force that was able to utilise violence effectively 'would not feel subservient to its government paymaster, and can ignore or bend instructions to its own interests'. In Iraq, the Private military and security companies' biggest incurred cost was political. In other words, 'their presence and influence distorted strategy, and helped to push The War on Terror towards even greater military action' (Hughes, 2007, p.135). In this way, they were able to reshape legitimacy.

Furthermore, the fact that states and non-state actors can acquire military capabilities in much the same way, as discussed in section one, influences states' legitimacy. Although, the state accounts for most of the growth of the PMS industry, and as such, they bestow legitimacy upon these companies. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) note:

'Rather than existing in opposition to the state, PMSCs are often part of complex security networks that knit together public and private, global and local actors that cannot be neatly contained within national boundaries: a process of reassemble into what we call *global security assemblages*' (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, p.3).

This study shows that there are three core reasons why states use their monopoly of violence to bestow legitimacy onto these companies: to use as a 'weapons-system' tool, to evade democratic channels and to make it easier to use force.

Shearer suggests that PMSCs can be likened to a 'weapon-system' that can be used by states to bestow legitimacy upon companies and markets (Shearer, 1998, p.89). Furthermore, Percy (2006), identifies issues with transparency that relate to theories of democratic peace. In other words, he contends that public opinion, and thereby public knowledge,

which could increase a state reluctance to go to war. The argument being made here is that the state willingly transfers its legitimacy in order to go forward with practices of war, outside of the appropriate domestic channels. In the words of Kant:

‘If the consent of citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared...nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war’ (Kant, 1795, p.4).

There are those who argue that PMSCs ‘legitimately acquire the use of force for profit motives, give authority of military means to unregulated agents and undermine state power’ (Isenberg 2007). Percy (2011) argues that contracting private military and security companies makes it easier for states to use force and therefore ‘easier for them to become autocratic’.

At the launch of the War on Terror, UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, released the document ‘Green Paper’, in which the key focus was to incite the differences between PMSCs and mercenaries, as well as to magnify how the market could regulate the industry. Although the published Green Paper did not result in the formation of new laws or rules, it did legitimise PMSCs, and, as Khalidi suggests, ‘The stage was set for their widespread use in the upcoming Iraq intervention’ (Khalidi, 2004, p.109).

This analysis suggests that the state has played a vital role in this in order, to gain advantage in geopolitical strategy and foreign policy. It can also be determined that the state’s monopoly of violence legitimises private military and security companies to serve its own interest. It does so for three core reasons: to use as a ‘weapons-system’ tool, to evade democratic channels and to make it easier to use force.

Imperial Analysis

This section seeks to synthesize the empirical and conceptual issues raised in the first two sections, with an imperial understanding. Firstly, it provides context and background to contemporary imperialism. It follows by amalgamating concepts of neoliberalism and imperialism to elaborate a new theoretical framework. It then uses this theoretical framework to better understand in contemporary debates regarding the US as an empire. Lastly,

the closing part seeks to illustrate the ways in which PMSCs function as a tool of neo-liberal imperialism.

Introduction to Imperialism

According to Khalidi (2004), the imperial idea is currently enjoying a fashionable revival. In the earlier times of imperialism, it represented an ideology that supported military expansion and imperial acquisition. More recently, it has reflected a 'system of political domination or economic exploitation that the pursuit of such goals helps to establish' (Heywood, 2000, pp.245-6). The strategies of imperialism over the years have included: direct colonial rule; forceful rule over by military and political conquest, and indirect rule through 'pre-existing state forms and local, co-opted elite structures.' (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.13). This paper aims to argue that in the current era of globalization and transnational capitalist economies, the American empire is prevailing. Moreover, this is occurring in a profoundly different manner from past imperial conquests, and has at its basis, radically different motivations. It will discuss the emerging differences in methods of imperialism, and simultaneously illustrate the factors which currently determine America to be an empire.

Hardt and Negri (2000) have advanced that a single power has replaced conflict between imperial powers. This single power, they argue,

'over determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and post imperialist' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.34).

The work of Hardt and Negri is most apt in reflecting the ideas of this paper. In their work *Empire*, they assert that a new global order has emerged, mediated by a new logic and structure of rule (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.17). Furthermore, this new global order is now being defined by 'supranational organisms' rather than the powers of nation states, which is no longer bound by a centralised establishment, thus moving beyond the limits set by fixed boundaries. The new global order is defined by, in their words, 'a decentred and de-territorializing apparatus of rule' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.17).

The strategies of imperialism over the years have included direct colonial rule; forceful rule over through military, and political conquest, and indirect rule through 'pre-existing state forms and local, co-opted elite structures' (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.13). Kiely (2010), advances the idea that the US economy, since the end of the second world war, has 'constituted a form of liberal free trade imperialism' (Kiely, 2010, p.254). Unlike past imperial projects, the US is no longer acting according to its own national interests, but for the interests of what Stokes and Raphael (2010) call, 'an emergent class of "transnational capitalists"' (Raphael, 2010, p.14). Furthermore, they argue that the US empire 'continues to be a distinct national project, albeit in an increasingly globalised order' (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.16).

Neoliberalism and Imperialism

Based on the research conducted, it can be found that the dominance of US neoliberal ideology 'reflects and necessitates' global economic strategies similar to those of the British in the mid-19th century (Kiely, 2010, p.256). David Harvey argues that 'the fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logics of power as distinct from each other' (Harvey, 2003, p.29). In other words, Harvey illustrates the importance of distinguishing the economic ('movements of capital') and political ('politics of state and empire') levels, as independent and self-determining notions. In this sense, it is important to analyse the influence of Neoliberalism on imperialism. As argued in the first section, neoliberal modes of government have facilitated the rise and re-emergence of the private military and security industry. Furthermore, Barker (2015) argues that:

'the privatisation of key components of the military in an era of neoliberal ideological dominance has turned out to be absolutely crucial to enable a militarised imperial turn on the part of the United States' (Barker, 2015, p.15).

Moreover, it can be argued that the neoliberal mode of 'imperial penetration and social rule' is what has made the empire manifest at a more complex level. For this reason, considerable requirements to create 'effective states' have emerged, through which, 'this form of global capitalism can be managed'. (Bartholomew, 2006, p.23). Additionally, this can be illustrated through the increase of US military bases, which is supported by outsourcing, and 'in the power of intelligence and police apparatuses of all the states of the empire, coordinated by its imperial centre' (Bartholomew, 2006, p.25). Therefore, as suggested by

Bartholomew, 'Neoliberalism led to the enhancement of the type of coercive apparatus the imperial states need to police social order around the world' (Bartholomew, 2006, p.35). Furthermore, Bartholomew advances that the global military structure coupled with military and economic pre-eminence, when combined with pursuit of activities in the name of 'the global war on terror', positions the US as 'an imperial power'.

US Empire

It has been argued, that the US has asserted itself to a war and strategy 'that has invoked descriptions and accusations of a traditional form of imperialism' (Reid, 2006, p.239). The US empire is a status often criticised or acclaimed by critics and supporters, although it can be argued that there appears to be an increasing consensus that the US is behaving in a quasi-empire fashion (Barker, 2015, p.12). Similarly, realists such as Walt, Mearsheimer and Waltz agreed that the US foreign policy is simulating dangerously close to a form of empire. The full range of debates as to whether the US is or is not imperial is beyond the scope of this study. However, to understand the role of PMSCs in relation to empire today, this section will briefly outline the areas of contention.

Some argue that in order to achieve global stability, it would require the US to act in an imperial fashion, much like the British and Roman empires did (Cox 1993 cited in Stokes & Raphael, 2010). However, this paper argues that US empire is different to historical forms of imperialism. Michael Ignatieff (2003) argues it best:

'America's empire is not like empires of the past...the 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, and Empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known' (Ignatieff, 2003, p.7).

As argued earlier in this section, based on history, one may assume that imperial rule can only be achieved through territorial acquisition, however this is unsubstantial. In other words, the characteristic of indirect US rule does not prevent it from being labelled as imperial in nature.

However, there are some who argue that being a part of the capitalist core allows many to derive benefits from the liberal order and so, this fact alone precludes one from considering

the US to be an empire (Stokes & Raphael, 2010). This paper puts forward the claims that US imperialism has elements of a concealed nature. In other words, the burden of 'ultimate responsibility' which the US believes it has, justifies, in their view, the determination to employ the 'full sovereignty' to act as needed (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, pp.34-35). Despite living in a system of equal and sovereign states, the US has sought to establish its power within a hierarchical order that best serves its own interests, and has done so through constant contraventions of this order e.g. the intervention and occupation of Iraq from 2003. This 'sovereign' right to reject international rules and norms when it deems necessary is a markedly key feature of the American empire, and is what 'marks it as imperialist' (Pantich & Gindin, 2013, p.2).

It has been argued that a benign imperium may exist in advanced capitalist countries (Bartholomew, 2006, p.15). Advocates for imperialism, such as Robert Kaplan, argue that there is a positive dimension to empire in that it can sometimes be the most benign form of order, and that the global, hegemonic state of America could provide the best hope for peace and stability (2011), however, On the other hand, this argument can be considered lacklustre since it ignores the imperial strategies used by the US, as mentioned above. Moreover, a hierarchical system is insufficient in determining imperial relations, but the defence of this system through a breach of rules is a symptom of empire, and even more so, through militaristic means. Ikenberry (2002) argues that the unilateral use of power by the dominant state, and more specifically, 'acting outside of the order which has been established for the benefit of the state' is what marks US actions as an empire and it was in this sense that the US was actively imperialist (Ikenberry, 2002, p.30). Furthermore:

'the key difference between empire and hegemony, is that in an empire, the lead state operates unilaterally and outside the order, whereas in a hegemonic order, the lead establishes multilateral rules and institutions that it itself operates within' (Ikenberry, 2002, p.44).

Based on the arguments above, this paper maintains the claim that the US is acting in an imperial fashion. Moreover, the next section will determine how PMSCs have enabled the use of imperial strategies by the US.

PMSCs as an Imperial Tool

The US has used various imperial strategies since the war on terror to achieve its goals. One of the ways in which the Bush administration managed to do this is through the substantial use of imperial rhetoric, whilst this is important, it moves away from the main focus of this paper which is the use of PMSCs. As a result, this section will be discussing the imperial strategies used by the US to determine what role PMSCs play in contemporary international relations, and moreover, how PMSCs function as a tool of neo-liberal imperialism.

Hobson (1938) argues that, if the survival of capitalist countries depends on the export of capital, the state will employ imperialist policies to support this extension, which often takes the form of war (cited in Milios & Sotiropoulos, 2009, pp.11-2). Moreover, Chalmers Johnson (2004) asserts that the US has established an 'empire of military bases'. He argues that the US as empire, relies heavily on the military, as opposed to the achievement of political power through direct administration of foreign governments, in order to achieve its foreign policy goals (cited in Milios & Sotiropoulos, 2009, p.13). This can be seen in the case of Iraq, where PMSCs were deployed to achieve these goals. Moreover, although historically the US has used military force across the global South in strategic regions, the use of PMSCs in the invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates two reasons why states may deploy these companies. Firstly, to ensure that 'its hegemonic position in global order remains unchallenged' (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.17) and secondly, to stabilise the flow of oil into international markets. This study argues that these reasons help to determine how PMSCs are used to achieve imperial goals.

Silverstein (2000) suggests that one of the core reasons for contracting PMSCs, is that they can assist the US in pursuing geopolitical interests without the need to deploy the national army (cited in Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p.133). This is particularly useful, argues Silverstein, in cases where training is provided to autocratic regimes, with outrageous records of human rights, overcome limitations in democratic oversight and accountability mechanisms, mentioned in the first section. Bartholomew (2006) argues that the 21st century has been characterised by two forms of American imperial statecraft. These two forms include 'economic penetration and informal cooperation' on one hand, and 'policing and intervention' on the other (Bartholomew, 2006, p.23). This paper argues that PMSCs have been hired to carry out such duties, for example, PMSCs have been utilised

in situations thereby permitting the US to rely on military intervention in 'rogue' states, which have not incorporated into the neoliberal capitalist order.

Therefore, it can be determined that states deploy PMSCs into strategic areas, to maintain or establish a state's control over resources. Whilst discussion on the relationship between the state, the PMSCs they employed and multinational oil companies remains beyond the scope of this study, it could be suggested that the intervention and occupation of Iraq may serve as an example of this. The War on Want report states that the largest market for private military and security companies in Iraq was the facilitation of security service for private corporations that were in pursuit of investment in the country (War on Want: *Mercenaries Unleashed*, 2006, p.4). The primary motivation of multinational corporations in Iraq was the gas and oil sector. This can be likened with an example from Colombia, in which PMSC DSL was contracted to defend oil conglomerate BP's pipelines in the 1990s. Today, oil company BP has vast influence with the American and British governments, and has purchased its own paramilitary force to support weak national forces. This is a prominent example of how PMSCs serve a role for both multinational corporations as well as governments.

Marxist scholars have argued that US acts 'primarily as an instrument for its economic elite' in order to 'secure nationally-based corporate interests' (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.45). Moreover, they argue that in order to secure those interests, American intervention in oil-rich regions falls among the key strategies. This paper puts forth the claim that, outsourcing builds on this capacity and motivation of states. This argument can be clearly demonstrated in the case of Iraq in 2003, where the closeness in relationship and strong links between top political figures in the Bush administration and US-based oil conglomerates became evident. (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p.45). Furthermore, at the World Tribunal of Iraq in 2005, the Jury of Conscience stated:

'In pursuit of their agenda of Empire, the Bush and Blair...embarked upon one of the most unjust, immoral and cowardly wars in history' (Jury of Conscience, World Tribunal on Iraq, 27th June 2005).

Private military and security companies function in three ways to serve as a neoliberal tool of imperialism for states. These three functions incorporate the elements of supplementing for the state, power and legitimacy.

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Firstly, as stated in the first section, supplementing the state accounts for the majority of PMSCs' profit. Although governments are met with negative consequences, such as a lack of constraint and poor accountability measures, it allows governments to circumvent democratic procedures. Moreover, a lack of public knowledge enables states to act in an imperial manner.

Secondly, although the thin account of power suggests that states remain central, this paper holds that states have redistributed their power through contracting of PMSCs in order to achieve imperial aims. The definition of imperialism that best refers to this argument of the paper is one that involves the extension of power of the state, beyond its own boundaries (Heywood, 2000, p.245). Moreover, states can use epistemic power to affect security discourses through PMSCs, in order to meet their foreign policy agendas. Harvey (2003) echoes the arguments of Hannah Arendt to suggest that the strategy during the Bush administration was about the 'geopolitical strategy of maintaining global hegemony through control over oil resources' (Harvey, 2003, p.195).

Finally, as suggested in the second section, this paper argues that the state's monopoly on violence legitimises PMSCs to serve its own interests. As Gallagher and Robinson argue, 'Economic expansion...will tend to flow into the regions of maximum opportunity, but maximum opportunity depends as much upon political considerations of security as upon questions of profit' (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953, p.6). Therefore, by reshaping its legitimacy, the state can manipulate security considerations. Moreover, Colas (2007) states how state building and the responsibility to protect can be seen as an attempt to enforce a global liberal order. More importantly, he suggests that this is conducted through 'the medium of state authority,' and that 'insofar as this order is upheld through the use of force beyond the USA and the territories of its allies, it may be deemed imperial' (Colas, 2007, p.161).

This section has concluded that PMSCs have been used by the US as a tool of neoliberal imperialism. Although the type of empire constituted by the US is that of a different nature to those historically; it has been argued that the methods and motivations of the US since the War on Terror reflects that of a 'new empire'. In this sense, PMSCs supplement for the state, power is re-distributed and legitimacy has been reshaped.

Conclusion

Historically, private military and security companies were contracted to reach imperial aims, and to aid in peacekeeping operations. This paper concludes that similar motivations have arisen since the beginning of the War on Terror. The Iraq war has proven to be in line with imperial strategies, and based on a doctrine of instituting neoliberal capitalism on a global scale.

The market-based approach can be considered the 'ultimate representation of neoliberalism' (O'Brien 1998 in Singer, 2008, p.197). As a result, military and security services are no longer politically neutral, and states are able to use this to their advantage. Neoliberalism has enabled PMSCs to affect conflict in two primary ways: by creating conflict and by magnifying it. Additionally, the privatisation of war has allowed companies to profit from conflicts. Moreover, neoliberalism has enabled imperialism to manifest at a more complex level.

Although outsourcing has been used in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency, this paper suggests that there are several other reasons which can be determined from this paper. Firstly, states can bypass standard regulation and accountability structures, which enable them to contract companies through unconstrained mechanisms. Secondly, governments can evade public accountability, and thus, are able to use PMSCs to serve their own agenda. Thirdly, states are able to evade correct democratic procedures, undermining the liberal values on which they are based.

Regulation efforts through the Geneva Convention and the United Nations have proved ineffective in curbing the effects produced by outsourcing. The War on Terror has facilitated a vast increase in the provisions of privatised war under the pretence of humanitarian intervention and the promotion of global capitalist governance.

This paper has demonstrated how power is being redistributed through the use of PMSCs. The type of power includes the formal capacity to decide over the use of force, epistemic and dependency on contractors. Furthermore, the state has utilised and facilitated this redistribution of power, in order to achieve imperial goals.

Legitimacy, in its most basic sense has been reshaped. The states monopoly on violence has functioned positively and negatively to legitimise the operations of PMSCs. This is for

three reasons. Firstly, as weapons-system to bestow legitimacy onto companies and markets; Secondly, to evade democratic practices, and thirdly, to make it easier to use force.

US imperialism is prevailing in a distinct way to which it did historically. The work of Hardt and Negri (2000) has enabled us to conclude that a single power has replaced inter-imperial rivalry. Furthermore, this new global order has been defined by 'supranational organisms'. Also, the US is no longer serving its own interests by doing so, but the interests of transnational capitalists. Since the War on Terror, the US has adopted strategies that have simulated those of an empire. Silverstein's arguments have helped to form an understanding to the use of PMSCs by states for geostrategic reasons. Marxist scholars have argued that PMSCs have helped states to act as an instrument for its economic elite, and simultaneously functioned for economic expansion.

Overall, it could be argued that PMSCs function in several ways, to act as a tool of neo-liberal imperialism. Firstly, the supplementing of the state in Iraq has shown that the Bush administration had imperial motivations during the 2003 occupation. Secondly, power has been redistributed to serve the imperial ambitions of the state. Lastly, legitimacy has been reshaped as a means to achieve geostrategic gains.

While this paper focused on the cases of the US and Iraq, PMSCs are used globally. More research needs to be conducted as to the effects and motivations of PMSCs and states, and the role that they play in contemporary politics. Additionally, better regulation standards need to be instituted to prevent PMSCs and states from acting on their own accord, as the current self-regulation is inadequate in facilitating this.

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THE UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS IN ETHIOPIA

Phoebe Seidel

Introduction

Ethiopia is a landlocked country located in the Horn of Africa. After visiting it in 2013, the country inspired me to question what schools and education systems are available for girls in Ethiopia. Ethiopia was chosen as a case study to analyse the effects of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), specifically analysing whether the SDGs are reaching their full potential. It can be argued that their creation was focused towards development, which is based on Western ideologies that struggle to be implemented in the context of Ethiopia.

Nelson Mandela said: “education is the most powerful weapon we can use to change the world” (Mandela, 2012, p.101); this narrative forms the basis of this paper. There are barriers to gender equality and education; and the idea that they are both universal is problematic. Education is fundamental in order to achieve gender equality at a local and regional level; to recognise limits of development and to produce alternative modes. Gender stereotypes can be a limiting and exclusionary label, that can limit a girl’s ability to create her own identity.

This paper will argue that the SDGs are not the most suitable system when applied to the development of girls in Africa, because they are open to interpretation and could be better tailored to specific populations. It will use Escobar’s Post-development theoretical perspective to argue that the SDGs are based on an idea of development that is not country specific, but a Western-centric ideology that “still ultimately embodies a global imaginary of modernisation” (Escobar, 2012, p.xvi) based on the West’s history. My interpretation

of development is influenced by Escobar's work. Is it that the current mainstream concept has Western-centric tendencies of superiority with an overly paternalistic attitude? Development should incorporate humans as equal individuals, with the right to develop and create their own identities at a local level.

Education, gender and development are the key concepts that this paper encompasses. The SDGs in theory are a beneficial, and a positive contribution to the world; but in practice, the implementation is not as successful as hoped for. It can be argued that the SDGs are flawed because they are based on a distorted idea of development. Organisations such as the UN help to create a global community, but also need to account for cultural, social and political differences, not to fall culprit to ethnocentric generalisations. This paper will analyse goals 4 and 5, evaluate their success, and determine whether they have a positive impact on each other.

SDG 4 reads to “ensure inclusive and quality education for all, and promote lifelong learning” (UN, 2016). There are issues with this goal; it is vague and subjective. The idea of quality education varies in different countries, and local regions within a country. Quality education could include: having both male and female qualified teachers, access to textbooks and other resources, teaching in the mother tongue, boys and girls having equal access, efficient and relevant content and recognition of practices at the local level and norms; each of these varies, depending on the location of the educational service.

SDG 5 is to ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ (UN, 2016). This goal again lacks specifics for individual states. The SDGs are aimed at such a large population, that their attempts to help the most people possible almost become inapplicable because aims become too idealistic and unattainable. The “SDGs are so encyclopaedic that everything is a top priority, which means nothing is a priority” (Easterly, 2015). This indicates that there is no hierarchy within the SDGs to make their implementation as effective as possible. Every goal is as important as the other, however this creates a lack of priority.

Education, gender and development will be analysed and related through Post-development and Post-structural feminism; to argue that there needs to be a revision of development that includes gender, in order to improve access to education.

The Ethiopian Context

Ethiopia, as a member of the UN, endorsed the UN SDGs, and is in the process of achieving the targets. Ethiopia made significant progress through the execution of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, it did not meet its targets in goal 3, the promotion of gender equality (UN Women, 2018). This shows there is still work to be done to achieve gender equality in the region. The most effective way to achieve this would be to move towards a local and gendered approach to development. Post-structural feminism could be incorporated into Post-development theory to argue that an effective way for societies to prosper is to recognise that gender could be deconstructed at the individual level, for the empowerment of girls, who in turn could influence society in multiple ways.

In Ethiopia, girls' attendance at school is poor, in comparison to that of boys. In 2015, the expected number of school years in Ethiopia for boys and for girls did not differ much. For girls, it was 7.9 years and 8.8 years for boys. These statistics indicate that the gap between expected years of schooling for girls and boys was not that significant. However, the reality showed a large variation, compared to the expectation. The mean years of schooling in 2015 was 3.7 for boys, and only 1.5 for girls (UNDP, 2015). These statistics show the iniquitous situation girls face, and how expected years of schooling do not correlate with the actual years of education that the girls receive in Ethiopia. This suggests that top-down approaches in relation to girls' education are not the most effective, and that even though Ethiopia's economy is growing, further consideration of gender inequality is needed. Improvements could happen if a different technique was adopted, such as a bottom-up approach to development. This approach pays "attention to the individual, the family and the community, but especially to the underprivileged and those who are at risk" (Seraes, 2007, p.493). This could possibly be better suited to Ethiopian girls because they are at risk of missing out on education.

The "status of men and women have profound implications for how they participate in market or non-market work, and in community life as a whole" (Parpart et al, 2000, p.3); this shows how it is important to adopt an approach that views men and women as equal, not just for economic reasons but for societal gains as a whole. It can be further recognized that an "expansion of education and literacy in a region can facilitate social change" (Sen, 1999, p.129). Education is vital for creating freedom in terms of identities

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for girls. With education, girls would be better equipped to contribute in society in ways other than as economic contributors.

The attitude of the UN, which works towards the fulfilment of the SDGs, employs “a manner that promotes economic growth” (UNDP, 2012). Economic growth should only be one contributory factor when considering development. There needs to be a strong focus on education, and particularly on gender equality in this respect. Ethiopia’s GDP has been growing rapidly since 2002. In 2015, it reached \$61.54 billion (World Bank, 2016). This growth indicates that Ethiopia has been developing proficiently in terms of its economy; however, this has not guaranteed similar progress for education and gender equality. At present, it can be argued that the SDGs follow a plan that prioritises economics as the basis for development over gender equality and education; this needs to be addressed.

Education “makes the horizon of vision wider” (Sen, 1999, p.199); it supports not only the economy, but also healthcare, environmental concerns, rights and freedoms, amongst many others. Education creates further opportunities for girls and women. Statistics from Ethiopia shows that as education among girls increases; the rate of child marriage, young marriage and child rearing decreases. “Women of ages between 15-19 with no education (28 per cent) have begun childbearing as opposed to 12 per cent of teenagers who have attained primary education” (CSA, 2016, p.14). This shows that the “proportion of teenagers who have started childbearing decreases with increasing levels of education” (CSA, 2016, p.14). Furthermore, “higher levels of education can protect against early marriage” (Jain & Kurz, 2000, p.10) and female genital mutilation (FGC) “is less prevalent among women with higher education” (CSA, 2016, p.45). This shows how education is instrumental in enabling girls to obtain more power over their own futures, because the “empowerment of women comes from greater years of education” (Herz & Sperling, 2004, p.5). Education can facilitate women in creating personal identities that are not limited to being a mother, and empowers them to make better lives for themselves.

Ethiopian girls should have the right to choose between options available to them, but should not have to follow Neoliberal Western development ideologies that promote economic prosperity as the most important aspect. The West can portray itself as the most modern, progressive and democratic system in the world, but the “power in the representation of social reality...[is] instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking, while disqualifying

and even making others impossible” (Escobar, 2012, p.5). The power that the West holds enables it to create a discourse – this means that development can be limited to a single Western approved narrative, i.e. that which the West holds to be the only ‘truth’. This neglects alternative ideas of development that the West does not promote. Development should not be limited to this single narrative. The “discourse itself has to be dismantled, if the countries of the ‘Third World’ want to pursue a different type of development” (Escobar, 1984, p.378). Development should have considerations beyond economic progress. There needs to be systems of development that are unique for each region in the world, rather than a centralized, ‘single-pathway’ approach.

It is important to recognise that “local/national and global economic contexts are not neutral from the gender perspective” (Bouilly et al., 2016: 340). Men and women should be valued equally. There should be no gender disparity before, during or after education. SDG 5 strives for the empowerment of women and girls. “Educated women tend to have greater freedom to exercise their agency” (Sen, 1999, p.199) – which shows a positive link between education and female empowerment. If women can read, write and interpret knowledge with a critical eye, they can also gain skills that could help to teach others, and allow them to live equally in the public sphere. Through their education, girls, mothers and matriarchs could challenge cultural norms and cultural imperatives, such as female genital mutilation, and lead future generations in the right choices to be made. These are the learning outcomes of formal education. Increasing equal access to education (SDG 4) in Ethiopia will have a positive impact on SDG 5. Education can give girls the confidence, power and identities that would benefit women and the society as a whole.

Although, the general trends, supported by data, indicate that there is some improvement in enrolment in primary education. There is still progress to be made. According to the 2011 Democratic Health Survey completed in Ethiopia, 52 per cent of women and 38 per cent of men had never attended school (CSA, 2012); but in 2016, the figures had decreased. 48 per cent of women had no education compared with 28 per cent of men (CSA, 2016). The ideas behind the SDGs can be considered positive, but there needs to be more emphasis on development created by local people. The “involvement of organised community participation has an incomparable role in ensuring equity, relevance and quality education” (Ministry of Education, 2017), to create the change that the UN promotes, but tailored to the specific needs of the Ethiopian population.

Gender and Development

This paper acknowledges that theory could be biased, hence, multiple theoretical perspectives are employed to argue the limits of the SDGs in their application to ‘help’ girls obtain equal schooling in Ethiopia.

Escobar’s Post-development theoretical lens is used to analyse and critique the SDGs. Escobar’s theory suggests that the idea of development is a false one; that is producing the opposite results to those envisaged. “The discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression” (Escobar, 2012, p.4).

Escobar would argue that it is problematic to try to implement Western ideas of development in Ethiopia, because development is not a ‘one size fits all’ model. Ethiopia has different ideologies, norms, cultures and identities to those in the West. Therefore, the aims of the SDGs might not be efficient in their objectives, because they are part of an ethno-centric bias that does not fully consider the local contexts across Africa. Nor do they consider the “process by which, in the history of the modern West, non-European areas have been systematically organised into, and transformed according to, European constructs” (Escobar, 2012, p.7). The world should not see Africa or Africans as an alternative to Europe or Europeans. Africa is not backwards or underdeveloped, but needs its own path and concept of development. Escobar recognises that the concept of development is mostly Western-centric, and creates unnecessary divisions between regions in the world that produce unequal distributions of power, and create identities of charity in the Global South.

The SDGs should not be seen as a solution to all poverty and inequality. The objective of quality education and gender equality cannot be enforced in Ethiopia through top-down approaches. As seen from the MDGs, the trickle-down approach is not entirely effective. It could be argued it is partly because both sets of goals work within a biased development mindset. Similarly, according to Sidi M. Omar (2012, p.44), development is inherently flawed because the “theories and practices of development are still framed within the civilising mission that synthesises the idea of the supremacy of the West”. Therefore, the UN may have created goals with inaccurate development agendas that are based on the West, wanting to ‘help,’ and ‘save’ the ‘rest’.

In addition, from the Post-development perspective, development is exposed to be a pervasive cultural discourse, with profound consequences for the production of social reality in the Third World (Omar, 2012, p.42). This shows development could create obscured perceptions about the Global South. The UN is one of many organisations, agencies, funds and programmes set up in Africa to assist development (UN, 2016). If the UN used this basis to create the SDGs, then there might be problems in their efficiency because of potential Western charity rhetoric. If development was another style of Western imposition intended for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the underdeveloped world (Omar, 2012), then, the SDGs could be patronising and paternalistic at the point of delivery. Similar to Escobar, Omar's argument focuses on the flaws of development; he states that "development project has failed...condemned people to sub-human conditions" (Omar, 2012, p.45). So, if the SDGs have used this idea of development, they are not going to be fully effective.

Post-structuralism argues that to understand a subject, it is not enough merely to study the subject itself. There must also be consideration of the conditions and systems of knowledge that facilitated the creation of the subject (Foucault, 1977). Post-structural feminism applies this to the context of the deconstruction of masculinity and femininity. This approach is used in this paper to address the differences between girls and boys, when it comes to having access to schooling. It is necessary to show that "power and knowledge are joined together" (Escobar, 1984, p.379) because the subject can be better understood and empowered if there is an understanding of the connection between knowledge and power.

Foucault is a dominant writer in the field of Post-structuralism; his work will be used in this paper to argue that knowledge, identity and values are all subjective and influenced by power structures surrounding them. Concepts that are central to Post-structuralism are power, identity and subjectivism. This is essential to the study of the effects of the SDG 4 and SDG 5 on gender equality and education, because gender and education are both subjective ideas. Gender identities vary across the world. Education and gender cannot be seen as universal because they are all subjective to context and power. Foucault argues that there is "no 'human nature' shared by all members of the species – the nature of individuals, their humanity, is produced by certain power structures" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.233). This is a central idea in Post-structuralism, no individual experience is the same, which

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links to Butler's work that women cannot be homogenised into one category. This supports the argument that girls need to be seen as individuals and recognised as equal to boys.

There needs to be an understanding of the "various forms of exclusion that constitute the world as we find it" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.234). How can gender equality be achieved if the concept of gender itself is a limiting label? Foucault argues that arbitrary labels to define all African women as victims and in need of Western development are limited and degrading. This links to Post-structural feminism through the argument that binary labels are limiting for the identity of individuals. Moreover, Foucault argues, "the modern individual is a historical achievement. This is to say, that there is no 'universal person'" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.233). This argument is employed to critique the SDGs because they cannot be universally applied. The goals should recognise individual difference, and variation in power structures if they are going to be effective.

Feminism is a broad theoretical framework that incorporates different arguments about how gender equality could be achieved. Gender "is a fabrication" (Butler, 1999, p.174) that has been constructed to define differences between the biological sexes. This relates to the meaning of power; according to Escobar, power is not simply the rich possessing power over the less fortunate, but it includes actions and behaviours including the results of masculinity and femininity (Escobar, 2012). Power that is derived from stereotypically 'masculine' behaviour, such as being regarded as strong and rational, is the meaning masculine (men) have enforced upon them in most societies. However, this is not fixed and can be reconstructed. Girls and women can also act in what are considered to be stereotypically masculine ways; so through analysing gender as a social norm and through education, stereotypes can be challenged. This is the tool to empower girls equal to boys. Post-structural feminism could assist in the effectiveness of completing SDG 5 gender equality. If Post-structural feminism was applied, then there could be teaching about the "social construction of gender" (Butler, 1999, p.174) and how it can be viewed differently so that girls and boys are considered as equals.

In Ethiopia, boys can be prioritised above girls if families can only afford to send one child to school, as boys can be seen to be more likely to get a job. This creates a division of labour with women pursuing unpaid work, and men paid work. The Poststructuralist feminist theoretical perspective would argue that this identity given to girls should be deconstructed, in order to achieve gender equality by increasing the number of girls in

school. The “work of caring and nurturing is normatively assigned to women” (Scott et al., 2010, p.2), but girls should be able to create their own identities and values, with the chance to go to school, and have the choice to implement what they have learnt and how it please them.

The theory acknowledges the difference between women across the world, to assist women from different cultures, struggles, ethnicities, races and localities. Post-structural feminism “recognises the importance of difference and local complexities” (Parpart et al., 2000, p.160). This is why Post-structural feminism is an important theoretical lens to argue that there needs to be further awareness of the complexities in Ethiopia, and how girls’ attitudes and identities could vary. The SDGs may not be able to create intended development because they use a top-down approach to development, which is not beneficial in local contexts where individuality should be applauded.

Post-structural feminist writers are critics of “Western feminism, particularly its tendency to conflate the experiences of Western women with those of women everywhere, thus ignoring important differences” (Parpart et al., 2000, p.160). This point is used to analyse whether the SDGs take a Western-centric approach, and if goals consider the different experiences of women and girls in Ethiopia. According to Butler, gender is “culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the causal result of sex, nor as seemingly fixed as sex” (Butler, 1999, p.10). So, gender is not as a result of biological sex, but rather, it is that to which societies assign individuals. This could limit the implementation of the SDGs because it does not consider the constraints of gender in order to achieve gender equality. Highlighting the potential inefficiency of the SDG 5, because it is not specific enough. If it included a Post-structural feminist perspective, gender equality might be better achieved; because it could address the implied power the gender has, and reform it so that boys and girls could exert equal power.

Post-structural feminism identifies that there is “very little agreement after all, on what constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women” (Butler, 1999, p.4). Questioning what would be included in a Poststructuralist feminist model is to question whether gender is necessary for girls’ empowerment and equality, because gender can be a limiting label. However, this is not a universally accepted ideal, but could have relevance in Ethiopia, if a Post-structural feminist model for development was adopted. The UN is a body that has a set of principles and values that might need to further incorporate local cultural values.

Gender and Education

Gender, education and development can be connected through the theoretical lenses of Post-development and Post-structural feminism. It is necessary to look beyond Western narratives of development, and incorporate the suggestion and implication of a genderless society. Through education, this aim could be achieved, as younger, more progressive and heterogeneous generations learn about knowledge behind power, and thus enhance their knowledge to progress and develop society. Through the deconstruction of gender, girls and boys would be seen as equal; both would have the same access to school, and be able to develop without discrimination due to their gender.

Development “has deep historical roots in colonial discourses of civilisation” (Freistein & Mahlert, 2016); it is linked to a past where Africa was seen as inferior. Education was a mission that the West saw as a duty to undertake, but this created false foundations for education and development. The “curriculum was impervious to local, national or regional specificities” (Negash, 2006, p.7), which is the historical foundation of the SDGs. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the SDGs and development as a whole. The goals are attempting to improve conditions of education; but if original educational systems were created with a bias against local populations, then adding to a system based on flawed concepts of development could increase inequalities.

Education was created for “an Africa that would develop in the best European footsteps” (Negash, 2006, p.7). However, African development should not be dictated by European concepts. A modification of education from a Post-development perspective could create a system that does not consider the Western approach to be superior. An incorporation of Post-structural feminism would expand the scope of women’s input in the schooling available to them, by removing the constraints of gender and therefore, the lack of flexibility within gender roles.

Ethiopia is the only country in Africa that was not colonised. Even though there was Italian military occupation of Ethiopia, “many historians agree that the Italian colonial presence between 1936 and 1941 was too brief to be considered” (Negash, 2006, p.7) as colonial rule. Ethiopia was able to retain its independence during the two Italian-Ethiopian wars, but Italian presence at that time influenced the education systems that were introduced. The “education system that the Ethiopian government implemented was very

similar to those that prevailed in African states, that were colonised for longer periods” (Negash, 2006, p.7) The system was not originally established by local Ethiopians, but by a collective aim, with different mindsets and values. The Post-development approach could be applied here, because the original aim of education was directed by a flawed development agenda.

Bouilly et al., (2016) discussed the need to explore how local struggles and global development agendas interact. It is necessary to recognise that African women’s struggles, resistance and “mobilisations are ancient” (Bouilly et al., 2016, p.338). Women’s development did not begin with the MDGs, or the SDGs, but have been present throughout history. In order to succeed with objectives of equal education and girls’ empowerment, an acknowledgement that development should occur at a local level driven by women and men at the grassroots is fundamental. It is essential to refrain from the “pitfall of oversimplification and essentialism” (Bouilly et al., 2016, p.339) of African women because women’s struggles can differ and women cannot be grouped together under the label of victim. There is a need to “stress the heterogeneity of women and their interests” (Herward & Bunwaree, 1999, p.1) and education can enable girls to have choices in relation to their own futures, and how to develop themselves and learn the skills in order to enter into the public sphere in different ways.

A bottom-up approach to development would focus on “participation, empowerment and providing ‘a voice for the voiceless’” (Servaes, 2007, p.490) at local levels.

It is relevant for an analysis of the SDGs to focus “on what women did for development, rather than what it did for them” (Herward & Bunwaree, 1999, p.1), because there is a need to be an emphasis on what women and girls can achieve. Rather than women being perceived as passive recipients of development, women should not only be measured by their capabilities to generate a profit, but also by their abilities to contribute to the society. Education should be distinguished as a tool that enables women to gain an education that could equip them to fracture societal boundaries of a homemaker, and enter into the public sphere.

All 193 UN members adopted the SDGs, but they “are not legally binding” (UN, 2016), only enforced at the state level. The UN is not an independent actor, but is composed of individual member states. The amount of power the UN is able to yield is dependent

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on the sum of power states are willing to devolve to it. This gives the impression that the UN could have limited ability in enforcing the SDGs, because the UN acquires its power from states. If states' priorities are not improving girls' education, then it will not take precedence in the UN agenda either. The International Atomic Energy Agency Peaceful Uses Initiative is a substantial development programme in the US that grants funding to 8 SDGs, however, goals 4 and 5 are omitted from their mission (Jawerth & Gaspar, 2015). This indicates the US's primary concerns in the SDGs are not education or gender equality which could affect the UN's priorities, because the US is a dominant actor in the UN. Therefore, the effectiveness of goals 4 and 5 could be limited because current development is dependent on individual states. Development should not be determined by international organisations that push selective development programmes. In order for girls' education to thrive, the Post-development approach should be adopted.

The company Microsoft supports SDG 5 through programs that encourage girls to "pursue learning and careers in fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics" (Microsoft, 2016, p.8). This deserves recognition as it aims to empower women through work, however, there needs to be caution so that women are not only seen as profit maximisers. The emphasis may be better placed below the institutional level, so women could be better positioned in society as well as economically. If communities are able to endorse "projects that are planned from the 'bottom-up', with women themselves participating directly in planning projects to improve their lives" (Herward & Bunwaree, 1999, p.3), then it will allow more women to have input in the system, create a safe space for girls to grow and learn in un-biased environments and maximise the quality of gender neutral education in schools.

The UN is part of the Neoliberal ideology, seen by some as the end of history, as Fukuyama argues (1992). The assumption is that states cannot move beyond Neoliberalism; it is seen as the most appropriate ideology and political system. The West views Neoliberalism as superior, which influences the UN. This is a troublesome perspective because the UN acts with particular morality, but actually it is promoting development created in the West for the West. Critics of Neoliberalism "expressed concerns that this approach creates inefficient, homogeneous schools that are unresponsive to local preferences and have little incentive to improve quality" (Lincove, 2009, p.60). Ethiopia has individual economic, political and cultural systems that could differ to Neoliberal states, therefore,

Ethiopia should be able to create its own system of development, which is not centred on Western approaches, but on what Ethiopia can do for itself. Development through a bottom-up approach has been successful and many cases showed how it also empowers girls.

The Neoliberal ideology is focused on the reduction of state functions that advocates for the protection of the economy and state services. The emphasis is placed on the private sector to have a dominant role in the economy and society. In Neoliberalism “the market is seen as the main arbiter of decision-making” (Parpart et al., 2000, p.37). However, in order for girls to be able to reach their full potential, a bottom-up approach based at the local level with women and girls holding the power might be better suited. If the economy becomes a Neoliberal system, this could create barriers for girls to receive a proper education, because large private organisations may neglect local communities to secure the most profit. “Educational elitism has been particularly supported by the privatisation of education as a way to transfer government responsibilities to private entities” (Macedo & Araújo, 2016, p.157) as the result of Neoliberalism. This again shows why small grassroots organisations are necessary to protect girls’ societal rights.

Despite the possibility that through education girls could contribute to economic output, this should not be the main consideration of development. Education is not just a means to generate economic gains, because the benefits of education “exceed its role as human capital in commodity production” (Sen, 1999, p.294). Girls’ individual identities need to be able to develop so that they have the ability to choose, and how to contribute to the society, whether it be economically, politically, or neither, because “gender equality should be valued for itself, not simply because it increases output” (O’Laughlin, 2007, p.24).

Ethiopia is unlikely to be suited to a Western liberal-democratic model of development, because its history, culture, economics and people are unique. Development needs to embrace difference to allow all types of human identity to flourish. Girls should have an equal chance to reach their potential as boys, because girls can also be agents of change. Beyond the jurisdiction of Neoliberalism, education could empower young women to contribute to political institutions, create laws that assist gender norms and adapt development so that it becomes appropriate for the local and female domain. It is necessary to create “ways of being gendered that do not regulate, but are full of possibilities for girls, for boys and for their teachers” (MacNaughton, 2000, p.3). Through education, this fluidity or potential removal of gender biases could be introduced. Female teachers are an

example of how girls and women “can be empowered as key agents of structural and societal transformation that is built on principles of gender equality” (Kirk, 2004, p.50).

Post-development theory suggests that current concepts of development, “only ever allow poor people a future that the rich could imagine for them” (Reid-Henry, 2012), with the idea that the ‘West knows best’ and all development should adhere to a Western model. In contrast, if women and girls are empowered with local agency, they can create the futures they choose. Post-structural feminism and Post-development theories are vital for development because they could allow for local, regional and individual paths to development and to prosper.

Conclusion

Without examining development as discourse, there is no way to understand the systematic ways in which Western countries have been able to control and create the Third World politically, economically, sociologically and culturally (Escobar, 1984). A new ‘post’ development idea could address such issues and facilitate change that overcomes Western hegemony and secures equality in education, society and the family.

Post-development and Post-structural feminism are key to reforming development because in their titles, they provide an answer. ‘Post’ development and ‘post’ structuralism show the need to move beyond development, and structure to look at the individual and see what people have, not what they are lacking.

There is a need to move away from charity rhetoric with reference to Africa, so that it is not described as backwards, underdeveloped and lacking, but be seen for what it has achieved, and the progress it can make in its own way and time. The West should not be the ‘benchmark’ that the world compares itself to. It is only one of the actors, with individual systems, values and identities, and should not be seen as superior.

Evidence from Ethiopia suggests that the number of girls in education has increased but there is still progress to be made. A localized, bottom-up approach to development could allow for individual communities to tailor development to their particular areas of need. As the bottom-up approach “focuses on local implementation structure” (Sabatier, 1986,

p.37), girls would be able to have much more influence over how development could benefit them.

If gender was deconstructed, in future a genderless society could create more equality and reduce the “limits” sometimes associated with being a woman. I believe that education means more than maths and science; it means broadening visions and gaining knowledge to challenge norms. Gender includes a vast amount of different identities that should be seen as equally worthy.

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A CRITICAL DISCUSSION ON GENDER IN DEVELOPMENT THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: CASE-STUDY OF BRAZIL

Marina Schmidt Teixeira

Introduction

Gender inequality creates a socio-economic and political imbalance of power, repressing “the growth of individuals, the development of countries and the evolution of societies, to the disadvantage of both men and women” (UNFPA, 2000). Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether development theory and practice can address gender issues within the development process. This discussion leads to other debates as: how do gender issues affect development? Do we need to change the way we understand and approach development? And, how can development be pursued?

This paper argues that dominant development approaches are insufficient to address gender matters in the process, neglecting gender and understanding development as a masculine concept. We need, then, to expand and deepen the comprehension of development, giving gender equity a central role and focusing on the oppressive ideological discourses in the society, to focus on gender issues. Hence, the way we address gender in the development process needs to transcend the outdated approaches in policy-making – which leads to economic benefit, but not necessarily to gender equity gains. Instead, we must focus on the deconstruction of the sexist and patriarchal discourses in the society.

Through this research, we will come to understand that the patriarchal discourse produces an ideology which normalises identities and legitimises the oppression of women, by serving the interest of the powerful. Thus, it diminishes women’s development through the gendered cultural and socio-political arrangements, regardless of the legislative structure of the state. Hence, we need to understand development under a broader account, which I call development as subversion. That is, a non-masculine process which seeks

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emancipation and empowerment, by overcoming identity-politics through resistance and resilience combined.

Development is defined in different ways in International Politics. For instance, while neoliberalism understands development concerning economic growth and industrialisation (Sachs, 2004); Post-development perceives it as a Western discourse (Escobar, 1995); and, alternative approaches of development, more inclusively, see development as a people-centred notion (Sen, 2001). Nevertheless, all those different debates conceive development as a masculine, abstract, and challengeable idea which neglects gender.

The research hypothesis and arguments are supported by the case-study of Brazil. Although such method is criticised for not being easily generalised (Dencombe, 2010), this paper claims that the case of Brazil is strongly relatable with other middle-income developing countries in the contemporary world and, particularly, in Latin America, which experienced a feminist uprising after the *Ni Una Menos* demonstrations in 2015 (Domagala, 2016).

This research is mainly centralised on women as the marginalised subjects of patriarchy. However, it does not intend to neglect other individuals oppressed by patriarchal discourses. In addition, this paper does not plan to understand women as a homogeneous group. Instead, as intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989) – regarding ethnicity, sexuality, class, e.t.c. – must be acknowledged and, thus, different individual privileges. Moreover, this work only analyses the effects of the oppression promoted by patriarchy. But, this is not to say that development as subversion should not be reinterpreted to undermine other discourses that encourage the creation of oppressive identities.

The first chapter analyses the dominant development approaches, and discusses the limitations of development thought. Then, the second section debates the practice of development in Brazil. And, finally, the third part of this paper debates the re-imagination of development as subversion.

Development Thought: A critical analysis Mainstream Development and Brazil

Traditional theories understand development as an economic-led phenomenon. Neoliberalism has dominated the development thought since the 1980s, focusing on individualism,

markets and “flexible managerialism” (Lewis & Kanji, 2009, p.52). Thus, it understands that the flourishing of developing countries is directly related to the capability of those countries to grow economically through marketing building (Caroll, 2012). Additionally, neoliberal policies advocated for a minimal government, decreasing its role as service providers which led to the liberalisation of the state to prioritise market growth (Balassa, 1971).

Consequently, development meant not only economic expansion, but also the openness of markets and participation in the globalised capitalist-led structure, which includes international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Wallerstein, 1979; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). However, this capitalist world economy can create and destroy means of social organisations worldwide (Freitas & Amorim, 2012). Hence, this approach perpetuates the idea of accumulation of economic power, leading to asymmetrical relations in the international system between developing and developed states, as well as in the domestic sphere. Therefore, this notion of development is superficial, as it does not consider it as a multidimensional process.

For instance, Brazilian economy experienced an extended period of rapid and high growth, in which the state became a tool for the accumulation of capital, increasing its participation in international politics (Amorim, 2014; Freitas & Amorim, 2012). Hence, in 2015, Brazil had the ninth highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) worldwide (World Bank, 2015). Furthermore, Brazil has been an agent on renovating and reinforcing multilateral bodies – as influencing the shift from G8 to G20 –, and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Brown, 2009). Thus, Brazilian economy advanced and the state engaged in the international capitalist institutions which we could suppose, according to the neoliberal account of development, would lead to a powerful status in the international affairs.

However, Brazil is classified as a “warning” state in the Fragile States Index of 2016, while some developed countries are considered “very stable”, “sustainable” and “very sustainable” (FSI, 2017). Hence, we can perceive Brazil as an anomaly, challenging the mainstream approach to development. Regardless of the economic growth, Brazil is still not considered a stable state, diminishing its international authority. This contradiction emerges from the problems inherent in the capitalist growth.

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Capitalist growth could create new and perpetuate existing inequalities – economic, social goods, political rights – leading to poverty in parallel to economic development (Freitas & Amorim, 2012). So, by perceiving markets as the main subject of development, neoliberalism is unable to be accountable to individuals.

For example, Brazil scored a 0.75 on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2015 (UNDP, 2015). However, Brazilian society is one of the most unequal in the world (Roure & Caprano, 2016). Regarding the Gender Inequality Index (GII), an indicator that measures gender disadvantages; Brazil scored 0.46, with *zero* being the most gender equal and *one* being the most unequal a society could be (UNDP, 2015). Hence, through this index, we can see a reflection of the inequality between men and women regarding health, empowerment and labour market, englobing maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, the share of seats in parliament, the population with a minimum of secondary school and labour force participation rate (UNDP, 2015b).

Brazilian women experienced the endurance of intensely rooted discrimination (Roure & Caprano, 2016). Moreover, Brazil was ranked 102nd out of 144 countries in the Girls' Opportunity Index, mainly because of its high levels of child marriage and adolescent fertility, as well as its lack of female political representation (Lenhardt et al., 2016). These factors limit individual opportunities, generating severe impacts on Brazilian social, political and economic development. Neoliberals neglect such limitations.

Additionally, heavily influenced by Escobar's (1995) writings, post-development presents itself as a radical criticism of the neoliberal mainstream notion. So, it comprehends development as a discourse, constructed by the West to diffuse an ideology and perpetuate the asymmetry of power between West and non-West, in the international system. However, this post-structuralist approach is more of a criticism and, thus, it fails to provide practical insight on development politics (Jakimow, 2008).

Freedom and Development

In that sense, an alternative approach towards development was required, going beyond the economic sphere to include individual liberties and address the inequalities in the community. So, Amartya Sen (2001) understands “development as freedom”, defending a middle ground account of development, between the mainstream as neoliberalism,

and the radical as post-development. Freedom is seen as a broad concept which includes agency and opportunities. Thus, development is the process of expansion of those opportunities (Sen, 2001).

The improvement of the quality of human freedom provides an evaluation of development progress. Freedom also represents a measure of the process' effectiveness as development is only achievable through people's free agency (Sen, 2001). Thus, freedoms are not just the main end of the development process, but are also its major means.

Ultimately, the elementary constituents of human capabilities, and the instrumental freedoms, are divided into five interrelated categories: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (Sen, 2001). Those freedoms are complementary and are reinforced into one another (Sen, 2001). Hence, economic unfreedom could produce social unfreedom, for instance, the lack of capital could lead to inaccessibility to a good education. Also, social and political unfreedoms could promote economic unfreedom. So, lack of political participation generates non-representation of one's interests in public discussions, which leads to economic disadvantage. Thereby, we see that development is not possible in a context of inequality; not only of income, but also of opportunity to reach social goods, assets and legal rights. Thus, the elimination of primary roots of unfreedom – poverty, authoritarian regimes, poor economic opportunities, social restrictions and intolerance – is indispensable for development (Sen, 2001).

Additionally, shared norms and values, constructed by public discourse and social participation, mediate the promotion and use of freedom, which influences social behaviour (Sen, 2001). So, freedom can be promoted by challenging the constraints within those norms and values. For instance, patriarchal structures, established by shared values, support an asymmetry of power between genders in every level of the society (Butler, 1990). Hence, patriarchy is used to define what is considered desirable and acceptable. It perpetuates gender stereotypes which maintain the socio-constructed gender roles, generating disadvantages and, as we have discussed, discrimination and, unfreedoms, as well as diminishing development (Butler, 1990; Momsen, 2004). Therefore, we have come to understand patriarchy as a root of unfreedom and, thus, it must be challenged to promote the development of the whole society.

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In relation to women, Sen (2001) advocates for women's productive role, claiming that promoting their agency is as crucial as the improvement of their well-being, affecting the whole community. Consequently, by empowering women economically – through stimulation of independent income-enhancing – and socially – access to education, ownership and healthcare – gender bias within the household and the society are reduced (Sen, 2001). Those economic opportunities would affect the function of the economy and the society, allegedly changing the existing social gender structures.

As the United Nations Secretary-General rightly asserted: “Gender equality is more than a [development] goal in itself. It is a precondition for meeting the challenge of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development and building good governance” (Annan, 2006). Moreover, women empowerment challenges the patriarchal social structures, leading to gender equity – social justice between genders, compensating disadvantages and promoting equality (Lovell, 1994). Indeed, we can see that the personal becomes public, as gender issues interfere in the socioeconomic and political spheres of the society.

Brazilian women lack employability, and opportunity to seek work outside the home, and earn independent income (Klaveren, 2009). Child marriage and adolescent fertility deprive girls from well-being and agency – education, ownership rights and empowerment – diminishing their freedoms, their personal development, the well-being of the family and the community (Lenhardt et al., 2016). Moreover, Brazilian women lack political representation, thereby limiting their political freedoms, which are necessary for producing social responses to economic needs and conceptualise those needs themselves, through the construction of knowledge in public discussions (UNDP, 2015; Foucault, 1972; Zalewski & Enloe, 1996). So, the perpetuation of the Brazilian patriarchal society establishes barriers for the development of the country.

Development in Practice: Case-study of Brazil

Women in Development (WID), Gender and Development (GAD) and Policy Effectiveness

WID emerged in the 1970s, through a liberal feminist structure, considering the active and productive role of women in the development process (Buvinic, 1983; Boserup, 1970). The institutionalisation of WID's main interests as policies happened in 1975, when the

approach was adopted globally with emphasis on income-enhancing projects via training and education (Razavi & Miller, 1995; Yang, 2008). Indeed, those WID-based policies focused on the profitability of addressing the practical needs of women for an efficient development (Kabeer, 1994; Momsen, 2004; Chant, 2003).

However, WID policies presented little concrete achievements, as women and their interests were still marginalised in development theory and practice (Kabeer, 1994; McIlwaine & Datta, 2003). A reinforcement of gender roles saw almost no change in women's position in the development process (Kabeer, 1994).

WID thinkers isolated women in development policies. Alternatively, GAD advocates aim to address women's practical and strategic needs, by challenging forms of discrimination institutionalised by the socio-historical constructed gender asymmetry of power (Moser, 1989). Therefore, GAD acknowledges the necessity of going beyond the addition of women to the development process, by promoting gender equity in the agenda (Parpart & Marchand, 1995; Jaquette & Summerfield, 2006).

This framework recognises that policies have different effects on different women; understanding intersectionality of women, the fluidity and construction of identity by interdependent factors (Waylen, 1999; Crenshaw, 1989). However, GAD does not pose a challenge to WID, instead, they are complementary (Young, 2002).

In the case of Brazil, contemporary development policies regarding women are strongly influenced by the WID approach; also adopting GAD aspects. Gender perspectives were incorporated into Brazilian public policy and governmental programmes, with the end of the Brazilian dictatorship and the declaration of men and women having equal rights and duties in the Constitution of 1988 (Farah, 2004). Public policies were based on differentiated gender roles, maintaining the traditional family structure, by recognising their impact in the public sphere and inserting actions, specifically directed to women, focusing on income-generation and childcare (Craske, 2003; Farah, 2004).

This approach remains in practice in contemporary Brazilian development policies. In 2004, the Brazilian president adopted the National Plan for Women's Policies (NPWP), to transform gender relations and eliminate gender discrimination (Agénor & Canuto, 2013). The NPWP focused on implementing measures – considering the intersectional woman

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– within every sphere of government, and the private sector addressing women's specific needs, particularly healthcare, childcare, education, income-generation programmes, and access to property and financial assets (Smp, 2012). Additionally, it installed women-only clinics and police departments in the major cities, dedicated to protecting women with women-only employees (Smp, 2012). Such policies understandably focused on access to infrastructure, since educated and healthy women have greater ability to engage in productive activities, work in the formal sector and receive higher incomes than uneducated women (Klaveren, 2009; WBGDG, 2003).

Furthermore, we have noticed that the implementation of the NPWP gendered development measures, along with Brazilian economic growth, improved the conditions of Brazilian women from 2003 to 2015, reducing poverty and income as well as gender inequalities (Agénor & Canuto, 2013). For instance, the proportion of women in the workforce and the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector rate increased from 2000 to 2010 (Agénor & Canuto, 2013). Moreover, female illiteracy rates for those above 15 years old fell from 13.5 per cent in 2000 to 7.1 per cent in 2015 and, Brazilian women participated more in the tertiary education than men (IBGS, 2010; World Bank, 2016; 2017a; 2017b). Hence, one could argue that the implementation of those policies focused on the practical needs of the mother, housewife, and employee woman, and regarding gender and intersectionality concepts have generated a positive impact on Brazilian development.

However, Brazilian GII was ranked 85th out of 148 countries (Agénor & Canuto, 2013). Similarly, in 2016, Brazil was the 79th out of 144 countries in the Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2016). Being mindful of Brazilian GDP and HDI positions, the data regarding gender represents the contrast that affects the development of the country. Thus, those policies include women in development agenda, but do not tackle the structural inequalities at its foundation, nor promote the expansion of women's agency. Indeed, those policies could lead to economic benefit. Yet, they will not surely lead to gender equality gains (Bradshaw et al., 2013, p.12).

Gender issues continue to exist firmly in Brazilian political and socio-economic structure. Although there has been progress in women's employment, their comparative advantage in education has not been reflected in relative market wages (Agénor & Canuto, 2013). For example, in 2008 women's salaries, it represented 84 per cent of men's, with the gap

increasing at higher levels of schooling (Bruschini, 2007). Ultimately, Brazil loses 15 per cent of its income per capita due to wage gap and lack of encouragement for female entrepreneur (Cuberes & Teignier, 2015). However, this gap reflects discriminatory actions and social norms since mere 11 to 19 per cent of salary difference refers to divergence in their capabilities (Klaveren et al., 2009). Again, such development policies may promote economic growth and some improvement in women's conditions. We have seen that those approaches are outdated, and policies act as patronising tools are insufficient to address the persistent gender inequalities and to transform the social structures that – as argued in chapter one – constrained women's freedom, diminishing the country's development.

Discourse as a barrier for development

Brazil is ranked 102nd out of 144th countries in the Girls' Opportunity Index, which is based on child marriage, adolescent fertility, maternal mortality, the ratio between women and men MPs, and lower-secondary school completion rates (Lenhardt et al., 2016). Since women are relatively more educated than men (Agenor & Canuto, 2013), we are able to assume that political representation and child marriage (linked to maternal mortality and adolescent fertility) rates hold the country's development back, perpetuating gender roles in the society.

Women are half of the population, yet, they constitute less than 10 per cent of the Brazilian Parliament (World Bank, 2017c; 2017d). This fact limits women's voice and power within the civil society, affecting the protection of their interests, and their ability to promote change. The values that encourage and exercise freedoms are formulated by public discussions which are based on shared knowledge (Craske, 2003). However, this knowledge is constructed by the discourse perpetuated by powerful actors – in this case, mainly men – according to their interest (Foucault, 1972). Hence, if women are not in positions of power, they are unable to construct those discourses, and thus, the knowledge, limiting their public discussions about their rights and concerns. Thus, the lack of political representation clearly limits women's political freedoms, which is responsible for social mobilisation on economic interests, and raising these needs in public discussions.

Furthermore, to introduce more women into politics, Brazilian government implemented a law in 2009 that compel political parties to have minimum 30 per cent of candidates from each sex (Watts, 2012). However, 1 out of 10 female candidates did not receive any

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votes, called “phantom candidates” which were a total of 14.5 thousand women in 2016 (Rossi & Mazotti, 2016). This law failed to challenge the patriarchal structure of the Brazilian society that perpetuates the gender roles and the male-centric aspect of politics.

Besides the quota, women are still significantly underrepresented in the Parliament. It is unlikely that this gender discrepancy in politics is because of lack of capacity, since women are more educated than men. So why would this be? Drawing from Aristotle’s (1962) writings, the patriarchal society understands the public sphere as a male arena. Thus, we can infer that women can lack the confidence to join politics as many times as they are not respected, and their opinions are devalued. Further, electors can feel mistrust in voting for women, as this is not the role females are expected to perform.

In overall, the neglect of women’s rights in the civil code, and the lack of policies that address women’s interests caused by the lack of political representation, diminished the development of the country, thereby, limiting women’s social opportunities and transparency guarantees. Hence, increasing women’s participation in decision-making leads to facilitation of greater gender awareness in the legislative process, which could make it easier to pass laws with gender agendas (Craske, 2003).

However, lack of political representation is not the only factor that diminishes women’s opportunities in Brazil. As mentioned before, the country faces the issue of child marriage – unions in which one or both parts are under the age of 18 – presenting the 4th highest absolute number of cases in the world, and the first in Latin America (Unicef, 2016). Those unions happen mostly in patriarchal societies, and in the poorest families in which gender roles are harmful; women are undervalued, and their education is not seen as beneficial by the family (Lenhardt et al., 2016; UNFPA, 2012; Unicef, 2015).

In that sense, Brazilian society understands the practice as an alternative in a context of limited opportunities (Taylor et al., 2015). As previously discussed, Brazilian girls are marginalised in the political arena; thus, their needs are underrepresented, generating lack of confidence in themselves (Lenhardt et al., 2016). They also face deficient health and nutrition, as well as limited educational and employment opportunities (Lenhardt et al., 2016). Hence, marriage assures the girl’s economic stability (World Bank, 2015b). The marriage could be a form of economic relief for the family, reducing expenses and sometimes receiving financial compensation from the husband (Taylor et al., 2015). Nevertheless,

particularly in Brazil, child marriage assumes a role of emancipation, and as a way for the girls to escape abuse or domestic violence (Taylor et al., 2015).

Marriage affects a girl's education, physical and emotional health, safety, political voice and economic status, violating her dignity and individual freedoms. As a result, the girl's development and empowerment are diminished. Ultimately, this limits international sustainable development goals, such as no poverty, access to good health and quality education, gender equality and economic growth.

Although Brazil has been absent in global discussions about child marriage, its Constitution advocates for gender equality, and establishes marital legislature as both partners must be over 18 or over 16, with both parents' consent. Exceptions are for cases of pregnancy, or to prevent criminal penalty for statutory rape (Taylor et al., 2015). However, as previously discussed, sometimes, parents' desire do not correspond to the girl's best interest, and adolescent fertility is a standard issue in the country. So this is another flexible legislature which facilitates the practice of child marriage, that violates international conventions. It generates opportunity for paedophilia without legal consequences for the rapist; it perpetuates the gender asymmetry of power, and enhances unfreedom, which all hinder development.

Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's first female president, pledged in 2010 to put gender equality as a priority on the policy agenda (Agenór & Canuto, 2013). However, those development policies and laws were incapable of addressing gender issues. The discourse perpetuated by the government policies sustains the gender roles and strengthens sexist stereotypes. Further, in 2016, during Rousseff's impeachment process, the former president was objectified and suffered sexist verbal aggressions, diminishing her power due to the traditional belief that public sphere is a male arena (Hao, 2016; Kerber, 1988). Additionally, the new president Michel Temer, selected an all-male cabinet, and shut down the ministries of women and human rights, reinforcing the ancient notion of male-centred politics (Zillman, 2016).

Gender can certainly not just be added to the development policy agenda, as a "mix and stir" method, as to do so is evidently inefficient in tackling gender issues and development. The outdated policies and laws have led to a simplistic structure, which remains weak in challenging the oppressive patriarchal discourse in the society. Instead, we need

to understand development as a gender-aware process, regarding the expansion of opportunities, not just through policies and laws, but going beyond Sen's (2001) approach and challenging the oppressive discourses.

Development as Subversion

Development Thought

It was previously concluded that we need to question the patriarchal ideological discourse in the development process. Thus, we must consider a new view of development, paying attention to dominant social discourses.

Similarly to Escobar's (1995) view, development as subversion shares concern about discourses, and is influenced by critical thinkers. However, this new approach differs from post-development as it calls for the deconstruction of oppressive discourses, which are led by ideological psychic prisons, such as patriarchy. So, the ultimate goal of development is to promote emancipation and empowerment of the subjects marginalised by patriarchy. Hence, development continues to be a personal and public continuous process as Sen (2001) understands. However, in Sen's perspective, development starts as a top-down movement, from government policies. Alternatively, this paper defends the notion of a primordial bottom-up flow. Through continuous resistance and resilience, we can subvert the identity-politics establishing a new non-masculine political discourse.

Ideology, Identity-Politics and Development

Gender and the patriarchal discourse are perpetuated consciously in our community, generally, without questioning it, diminishing women's agency and development.

As we have seen, currently, development is conceived as male-centric, including gender-aware approaches. Consequently, both the deconstruction of the dominant patriarchal discourse, and the introduction of a more holistic discourse must occur for women to maximise their agency.

In that sense, we can notice that the patriarchal discourse produces what Gramsci (1971) calls a hegemonic culture, since it maintains the imbalance of power in the society through

the spread of its values and ideology, diminishing women's development on the terms of an objective illusion. Thus, patriarchy is not natural, but a conscious myth that propagates its principles as "common sense" values, that maintain the *status quo* (Sjödin, 2006; Marx, 1978, p.766; Gramsci, 1971). However, we can challenge this myth through consciousness and a *non-masculine* approach to develop and be strengthened by a different political discourse.

As we have previously debated, the patriarchal hegemonic culture affects all areas of the country's development. The addition of gender equity consciousness leads to the expansion of women's opportunities. Such equity enables a fundamental social change through the notion of development as subversion that may result in more economic power to the country's administration (Cuberes & Tignier, 2015). But, as we have discussed, the change in social structure decreases socio-political inequalities within the country, promoting higher status in the international sphere.

This higher status provides greater power to formulate knowledge and systems of truth, moderating narratives; setting agendas and discussions consistent with Brazilian interests; and, acquiring more control over its representations internationally (Foucault, 1972; Anand, 2007). Therefore, understandably, the deconstruction of the patriarchal discourse and adoption of a new account of development – resisting the domination and deception caused by the ideology (Foucault, 1988) – is beneficial for the development of the country, diminishing domestic hierarchies, but also increasing the country's international power.

However, women may be passive to oppressive norms and practices, which lead to disempowerment and lack of self-confidence (Bartky, 1988). Such passivity is understandable because questioning patriarchy means to question their personal identity, which is connected to their sense of competence (Sawicki, 1994). Therefore, the patriarchal ideology formulates expected female experience and identity (Butler, 1990). The latter leads to coercion and self-regulation of women, including when those identities are formulated for emancipatory ends, as they constrain the subjects they hope to liberate (Butler, 1990). Therefore, we recognise the naturalised identities to create a sense of deception and to establish the domination of marginalised subjects, which infringe their development by limiting their opportunities.

Judith Butler (1990, p.149) claims: “If identities were no longer fixed as the premises of a political syllogism, and politics no longer understood as a set of practices derived from the alleged interests that belong to a set of ready-made subjects, a new configuration of politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the old”. Thus, we need to think beyond the structures of identity to formulate a better account of development, seeking emancipation and questioning the prevailing gender norms, through the exposition of the conditional aspects that construct the notion of a natural gender identity. Moreover, development approach needs to transcend the concern for women’s interest and needs.

Indeed, we are required to disentangle and resist the tie of disciplinary power to our identity. Then, we go beyond the framework of identity-politics, as it marginalises and segregates those who do not conceive themselves within the structure established by those identities; neglects the power differences, and promotes conflict within the group (Foucault, 1977; 1980; Butler, 1990; Bernstein, 2005). Thus, the new account of development must consider development as subversion, regarding non-masculinity achieved through resistance and resilience, understanding the necessity of agency within the strains originated by disagreement, disintegration and diversity (Butler, 1990).

Development as Subversion

Therefore, development as subversion focuses on revealing the specific shapes gender-power relations. It takes micro-politics to establish detailed opportunities for emancipation, empowerment and social change. Consequently, to achieve its goal, the account of development suggested by this research is based on three interrelated concepts: non-masculinity, resistance and resilience.

As discussed previously, the patriarchal ideological discourse naturalises oppressive gender identities in the community, through common sense values and it generates an identity-based approach in the political sphere, which is essentialist, oppressive and harmful to development—as in the case of political representation and child marriage in Brazil. Therefore, we need to understand development beyond identity-politics, adopting a non-masculine facet. This prevents the establishment of a privileged male-centric discourse, subverting the oppressive patriarchal discourse in the society. Hence, the naturalisation of identity needs to be demystified, exposing its discourse-construction (Eagleton, 1979).

Through political manifestation revealing both the constructive nature of gender and the ideological use of patriarchy to maintain the gendered imbalance of power, we create a consciousness which conditions agency (Rosenberg, 1980), so, we can see the emancipation from patriarchal domination, and the empowerment of marginalised subjects. In development as subversion, I assume that by dismissing the privileged subject that orders patriarchy, there will be a 'de-ideologisation'; transforming the social structures, and establishing the foundations for the empowerment of marginalised subjects. Yet, this political process of social change requires education, generated by constant resistance and resilience.

To strive against the patriarchal signifying action (Eagleton, 1979), we can certainly assert the necessity to resist the normalisation of identity for development. However, the discourse-knowledge-power relationship discussed previously dismisses the notion of resistance, based on a subject that pre-existed its formation through power (Foucault 1972). Thus, their ability to autonomy and free agency is restricted. Hence, resistance to power can only be formed upon the exercise of power, aiming to lose the constraints for the possibility of agency (Foucault, 1980, p.142).

Thus, this resistance is better exercised alongside with the creation of political spaces, to present and challenge political norms, discussing the essence of what is considered beneficial for women, and contributing to a democratic public discussion on the common good – instead of common identity – interpreted on varied forms by a diverse group (Brown, 1995). Such discussions would lead to the formulation of public discourse, designed to achieve a fundamental social change, and a more equitable society (Ackerly, 2001; True, 2003). Ultimately, those discussions instigated the establishment of marginalised subjects, being able to resist the domination, replacing the normalised identities for autonomous self-formation (Sawicki, 1988; Lloyd, 1988).

In that sense, subjects can change power relationships to expand their agency, seeking the smallest amount of domination possible (Foucault, 1988). Consequently, development process pursues empowerment and emancipation of women through resisting patriarchal power. This resistance happens through the establishment of new attitudes and cultural ways, and contestation under a political camouflage, using language and formulating knowledge and, thus, systems of truth (Scott, 1985; 1990; Foucault, 1980). Moreover, this emancipation differs from the traditional emancipatory thought which aims to abolish all forms of constraints (Sawicki, 1998). Instead, we see that the freedom chased

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by development regards constant individual agency, which ensures power relations will not re-establish a state of domination. Hence, resistance, for development as subversion, is a form of political action which refuses domination and seeks emancipation.

However, resistance as politics has “no inherent attachments and hails no particular vision” (Brown, 1995, p.49). To have the ability to resist the hegemonic ideology and achieve emancipation, the development process requires political spaces for challenging political norms, and debating the nature of identity (Brown, 1995). Thus, the practice of resistance needs to be supplemented by resilience.

Resilience is understood as the autonomous ability to “bounce-back”, absorbing disturbance and reorganising itself through adaptability, ensuring survival in conditions that denies the change of structures (Walker et al., 2004, p.1; Katz, 2004). A resilient social body is capable of questioning the *status quo* and to formulate alternative futures, going beyond the idea of “bouncing-back”; by articulating and reinventing a new *status quo* after the moment of shock (Brown, 2014; Raco and Street, 2012). Thus, resilience is an essential concept for social resistance (Churchill, 2003), being able to institute the foundations, and preconditions of subversion of the patriarchal hegemonic culture; establishing opportunities for emancipation through the agency. For the effectiveness of the development process, resilience must be constant (Golubchikov, 2011) and subjective to change, so as to persist the struggle against the oppressive patriarchal ideology, and its normalised identities. Thus, we understand resilience as proactive, being primordial for the promotion of empowerment of women, which attempt to build a system adaptable to new circumstances.

However, when resistance and defiance are not a possible option due to disorganisation, or weakness of the marginalised subjects, resilience could be applied as the first step towards social transformation (DeVerteuil and Golubchikov, 2016). Hence, we see resilience as a strategic tactic for when subjects are unable to change the circumstances, but still can demonstrate agency, self-organization and ability to cope and adapt, especially confronting the gaps of the rigour of oppressive discourses. But, resilience by itself is not always effective to achieve social change and development (DeVerteuil and Golubchikov, 2016). Resilience and resistance could work in a chronological order, or even in a co-constitutive moment. Ultimately, we need to combine resilience with resistance, to reach social transformation through non-masculine politics, by promoting emancipation and empowerment of women leading to development as subversion of the patriarchal psychic prison.

Conclusion

To conclude, we are certainly being able to comprehend the limitations of development, thought, and practice, regarding gender matters; recognising the necessity of widening our understanding of development. This paper has evaluated the importance of addressing gender in development and has argued that the dominant approaches of development fails to address gender issues, perceiving development as a masculine, simplistic and superficial concept. Consequently, we need to understand development through a new account, which broadens our perception of the concept, by subverting the oppressive discourses in the society, and being able to combat the harmful gendered problems.

Indeed, this paper is not only a critique of traditional approaches, but also of dominant ways of inserting gender in development. This research provides us with an insight into the field, a way of updating development, thought and practice, by introducing new elements and addressing the gaps in the existing literature and policies. Therefore, development as subversion presents practical and theoretical implications, as it aims to challenge the oppressive patriarchal discourse in communities; but also, it starts new areas of research expanding this theory. Moreover, through the lenses of development as subversion, future researchers should consider investigating the following questions: How can we promote resistance and resilience in the society? What about other oppressive discourses (non-patriarchal)? Can they also hinder development? If so, would all countries we currently consider developed still be considered developed (e.g. states with oppressive racialized discourses)?

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THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SPANISH DIPLOMACY: UNDERREPRESENTATION AND INEQUALITY IN FORMAL INSTITUTIONS

Jordi Cortes Espasa

Introduction

The issue of womens' underrepresentation in the diplomatic services along with the difficulties women face reaching high-level positions is relevant, because it highlights a problem that lies within public institutions generally. When looking closely at the positions held by Spanish women diplomats, only a 7.6 per cent of a total of 195 countries were women ambassadors in 2016, according to the data from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign affairs (2016). If access to the diplomatic service is technically equal for men and women, why are the numbers of women diplomats so low compared to men? The Spanish patriarchal mindset has fomented a system where women were raised to be mothers and wives in order to support the Spanish family model. Women have been regarded as incapable of participating in a career that requires "male" aptitudes, such as determination, bravery and strength of character, to deal with situations in an international sphere. This mindset still prevails in current times, not only within society but also within public institutions. Women diplomats with the same years of experience and working skills as men face discrimination in the diplomatic services. This is reflected in the high levels of underrepresentation between men and women entering the diplomatic services, and reaching high-level positions. The purpose of this study on gender equality is to raise questions about how gender norms are implemented in formal and informal institutions.

The study is divided into two sections: The first will analyse the theoretical framework of Feminist Institutionalism (FI); and examine how formal and informal practises can be used to discriminate women in the workplace. This part will also seek to explain the

difficulties women have in accessing higher positions within the diplomatic body through a comparative analysis between years 2005 and 2016. The second section will address the opinions and experiences of three women diplomats, regarding the challenges they have faced while exercising their profession, and how discriminatory practices in the workplace have gone unnoticed due to the patriarchal nature of the institution.

The use of Feminist Institutionalism as a theoretical framework contributes to my research in reinforcing the idea of women as disregarded actors within formal institutions. The goal of Feminist Institutionalism is to explain how formal and informal institutions are understood as gendered, and the challenges that restrict the chances for innovation towards the achievement of gender equality and gender justice in those institutions.

Spanish Women Diplomats in Numbers

A Historical Date: Access to the Spanish diplomatic Services

In order to find the first Spanish woman ambassador, we have to look back to the second Republic where Isabel Oyarzabal became the head of mission at the embassy of Stockholm in 1937 (Turrión, 2014). That was the last time a woman would be allowed to occupy a diplomatic position abroad for a long time. It was the end of the Spanish Civil War and Franco was coming into power. What followed was a period of restrictions for the development of women's rights in many areas. Women were not allowed to vote until 1977 (Dale, 2013). Access to the diplomatic service was granted to Spanish women in 1964 after the removal of the ban imposed during Franco's dictatorship. Maria Rosa Boceta, would have become the first woman diplomat in 1972. On paper, women were allowed to take the examination to become diplomats; however, reality would show that in an environment still dominated by men, women would struggle to serve their country as diplomats. After competing against five hundred candidates, and remaining among the top fifteen, Maria Rosa Boceta passed the diplomatic exam. Nevertheless, as only ten places would be offered that year, she was ranked in the eleventh position, leaving her without a post. Soon after her exam was over, she found out that the president of the examining board had previously stated that no women would become a diplomat while he was presiding over the examination jury board (Boceta, 2008).

Currently, the process of becoming a diplomat in Spain consists of a competitive examination, made up of five different tests: a general knowledge exam; an essay on a current political, economic, social and/or cultural topic chosen by the jury members; a language test in English and other language selected from French, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, German, Portuguese and Japanese; and lastly an oral examination on four topics related mainly to international law, international organizations, the European Union, development and cooperation, economy, history and international relations (BOE, 2016). While the first four parts of the exams are objectively marked based on the results of a written test, the last oral examination could be regarded as partial due to the subjectivity in considering candidate's presentation and knowledge skills. The results are based on the capacity of the candidate in explaining with clarity and precision, the content on a certain topic. While the results from a written test or translation of a text from English to Spanish could be easily quantifiable, the oral presentation skills of a person may be judged differently according to who is listening. In the case of Maria Rosa that last part of the test served the president of the examination board as a justification to leave her out of the diplomatic body, not because she did not perform well enough in her exam, but because of his sexist ideas.

Challenges and Justification for the Current Numbers of Women in Diplomacy

The current number of women in the Spanish diplomatic body highlight the level of underrepresentation of women figures. Out of 926 diplomats, only 216 are women, according to data from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). An explanation of why the number is so low is difficult to find. However, there are a few valid justifications. One could be the later incorporation of women to the diplomatic services in 1964. The second reason is the challenge of managing a family and a diplomatic career. That will be explained in greater details in the following section through the interview responses. The job of a diplomat can be mostly exercised internationally, therefore those women who might already have a family might be discouraged to apply for a job that requires spending a great amount of time travelling or living abroad. Historically in Spain, women have taken care of their children, while men would develop a professional career. In our current society that has changed and women are now fully integrated into the labour system, playing an active role in many areas of the economy. Nevertheless, in cases where both men and women have a career and a successful job, it is more likely that the women give up

their professional life in order to look after the family. In Spain, 33.1 per cent of women have searched for a part-time job, in order to spend time looking after their children. By contrast, men only have done so in 8.1 per cent of the cases (Gimenez, 2008). A third reason, although difficult to prove, is the link between the low numbers of women diplomats with the subjective nature of the last part of the examination process. Miguel Angel Vecino, is a Spanish diplomat who has highlighted the problem that lies within the selection process in the diplomatic examination. Vecino suggests that meritocracy in Spain belongs to the past, and that the current recruitment process for diplomats is the one that benefits applicants not for what they know or the experience they have, but because of who they know in the government (Villarino et al., 2015).

The Struggle to Become Women Ambassadors

The struggle of Spanish women wanting to become diplomats does not stop in the selection process. Those who want to progress once inside the diplomatic body have the chance to do so, however, reaching the top of the diplomatic career seems almost impossible. It is true that there are women ambassadors, nevertheless, and as Figure 1 shows, they only account for 7.6 per cent of the total number of Spanish ambassadors in service. As reported by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2016, only fifteen women were appointed ambassadors among a total of 195 countries. When looking for reasons to justify the poor representation of women as ambassadors in foreign countries, it is important to pay attention to the designation process. In a way, it has some similarities with the diplomatic selection process, as it also uses subjectivity to choose the candidates. Since 2014, those who wanted to be considered for the ambassadorial position are required to have at least twenty years of experience within the diplomatic body. This requirement was introduced to make the selection process more transparent and fair for all candidates. Yet, the new prerequisite did not take into consideration that women were only allowed in the diplomatic service from 1964 and that the first woman being granted a post began her service in 1972. Mon Gonzalez (2002), a diplomat at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign affairs, reminds us how slow the access of women to Spanish diplomatic services was. With the exceptions of Maria Rosa Boceta in 1971, Aurora Bernaldez in 1972, Mercedes Rico and Marta Vilardell in 1973, in the first two decades (the 1970s and 1980s) the incorporation of women was very irregular and did not reach over 10 per cent in each promotion round. There were years such as in 1977, 1980 and 1981 when no women accessed the diplomatic service. It was not until the 1990s that the percentage of women becoming

diplomats increased to 40 per cent. In fact, from 1971 until 1990, only 41 women had access to the diplomatic service in Spain. Besides the requirement of twenty years of experience in the diplomatic service, knowledge of the local language, as well as familiarity with the political context of the destination post are other conditions to be taken into consideration when appointing an ambassador. Nonetheless, the final decision is made in a minister's council, consisting of the minister of justice, foreign affairs, defence, public affairs, national affairs, development, education, employment, energy, agriculture, health, the vice president and the prime minister (Moncloa, 2017).

Beyond having professional experience in the Spanish diplomatic service, the ultimate decision is made by the council of ministers, not exclusively based on language skills and control over the speciality of the area in the post, but ultimately it is made on the basis of personal opinion. The key word here is 'designation', as the person is appointed by a group of people who, besides considering the professionalism of the candidate, base their decision on their own personal ideas, that might be linked to political partisanship or personal contacts and networks. Proof of subjectivity in the ambassadorial selection process could be found in the appointment of the former Spanish ambassador in London, between 2012 and 2017, Federico Trillo, who was given the post without even being a diplomat (BOE, 2017). What it is labelled as 'political' ambassador, has been a common practice in the designation of ambassadors in the minister's council. Between 2004 and 2010 up to twelve Spanish politicians were made ambassadors in posts such as Turkey and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In 2011, the embassies of Argentina and Belgium were occupied by politicians, as well as the representation of Spain in the European Union, and the Organization of American States (RTVE, 2011). If the designation of political ambassadors is often related to political interests, why could we not relate the low rates of women ambassadors to a problem of gender discrimination?

Data in figure 2 shows that in 2005, only 5.7 per cent of ambassadors were women. That is translated as eleven women ambassadors per a total of 191 countries. That same year, the total number of diplomats was 783, of which 143 were women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). The result is alarming, as from all 143 women diplomats, only eleven were appointed as ambassadors, which means that the council of ministers would have considered that 180 men were better prepared and qualified to occupy the head of mission posts. Even more discouraging was the complete absence of women appointed to the position of General Consul in 2005. There was no female representation at any of the 87

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consulates that Spain hosted internationally. That figure changed in 2016 when six women were given the position of General Consul, but again they were a substantial minority compared to the 95 men appointed the same role that year.


Figure 1 shows that in 2016 only 7.6 per cent of ambassadors were women, which is translated into fifteen women as head of mission in a total of 195 countries. This figure is barely significant as the number of women ambassadors remained almost at the same level as in 2005. An interesting fact is that by 2005, there were 179 women with more than twenty years of diplomatic experience, but that same year, only eleven were appointed to be ambassadors. By 2005, they all had the requirements to be the potential ambassadors, however, the minister's council decided to assign only eleven women to the highest position in the diplomatic service.

Figure 1. Percentage of women as ambassador in 2016



■ Women 7.6% ■ Men 92.4%

Figure 2. Percentage of women as ambassador in 2005



■ Women 5.7% ■ Men 94.3%

Source: *Guide of representations of Spain internationally* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Destination Post and Gender Discrimination

Despite the number of women diplomats with the required number of years of experience and background, they are still regarded as not good enough to represent Spain in a

foreign country as ambassadors. However, when they do, they have to face an extra level of discrimination. Women ambassadors are not sent to Washington, London, Rome, Paris, Berlin, Moscow or Tel Aviv. Those are considered top destinations for the interest they represent for the Spanish foreign ministry (Pascual, 2015). Countries with a woman ambassador in 2005 included: Botswana, Cameroon, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Slovenia, Belgium and Seychelles. Mainly African and Central American regions, with a couple of exceptions in Europe. Women ambassadors in 2016 occupied posts in: Albania, Angola, Botswana, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Finland, Ghana, Laos, Lebanon, Malawi, Namibia, Thailand, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The fact that women are sent to mainly African, Asian and Centre American destinations has to do with the relevance of the Spanish bilateral relations with such regions. Countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Malawi, Togo and Zambia were considered in 2016 as least developed countries (UN, 2016). Foreign policy in those destinations will have a lot to do with development, aid and cooperation, and therefore it will require a person who is compassionate, humanitarian and unifier. While in Washington, Tel Aviv, London or Moscow the foreign policy would be focused on economic, political and defence issues that require a firm, tough and disciplined person. Through the designation of ambassadorial posts, we can see how gender stereotypes along with patriarchal hierarchy remains a decisive element in Spanish public institutions.

Spanish Women Diplomats and Their Experience With Gender Discrimination

Responses to the diplomatic selection process

When interviewees were asked about the possible reasons behind the low number of women at the Spanish diplomatic service, subject 1 highlighted the masculine character of the examination process as a deterrent factor. In her experience, the exam process was very strict and the members of the jury board, were constituted by men, had a stern and not very welcoming attitude which could be intimidating for women candidates. Subject 2 confirmed this opinion as she remembered her exam being a very tough process where only a small number of women made it through the selection process; although, from her point of view, many more could have met the entrance criteria.

Responses to the Low Presence of Women at the Spanish Diplomatic Service

Besides the issues that may arise from the examination process, all interviewees mentioned the difficulties of reconciling a professional career as a diplomat with having a family as a deterrent factor to become a diplomat. According to Subject 1, one of the reasons that might influence the low percentage of women diplomats is the family sacrifice that is required when becoming a member of the Spanish diplomatic service. Subject 1 highlighted the difficulties she had when she landed on her own in Bulgaria to start her new position at the embassy with a newborn baby. Her husband did not give up his career back in Spain and that left her in a complex situation where she had to combine her job at the embassy and looking after her daughter on her own. According to her, that had been the situation many Spanish women suffered as they had to follow their diplomat and ambassador husbands in their destination posts abroad. However, as she pointed out, that situation does not happen in the reverse case, as it is less likely that men would give up their careers to follow their wives when destined to a foreign post. Although, she never neglected her job at the embassy, Subject 1 expressed how there were times when an emergency would come up and she would have to take her daughter to the hospital. She admitted that the effort made by other women (baby sitters, friends, maids) who helped her with her daughter while she was based in Bulgaria was important, as without them, she could not have managed. Subject 2 defended that one of the reasons for that low outcome could be the very complicated situation from a family point of view. According to her, it demands family sacrifices, therefore, women often opt for a different career path that allows them to reconcile having a family and a professional life simultaneously. Subject 3 also had a very clear opinion on the difficulties women face in uniting the job of a diplomat and ambassador with a family life. In her opinion, women still hold responsibility as main actors in the family. They are expected to carry all the weight in tasks such as taking care of the well-being and education of their children. For that reason, many women would refuse to be sent to a foreign destination where their child's education or security might be at stake. Altogether, the difficulty of reconciling a family with a diplomat job seems to be a compelling explanation for the low percentage of Spanish women diplomats. As seen through the testimonies of the interviewees pursuing a diplomatic career, taking care of a family is still nowadays hard task for women, and especially if they are to do it on their own.

Responses to Gender Discrimination in the Workplace

All three interviewees in one way or another have faced discrimination while at work. While working at the embassy in Bulgaria, Subject 1 was told by a male director that she had a problem, referring to her newly born daughter. As she pointed out, her daughter was never the problem, as she had never been absent from work due to the care of her child, despite looking after her on her own. Subject 3 also had a similar experience with gender discrimination in the workplace. She was pregnant while working at an embassy in Ecuador, and was about to take her four months' maternity leave. The male ambassador in charge at that time made it clear to her that he was contrary to the idea of her taking that time off, that by law, she was entitled to. As defended by Feminist Institutionalists, men's perception of women's struggles can be very different from how women view their own difficulties. In the case of Subject 3, not only she had to deal with going through pregnancy, but also with the pressure of her discontented boss for taking time off. However, the male ambassador did not take into consideration that telling her how she was about her taking time off would also make her feel uncomfortable and guilty. It is hypocritical to implement facilitation policies, if those who have to respect them and enforce them do not act upon them. On a different occasion, Subject 3 had to interview a director at the Foreign Ministry in Ecuador; in a formal meeting, after having presented her arguments for an important vote proposition, that director asked her if she was married. Subject 3's first reaction was to repeat all the arguments she had previously noted. She felt shocked, not having expected that type of question, especially in a formal meeting. In her own words, she felt as if the content of the conversation and the work she went there to do did not matter to him at all. One of the criticisms presented by Feminist Institutionalists is the fact that gender relations are seen to be institutionalised. Small acts of chauvinism such as the question presented by the director at the Ecuadorian embassy are present in the day to day lives of women. The question presented by the director at the Ecuador embassy to Subject 3 might have sounded natural in an informal situation. However, it was out of context in a formal meeting discussing an important vote proposition.

Responses to Gender Quotas at the Diplomatic Service

When questioned about gender discrimination in the workplace, Subject 2 mentioned cases of positive discrimination; where women were promoted due to their gender. In her

opinion, those types of practises should be avoided as they do very little to improve the role of women within the diplomatic service. Subject 3 was also against gender quotas in public institutions. However, she excluded positive discrimination from those cases where a man and a woman diplomat are equally well qualified and experienced. She used as an example, the case relating to the low percentage of women ambassadors. In those cases where male and female diplomats are equally well qualified for the job, this should be given to women, as they are underrepresented in the highest positions. Subject 3 added that this approach to positive discrimination could improve the numbers of women ambassadors within the diplomatic service. Subject 1 contributed to the latter argument by adding that although positive discrimination should not be applied in the diplomatic selection process, as it could help women's career progression once inside the service. She argued that candidates should be chosen according to their merits and experience rather than their gender. However, once they have made it into the diplomatic body, there should be tools to help women developing and reaching those ambassador positions.

Responses on the Role of Women in the Spanish Diplomatic Service

Responses to women's contribution to the Spanish diplomatic service were very diverse. Subject 3 highlighted that women have not been part of the diplomatic body long enough to make a distinctive contribution. She believed that in order to increase the number of women ambassadors, women candidates would have to show to those who appoint them that they were more than capable of doing the job. Her thoughts reflect the struggle many women face in the diplomatic service. In order to break through that glass ceiling, they have to work harder than men who have easier access to top positions due to their gender. Feminist institutionalists highlight that the way men experience inequality is completely different from how women do. In the case of Spanish women diplomats, they are most likely to have fewer opportunities than men, and they might have to show greater levels of effort to prove themselves competent. Subject 2 has a similar approach, she explains the reason why the number of women ambassadors is lower as due to the shorter time women have spent in the diplomatic service. She argues that the reason for women not being sent to important international posts such as Washington, London, Tel Aviv or Paris is due to the small number of women with enough experience and knowledge in the areas of those destinations. However, in chapter two, data showed how the number of women with over twenty years of experience and qualifying for the ambassador

position were very disproportionate compared to the number of women appointed ambassadors. While being interviewed, Subject 2 also had a strong opinion on who should participate in a study of gender discrimination at the Spanish diplomatic service. According to her, only those with “sufficient” experience should participate in the research study. When asked about possible candidates to be interviewed, Subject 2 suggested candidates who might have a critical opinion to gender discrimination, being male diplomats, all the names she recommended to be interviewed. In her opinion, there is nothing different that a women diplomat adds to the service compared to what a male diplomat could have done. Nevertheless, women have always been linked to certain roles in the society: the mother, the carer, and the nurse. They have also been linked with certain attributes: the conciliator, the promoter of dialogue, and the sensitive. Spanish women diplomats have proven they also have “masculine” attributes such as bravery, determination and negotiation skills. A testimony of that was the liberation of religious volunteers and the Spanish journalist from El Mundo by Maria Rosa Boceta in Sierra Leone (2008). She had to deal with probably one of the most complex situations ambassadors could face in their entire career, which was negotiating the liberation of prisoners directly with a violent armed group. Boceta confronted a very critical situation which many other male diplomats never experienced, accomplishing the liberation with no human casualties, and avoiding any ransom for economic rescue.

Regarding the role of women within the diplomatic service, Subject 1 talked about the ability to stay true to one’s self and being able to be honest with the work one does. She highlighted the rigid hierarchical system in the diplomatic body as an obstacle for women diplomats; as it is very hard to climb to the top without having connections. As witnessed by Subject 1, the ways in which one could build those connections is through agreeing to do things a person would not do in a normal situation, to please those who hold the power. Assuming that the lack of women in ambassadorial positions, or the assignment of their destination post is based on the low proportion of women within the diplomatic service, it is looking away from the real problem. In order to increase the number of women not only as diplomats but also as ambassadors, it is important to look at the structures that are already in place, in order to identify any formal or informal construction that acts as an obstacle for women diplomats’ development. The change needs to come also from the women diplomats themselves, especially those who through a great struggle have made it to the top of the hierarchy, and are able to exercise pressure within the system.

Conclusion

This study has presented arguments to demonstrate that despite their existence in public institutions such as the Spanish diplomatic service, women are still victims of gender discrimination. They still represent a minority within the diplomatic body, and their presence in ambassador and consul positions is extremely rare. The research has also shown how women are seen to have different attributes from men, which made them suitable only for 'low-ranking' destination posts in Africa and South Asia. Whereas posts that are highly rated for their strategic importance in Spanish bilateral relations, such as London, Washington and Berlin, are given to male diplomats.

The use of Feminist Institutionalism as a theoretical body has reinforced the argument of women as disregarded actors within the Spanish diplomatic service. The quantitative analyses offered a comparative analysis of years between 2005 and 2016, with regards to the number of Spanish women in consul and ambassadorial positions, and rates of male and female diplomats in the diplomatic service. The low number of women in the diplomatic service in comparison with men, raised questions as to whether this is due to the male dominant character of the service, or the difficulties women face in balancing a diplomatic career and a family life. The testimonies from the interviews, underline the struggles women diplomats face when developing their profession. Their experiences and opinions shows how informal rules are present within the Spanish diplomatic body, and the way it affects the lives of women diplomats. The interview chapter is a great contribution to the overall dissertation, as it offers primary sources that gave an account of those informal rules that otherwise would go unnoticed. It is through these women who have had the courage to report gender discrimination abuses in the workplace that informal practises could be eliminated.

Despite the designation of women diplomats as ambassadors in Berlin, Belgium and Estonia between the end of 2016, and the beginning of 2017; their presence remains very limited in comparison to male ambassadors. As it has been described through the text, certain formal rules such as the last stage in the examination process, and the designation of ambassador positions in the council of ministers remain an obstacle for the presence of women in the Spanish diplomatic service, and their development within the institution. The combination of a very hierarchical system with the influence of a patriarchal mindset, not only slows down the entry of women diplomats to ambassadorial positions, but

also acts as a constraint factor for women applicants. Although these might be the more influential factors in the development of women's diplomat career, there are others, such as women diplomats' perception of their role within the diplomatic service. Subjects 2 and 3 highlighted the lack of contribution of Spanish women diplomats played within the diplomatic service. However, practice shows that there have been women making a difference in how diplomacy can be exercised.

Addressing gender discrimination in the Spanish diplomatic service works through removing all sorts of formal and informal practises that prevent women diplomats from promoting themselves and from being themselves. The promotion of gender equality and the implementation of effective disciplinary measures to prevent gender discrimination are two starting points to tackle the problem. One interesting factor for future research might be the phenomenon of gender discrimination to be promoted if only indirectly by women diplomats themselves. Despite admitting the struggle, women have to access the diplomatic service and to achieve promotion once inside; some of them have had to blend in with the system in order to progress. This has required some women diplomats to acquire "male" attributes and practice "male" patterns of behaviour, in order to fit into a men's world. In defaulting to a "male" stereotype and observing the informal rules maintaining patriarchal practises, some women diplomats could have forgotten the underlying reasons for acting like male diplomats, which was the discrimination towards women in the diplomatic service. While she was being interviewed, Subject 2 hinted that in order to have a representative view from Spanish women diplomats, only those with "sufficient" experience should participate in the research study. Subject 2 also suggested possible candidates who might had a critical opinion on gender discrimination, being all male names. It is interesting and at the same time paradoxical the way in which some Spanish women diplomats now in high-level positions have achieved success, perpetuating the system that made it so hard for them to feel part of it. A starting point for further research in the subject could be identifying the moment when women diplomats switch from being victims of gender discrimination to become perpetrators of those acts of discrimination. It could draw attention to the reasons behind the difficulties women diplomats experience once inside the Spanish diplomatic service to develop and promote to higher positions.

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Area Studies:
Vietnam in Transition

15

THE COUNTRY IN A BOX: CAN A COMMUNIST STATE SURVIVE IN TODAY'S GLOBAL CAPITALIST ECONOMY WITHOUT SACRIFICING ITS KEY PRINCIPLES?

Liam Bemrose

The room is dim, we are funnelled through in two lines, arms by our sides, our eyes scanning the room, decorated corner to corner with army personnel, each as lifeless as the centrepiece. A dead man in a box; this dead man is a champion of independence, the symbol for Vietnamese 'communism', embodied within the corpse is the former prime minister and freedom fighter, Ho Chi Minh, a metaphor for the country in which it resides, a country with a regime atrophying within its border.

Were Ho Chi Minh's efforts in vain? In a world where states rely immensely on economic success under a capitalist market, communism cannot survive. The importance of this issue is critical for communists all over the globe; but states like Vietnam showed that it is in fact, possible to survive, if you play ball. However, it is not to be forgotten that communism and capitalism have always been two extremely different ballgames, and will continue to be.

This article will critique the form of communism adopted in Vietnam, and to draw similarities between this dead man in a box with Vietnam's 'communism', and the borders that nationalism and capitalism create within its framework.

In order to answer this, we need to go back and chronologically dissect the course of 'communism' in Vietnam, starting with the birth and legitimization of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) via nationalist goals – the creation of the box; how 'communism' prevailed, then subsequently focus on the policies, figures, and visual experiences of non-communism

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under the CPV in Vietnam, and finally asking the question: can communism¹ exist in the twenty first-Century? If not, why?

Once under the imperial rule of France, the socio-political sphere within the country bred a new generation of dissenters of colonial rule. The French had given the Vietnamese the opportunity for a higher Western education in hopes of creating a bourgeois class. However, this only intensified their frustrations and resentments.

Those that attended the French university studied the principles of 1789, “the best-known precepts of the French Revolution – *liberté, égalité, fraternité*” (Fitzsimmons, 2012: 75), the rights to liberty, equality, and happiness for all men; and it was from here they sought the wisdom of Marx and Lenin. Among the Vietnamese students was the leader himself, Ho Chi Minh. The root of Ho’s passion did not lie within the ideology of communism; however, it was in nationalism. Ho Chi Minh declared “it was patriotism and not communism that originally inspired me” (quoted in Karnow, 1983, p.134).

Ho’s nationalism is apparent throughout his political career: his focus always centred on the independence of Vietnam, and not the spread of communist ideology. Nationalism is a far more powerful tool to unite a nation than any other political ideology. It acts as a glue uniting a society socially, culturally, and of course politically, more so for a society where history has played a major role in defining their present. Communism acted as a vehicle for a nationalist movement, and this stemmed from the rejection of aids by the U.S. (Rausch, 2011). The pre-1945 desire for independence never amounted to anything more than outbreaks of violence. The Vietnamese’s thirst for independence was only further aggravated by French military forces.

Ho requested freedom for his people at the Paris peace conference in 1919, at Versailles, claiming self-determination to Woodrow Wilson, and the other ‘big four’ (Whitman, 1969; McDonald, 2012). However, the peace conference failed to address such colonial issues; he was denied a resolve again in 1945. Given the situation, most nationalist leaders would have made the same decision as Ho: to side with the only global powers that

1 The foundation of this report is built on communism, but as a concept, it lacks a central definition. Throughout this report when ‘communism’ appears within the quotation marks, it is referring to my perception of communism in Vietnam under the CPV, and what one may perceive as nationalism or market-oriented socialism. For the sake of this report, communism will be referring to the ideology outlined within the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx.

could stand up to the U.S., to opt for an ideology that was not colonising the world over, to side with the Soviet Union and China – the ideology of communism and socialism, a means to an end for Vietnamese independence. During World War II, Ho aligned himself to the Viet Minh, a nationalist party started by Ho in 1941. With the allies against the communist movement of the Soviet Union, Ho chose to side with the Soviet Union with the hope of defeating the Japanese, who had occupied Vietnam from 1940, and ultimately be rewarded with independence. Here, Ho's nationalism stands taller than his passion for communism.

The creation of Vietnam's box of ideology was a result of Ho Chi Minh winning independence for Vietnam from French imperialism in 1945; which was also the birth of the CPV. Since declaring their independence on 2nd September, 1945, Vietnam has been governed by the CPV. The party at its core is committed to the ideology of the people, but as time passes, we are able to peer through the deepening cracks, and nationalism might be to blame to some extent since it was the main reason behind the party's formation.

Nationalism is omnipresent within Vietnam, visibly entwined with 'communism'. This was arguable as a fallout from the independence campaigns of the CPV. Upon arrival at the airport in Hanoi, one catches the first glimpse of 'communism'. The workers, all wearing matching green suits, and all bearing the great gold star. One thing that is ubiquitous within communist states of the past and current is the notion of supreme nationalism. This could be very controversial when one reads the communist manifesto, as the working class are supposed to have no country. Communists concern themselves with the struggles of the proletarians as a global class. "They point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality" (Marx and Engels 1848, p.22). So, can communism be born out of nationalism? Vietnam follows this thesis, boasting communist ideals whilst historically rooted in nationalism.

When one asks a question about the government in Vietnam, one finds that the grammar used to refer to their government changes. In Britain, people will refer to 'the' government, but in Vietnam, it was always 'our' government, often supportive, rarely critical, reminiscent of nationalism. The grammar also changes when conversing with the same Vietnamese student, when in a large group, in front of people of title or fellow peers, to when it was one on one, with no prying eyes nor ears. In this case, does this regime support the freedom of speech? It did not seem so. Can you have communism without the

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freedom of speech? Without freedom of speech or expression, does this mean the government control the development of culture?

Marx and Engels declared that communism calls for the “abolition of private property” (1848, p.47). However, since the liberation of the Vietnamese economy via the Doi Moi reform, the state has adopted more capitalist policies, including decreasing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). General Statistics Office’s Industrial Statistics Department released figures showing that in 2013, only 3,135 SOEs were left from nearly 5,800 in 2000, an almost fifty per cent drop (Vietnam Briefing, 2014). It has been very economically successful for Vietnam as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 33.64 billion USD in 2000, to 171.22 billion USD in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). This is an incredible increase, although not very communist. The now privately-owned enterprises are laying the way for an increased bourgeois presence.

Coming from a Western society, one noticeable difference one would observe from the first steps into this urban jungle are the urban ‘trees’. Being the street vendors dotted on every corner, visibly on a lower income due to their mode of transport, a bicycle, a couple of decades behind the now dominant motorbike. These urban fruit bearers, like their jungle counterpart, work for themselves in a competitive market. So, how has society failed these people? Under ‘communism’ one would assume the deficit of these workers, and the elite would not be so visible. However, a sad sight in the blinding traffic of Hanoi, there is a vast economic inequality, one can see a Rolls Royce alongside the street vendors, who typically earn between \$2.50 and \$5 per day (Harris, 2015).

Figures available from the World Bank (2016a) showed that the Gini index of Vietnam is not out of step with other communist states. However, these figures are higher than many democratic states, meaning a higher income inequality. In 2012 Russia and China were estimated at 41.6 and 42.2 respectively. Whilst in 2012, Vietnam held an impressive 35.7. Compare this to figures in 2012, the democratic states of the United Kingdom (U.K.), Spain, and Poland with 32.6, 35.9, and 32.1 respectively. Moreover, the figures of the communist states over the years have been fluctuating, whereas the democratic states have been more stable and on a decrease. This might suggest that in contemporary communist states, there is a lack of concentration on working towards a more economically equal populace.

This leaves the poor trapped inside the box of ideology, alongside Ho Chi Minh, who they still hold dear to his ideals of communism. However, the elite, be it the rich or the politically endowed have escaped the box, and whilst promising communism to the poor in the box, they cleverly put in place non-communist policies which are out of sight.

Are we seeing a repeat of Lenin's Soviet Union New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 in today's Vietnam under the Doi Moi? In 1921 Lenin knew he had to reboot the Soviet economy after the civil war. Although various changes happened including the seizing of private property and the surplus-food appropriation. it was only when the Soviet Union opened up their economy to capitalism that the economy was on the rise. A similar story can be told for Vietnam, a struggling economy, a recently overturned regime with a new communist regime in need of new policies to keep up in the capitalist world. "They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions...Working Men of All Countries, Unite!" (Marx and Engels, 1848, p.34), the fathers of communism wrote that to achieve communism, it must be on the world stage; it must be a global movement. This is key to understanding the survival and demise of communism throughout history. It also explains why it is not possible for capitalism and communism to coexist.

As long as we live in a capitalist global economy, no real communist regime can survive without surrendering certain economic practices. It would be fairer to call the regime in Vietnam as a market-oriented socialist state. The people still hold the values you would expect in a communist state, but only the poor and middle-income earners; only the proletariat. The Doi Moi reforms saved the people of Vietnam, but the price was the betrayal of communist ideals; Vietnamese communism died in 1986.

I believe that Vietnam is home to truly amazing people, a bizarre concoction of the new and the old, with breath-taking scenery and smoggy cities. I would love to see a communist world, but not like the one I saw in Vietnam where fiscal inequality is so glaringly apparent. It cannot coexist with communism, and communism cannot be born from nationalism, nor coexist with capitalism.

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16

CULTURAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT

Livia Cuciurean and Victoria Vall

This paper is the result of the inclusive research based upon our field trip to Hanoi, in December 2016, organized by the University of Westminster. Driven by curiosity and astonishment in front of such different culture, we sought to outline the patterns of continuity and change within the Vietnamese society. Among those patterns, we focused on gender issues derived from Confucian ethics and the wider concept of “equilibrium” that embraces all the contradictions we highlighted.

Introduction

A vibrant and chaotic city, capital of a developing country, is part of Hanoi as reported in its structure. In its architecture and in the lifestyle of its inhabitants, the wounds of development have almost overwhelmed it. An incredible existential duplicity immediately exposes itself to the eyes of a foreigner – because as much as one can read on books and articles about it, the reality of that vision is stunning, and somehow erases any preconception that might have existed on the words of another observer. Indeed, from the moment we landed at Noi Bai International Airport, to the moment we arrived at Dai Hoc Hanoi, our hosting University, in just a couple of hours of permanence, it was clear to most of us that no preparation, reading or documentary scrutinizing could be enough to prepare us for the impact.

One of the first things we observed during our stay in Hanoi was that at the basis of its very existence, there is an extended concept, a virtue of being that we try to describe as ‘equilibrium’: this doesn’t mean a perfect balance of existence or the discovery of the right way of development and prosperity. It represents more than everything else, the virtue

that an equilibrist exercises, in a circus while walking on the tightrope: an incredible performance of surviving, despite and beyond the struggle.

This is immediately evident, if one looks at the architecture of the buildings in which most of the Hanoians live: narrow constructions, lifted up on maximum three or four levels, and so ingeniously shaped – we believe – as to stir up the greatest perplexity in a foreigner, firstly on the physical laws that keeps them intact, and secondly on the reasons of such a peculiar choice of style.

Another element of evidence resides in the complex unwritten regulation that governs the traffic in Hanoi. Forget about all those stressful hours spent with an angry instructor by your side, while trying to follow the consistent amount of rules of driving, and at the same time, to avoid putting someone in danger with your inexperience. Driving in Hanoi has one and sole rule: equilibrium of power, exercised by the supreme means of the horn. Whereas, driving a van or a motorbike will put you in conditions of hierarchy, that once acknowledged would launch you on the most pacific, despite hectic, roads you have ever seen.

Equilibrium in the Social and the Political

Proceeding with our research, we discovered the perception that Vietnamese people have on the Communist Party is dual, and conflicting, but it also presents several features of ‘equilibrium’. On one side, it stands for the official defense of the legitimacy of governing of the Party. It is viewed as the savior and liberator of the nation, and more recently, as the creator and supporter of a successful socialist-based market economy. This is the view that our Vietnamese teacher put forward during our lectures. Besides the introductory overview on the past accomplishments of the Party against the invaders, the teacher also presented key data on Vietnam’s recent economic development.

Since 1986, with the introduction of the economic and political reforms under “Doi Moi”, Vietnam has reported a continuous significant economic growth that has been stable at about 6 per cent for the last two decades. Moreover, according to Vietnam’s 2011 – 2020 Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS), the aims of the Party for the next years will include “promoting human resources development, improving market institutions and infrastructure development” (The World Bank, 2016). Nevertheless, the “Doi Moi”

reform, as it is presented by the ruling class, and by the teachers in the University of Hanoi, *ergo*, a well-designed compromise between socialism and market economy, has actually transformed Vietnam into a capitalist country with very little exposure to the Marxist doctrine. The communist *façade* has therefore to be considered just as an instrument of power legitimization for the Party.

If in appearance Vietnamese people still believe in the ruling legitimacy of the Communist Party, new facts, new events and new means have created the right conditions for the rise of criticism. For example, veteran dissidents such as the Catholic priest Father Nguyen Van Ly and some associates published in 2006 “We are no longer afraid. We ought to know the truth”, an appeal for the freedom of speech, and a demand for the end of the Party’s monopoly on power. In subsequent years, activists have been able to connect through to the internet access platforms such as PalTalk, to participate in the political debate, despite the strong antagonism of the Party (Hayton, 2010).

However, it is arguable that Vietnam’s recent economic development has given the Party, the opportunity to make the case for political stability as necessary conditions for the country’s prosperity. Indeed, political stability and the decentralization of state management of the economy after the “Doi Moi” reform have created the right conditions to attract foreign investment to the country. (Serkin, 2015). For example, Dragon Capital, the second largest fund management company in Vietnam, with more than \$1 billion of assets, founded by the British Dominic Scriven in the nineties has had a significant role in the Vietnamese privatization programs, involving the former state-owned Vinamilk, a dairy company that first groped for attracting money from non-governmental investors (Mooney, 2016).

Another factor of ‘equilibrium’ can be identified in the guidelines of Vietnamese foreign policy, especially in the past two decades. In contrast to the isolationist North Korea, Vietnam has become a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July, 1995, and of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 1998. This was due to the consistent efforts for the normalization of its international relations with the neighboring region. The intention expressed during the 8th Party Congress in 2001 was to follow a foreign policy based on an “independent and self-reliant diversification and multilateralization of international relations”; this is with the objective of Vietnam becoming “friends with everyone”. In line with this, Vietnam has maintained favorable relations with other countries in the region; joined international organizations such as the Asian Development

Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and since 2007, the World Trade Organization (Pike, 2014).

Moreover, when discussing the Vietnamese foreign policy, it is important to take into account the country's role as a kingmaker between China and the United States. Vietnam and China have a past history of contrast and rivalry. Nevertheless, as often argued by the Vietnamese teachers during the lectures, Vietnam has always looked at China as a bigger sibling, and a model. It managed to maintain good relations with the country. On the other side, after the lifting of the trade embargo in 1994, the relations between Vietnam and the United States have become normal and proceeded according to the concept of "comprehensive partnership" (Nguyen, 2015). According to Vladimir Petrovsky (2016), a senior researcher at the Centre for the Russian-Chinese Relations Studies and Forecasting, Vietnam "continues to pursue a balanced policy of maneuvering between China and the United States" and "is trying to do its best to establish stronger, more productive trade and economic relations" with both of the countries.

The government of Vietnam seems to be committed to override the disputes with China over the South China Sea, in order to maintain cordial relations with the superpower (Lan, 2015). Many Chinese commentators, such as Zhang Baohui, think that Vietnam is pursuing a different strategy. The security expert at Hong Kong's Lingnan University argues that "Vietnam is working with the US into an enhanced deterrence strategy". He claims that in order "to enhance its relations with China, they have to play the US card", bearing that the Vietnamese warming with USA was a strategic move of containment, related to the ongoing dispute over the SCS (Torode & Rajagopalan, 2016). At the same time, the good relations between Hanoi and Washington has led to progress in the negotiations for Vietnam's participation in the TTIP (Lan, 2015). However, Donald Trump's statements on the project might undermine the participation of Vietnam, and compromise the Vietnam-US relations for the future; and doing so might imbalance their situation (Silva, 2016).

A Deeper Look into Gender-equality

Another fundamental feature of Vietnamese culture that could be linked to the concept of 'equilibrium' is its deep connection with the Confucian ethics. The Confucian dogmas

that influence Vietnamese lifestyle and everyday relations are of Chinese heritage. The enduring Chinese control of the region lasted for more than 1000 years, and has profoundly influenced the Vietnamese conception of societal structures, such as family, education and state organization. Through the introduction of values, such as reverence for ancestors, respect for elder figures and submission to a hierarchy, it is important to note that these shared philosophical beliefs strongly influence the power relationships between men and women. For centuries, in Vietnam, only men had access to education, whereas women were limited to the roles of mothers and housewives (Thang, 2014). During the seminars that we attended alongside some Vietnamese students, when we were asked to research on gender issues, my Vietnamese classmates started precisely from the Confucian philosophy.

On a bus ride along the streets of Hanoi, we entered into a conversation with a student from Hanoi University, who started to describe cultural practices of gender oppression in Vietnam. We were moved by the discussion, and triggered to look deeper into the issue and conduct further research. This has given us the chance to reflect on many issues.

According to Goodkind, gender equality in Vietnam has not been improving in spite of its recent economic development (1995, p.343). The issue is more acute for the women and children who come from families that do not benefit from the recent economic development. They are at risk of falling into the dark trap of human trafficking, or other deviant industries (UN ACT 2016). There is no real political effort to tackle gender inequality, and the policies seems to reinforce cultural perceptions on gender roles.

Gender oppression has many roots, and Confucianism can be perceived to be one of them. Grosse (2015) explains how the main pillars of Confucianism put men at the centre: it is about the sovereign and his ministers, the father and the son, the husband and the wife, the elder brother and the younger brother and the social relationship between friends. According to the moral code of Confucianism, the woman must be obedient to her father, husband and brother. This could be linked to another moral code in Vietnam, which has to do with a woman's duty to protect 'the personal face' of her husband (Nguyen & Simkin, 2015, p.5). The concept of 'face' – or 'the dien' in Vietnamese – is a cultural and moral code that rules the way Vietnamese people behave. This set of codes sets what is right and what is not. And breaking the code is viewed as a shameful behavior. A man should for example not be doing housework – this is seen as a duty for women. Moreover, doing that in front of a third person would especially be considered a loss of 'face'.

A woman's job is to protect the face of her husband, when he loses his face, she loses her face too. This could result in women accepting abusive behavior from their husbands, especially when it is done in public, in order to protect the husband's face (Nguyen & Simkin, 2015). It is also seen as shameful for a man to marry a woman who works in a better profession or earns more money than him (Nguyen & Simkin, 2015).

In Vietnam, Confucianism, the moral code of 'the dien', and especially the enforced marital limitations imposed on women, are the three main factors behind gender inequality. These obstacles hinder women to reach their potential, because they often have to choose between getting married, or using use their skills and knowledge to create a career in line with their passions and ambitions. Vietnamese women would find themselves drawn between the two desires, and would most likely follow the one seen as most culturally acceptable.

This unequal social structure is being encouraged on a structural level through double-minded policy constructors, who verbally commit to one thing but structurally encourage something else.

One of the policies enforced in order to limit the consequences of cultural limitation on women's working opportunities is the gender equality law. In this coming section, we will explore the strengths, as well as the limited impact of this measure on the society.

The gender equality law was established by the Vietnamese National Assembly in November, 2006 (Trong, 2006). The Article 4 of this law decree in particular is about the importance of mutual assistance between men and women in social and family life. Therefore, it is directly speaking against the cultural obstacles previously mentioned (The National Assembly, 2006, p.2). The gender equality law is certainly the clearest effort made on a legislative level in the fight for increased gender equality. However, the implementation of such legislation had to face the far more influential and dominant cultural structure.

The power of implementation of the equality law has been given to local bodies and less powerful organizations like Vietnam Women's Union (VWO). VWO is a social and political organization, working to improve women's status and to increase gender equality in the country (VWO, 2013, p.1). The organization is not a branch of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and is therefore holding only limited power, which consists of recommending

policies related to women (VWO, 2013, p.3). The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has not taken the implementation of the law on itself, this indicates that the CPV does not view gender inequality as a national issue. According to Hang (2008, p.18), the government's attitude has only been strengthening patterns of gender bias on political as well as on social levels. This is because the Communist Party controls the media and the education sector. All these institutions are therefore contributing to the perpetuation of cultural practices and stereotypical views on women's role in the society (Hang, 2008, p.19). However, as a hint of negative equilibrium, hypocrisy incurs when one thing is said while another is done. If the words coming from the Party seem to intend willingness for gender equality and modernization, the facts demonstrate that the gender-favorable laws are only a *façade* to gain more international recognition, and they do not reflect, nor wish to improve the ongoing gender struggle.

VWO's mission is to empower women and to protect their rights in the society. It employs resources to protect and support the women who struggle because of economic inequality and cultural oppression. It also supports women who were victims of human trafficking (VWO, 2013, p.7). The contribution of VWO to the Vietnamese society is important because, it protects and educates some the most vulnerable parts of the population. However, the organization is not able to tackle the root cause of the problems. Its power is limited, and can only mitigate some of the effects of this issue.

Outlined here is a form of oppression that impedes women from reaching their full potential, even though the economic opportunities actually exist. This issue is more acute for women from a disadvantaged background, and this is because of the widespread issue of human trafficking. Every year, many young Vietnamese women and children are being sold as brides to foreign husbands (UN ACT, 2016). Many poor, young women are also forced into prostitution. Therefore, rigid social and cultural structures, gender oppression and economic struggle are all contributing to the marginalization and exploitation of the female population.

The fight against gender inequality is multilayered, and it requires change on political, economic, cultural and educational levels in Vietnam. In order to obtain real constructive action from the government on this matter, the issue must gain greater political relevance, and be taken into consideration much more often during the political debate. In absence of real governmental interest on this issue, Vietnam's Women Union should gain

more authority, and resources to practice their work which is of high importance in order to protect those who are suffering. The actions of the Vietnamese Communist Party have proven to be reinforcing gender unequal behavior. Change will not take place unless there is increased pressure from the population and the international organizations.

Conclusion

Our experience in Hanoi taught us that it is important to pay attention both to the details and the framework while looking at Vietnamese culture, economy, domestic and foreign policy: there is a whole spectrum of contradictions. However, one characteristic which may be derived from the Confucian philosophy appears to be equilibrium. The potentialities of this small developing country are incredible: the way it faced almost one century of wars and revolutions, and the rapidity of its recovery are surprising and admirable. To our eyes Hanoi appeared to be 'happy' city: it is full of beautiful places and welcoming people and its bylaws are quite different from our owns; sometimes mysterious and difficult to understand. However, our observations might also just be an illusion. Indeed, beyond the great actors – the few who detain the power in the country – Vietnamese people have to face great daily struggles. Therefore, a further development of the concept of 'equilibrium' is needed, so that it can include gender and social equality, political transparency, division of power, freedom of opinion and press. During the time we spent discussing on political and social matters with the students of Dai Hoc Hanoi, we saw their willingness to learn and work for their country, and determination for the pursuit of those goals. We hope to have the chance in the future to collaborate with our colleagues from Hanoi in order to help them build the Vietnam they dream about.

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Arts, Politics and Education

17

EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF ART AS RESISTANCE WITH DEN

Khalil Sabawoon

Excited to see what exactly might be presented in an exhibition that claimed to speak of unknown histories: together, with other DEN students, I went to see the “Soul of a Nation” exhibition at the Tate Modern. How would the heroes of the fight against the oppression of a superpower be portrayed through art and pictures? Would the gallery be presenting the people that I admire in modern history?

I had so many questions in my mind when I entered the lift to the third floor. As soon as I stepped out of the elevator, I see none other than Malcolm X, a man whose words shook the foundation of his oppressors, on a small display. Then I heard a powerful voice by James Baldwin, and on a similar screen runs a video of Baldwin. Handing the tickets to the lady sitting by the door, I stepped into the gallery, and into the past.

The art and pictures at “Soul of a Nation” spoke more than a thousand words in a much louder voice than I expected. Though the art and photographs were motionless, the harsh reality of the oppression of the Black community was presented in the most beautiful and creative way. The happiness and joy that was taken from our Black brothers and sisters by the “Masters” of evil were exhibited in creatively colourful art. History has ignored the Blacks, but here the blurry dark photos made us stop to read the bravery of the heroes. The objects on the walls were an indication to inhumanness of the oppressor and the fist in the middle of the hall was the sign of Black power – right in the heart of the oppressor. The United States flag lies on skulls, a stark reminder to the powerful voice of James Baldwin I heard earlier: “I picked the cotton ... I built the railroad...”.

This visit to the gallery was not a simple tour, but it was a travel to the past, to the heart of struggle and fight for basic equal rights. There were many more artistic presentations and photography, but to articulate them all here is impossible. Sometimes, things can be experienced but can hardly be explained.

Walking towards the exit of the gallery, incredibly inspired and ready to stand for justice, I left full of thoughts and questions; they fought, died, and walked what they preached. But can we carry on the legacy of their fight against oppression? How much have we studied about their work? What is my role in carrying on the fight against injustice and oppression? The trip to the gallery ended, but the journey of fight against injustice must be continued. I will finish it with this; from them to us and from us to the future, let the legacy be continued.

18

BEHIND THE STAGE STORY OF “HANDS UP”

Beatrice Duduianu

Discrimination. Segregation. Oppression. Three words that have caused centuries of suffering, distress, and hatred among all diverse communities. All ended due to a brave move to break white domination. Injustice towards African Americans which made the white supremacists act inhumanely because of the colour of their skin. From 1954, the civil rights movement started fighting discrimination and prejudice against black Americans. The leaders of the movement fought to bring change in several ways; marches, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, protests and social persuasion for legislation. Most took non-aggressive, non-violent methods to make their voices be heard. However, some noticed that their voices were ignored by the white elite so they took a more aggressive approach to self-defence, like the Black Panthers.

Of course, a few of the many successes of the Civil Rights Movement include the Supreme Court decision *Brown Vs Board Education Act* which desegregated schools in 1954. In 1965 the Right to Vote Act was signed, so all races and ethnic groups could vote. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law: workers should not be discriminated because of their race, gender or ethnicity. These struggles were successful at achieving all this because the oppressed were ready to act and fight for a better world in which there would be equality between whites and blacks.

What our job is, is to not allow the world to forget what these people like Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X and Black Panthers fought for. Our duty as humans, as the generation of the future, is to continue their legacy.

Our trip to the Tate Modern, to see the ‘Soul of a Nation’ exhibition, allowed us to find an opportunity to make our contribution to change the world. With other members of the Democratic Education Network, we used every artwork and every portrait from the exhibition to help us tell a story, our story. Art is a perfect way to represent the experience

BEHIND THE STAGE STORY OF “HANDS UP”

Beatrice Duduianu

of historical events whether it's in the past or present. We decided to use theatre to tell this story.

Writing the script for the play 'Hands up' was not easy, and the biggest challenge was to make it personal for the actor, finding the right person to deliver the words in order to give the audience the best experience.

The next challenge was rehearsing: talking at the right speed, pausing at the right time, practicing the small effects that in the end make a huge difference. The actual rehearsing was stressful and took time, but everyone was eager to make this happen. Why? Because it was our chance to tell our story and at the same time to make our contribution to change the world. As we are all studying Social Science, apart from a few, many had no experience of acting on a stage, let alone ensuring that we are presenting the right story.

On the night of the production, that is exactly what happened. We started a journey for the audience, to inspire, to lead and to influence others. The job for the audience is to join us on this journey. What follows is an extract from the script and the reflection of a student to highlight this experience.

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BETWEEN THEATRE, HISTORY AND DEN: FINDING MYSELF

Jamul Wilson

The theatre production script was a reflection on the challenges that black people face in the contemporary Western society. Prior to the performance, I had an understanding of black history, particularly the civil rights movement that took place in the 1960s and how it has failed to prevent various challenges from occurring in the contemporary Western societies. Although the civil rights movement has enabled black people to have more rights, for example removing segregation within the U.S. and reducing discrimination in various social institutions, black people continue to face the challenge of expressing themselves in a world that disallows them to be who they want to be, and force them to conform to the norms and values of the western white patriarchal societies. Furthermore, my group visited the “Soul of nation” exhibition in the Tate Modern. The “Soul of a nation” enabled our group to expand this knowledge on black history. Instead of holding a perspective that the civil right movements has still not enabled them to express their true selves in the world, this exhibition has allowed us to see the courageous side of black history, and how black people in the contemporary world are continuing this courageous fight to overcome stereotypes or forced norms and values from the mainstream society. This information has enabled our scriptwriter/director (Beatrice) to structure the play in a certain manner that highlights the emotion black people have in standing up to discrimination and oppression.

Moreover, Beatrice encouraged me to take the role of expressing the monologues as well as performing in the ‘Black Panther’ and ‘Jeremy Kyle’ scene. Although I felt anxious about performing these roles, my understanding of black history, and the continuous problems that black people face, made me want to pick these roles. However, the main reason was highly personal; I as a Black British man of Jamaican descent have faced the same challenges that were highlighted in the script. One of the main challenges was the lack of confidence to express their true self in society. This is relatable for me because growing up in

East London I was always told that my mannerism, cultural norms and values and the way I express myself would not be accepted in mainstream Britain. For me, as a young black male to progress, I would have to adopt a “white mask”, which made me less comfortable with my ethnic identity. In other respects, individuals within my local area enforced the stereotypes of a “black man” onto me. They challenged the way I expressed myself by claiming I wasn’t masculine enough and practically a push over. This influenced the way I expressed myself in my middle teenage years (14-16) as I adopted more of a hyper-masculinity identity emphasizing black stereotypes – such as trying to be violent and aggressive because I feared showing my real self to others, which was the opposite. Taking all of these experiences would allow me to perfect the role, as I would express my real emotions from past experiences, rather than allowing another person who has no understanding of these challenges to fake the emotion in order to perfect the role. These reasons above are what really inspired to take on these roles.

Furthermore, learning the script for the play wasn’t as easy as I thought it would’ve been because I struggled at first with perfecting the emotions at a right time. If it wasn’t for Beatrice directing, I wouldn’t know when to pause after saying certain lines from my script, along with toning my voice in order to create a suitable atmosphere. Another way I helped myself to bring forth my personal emotions in the play was by remembering depressing experiences I’ve been through as a young black male growing up in East London. This enabled me to express the vulnerable side of myself that made it seem more real rather than just “general acting”. On the other hand I had to learn how to cooperate with my team in the other scenes, most particularly the Black Panther scene. The Black Panther scene highlighted the amount of frustration we had as we failed to succeed in perfecting this scene, as some of us were bad with movements and timing. What we had to do in order to succeed was to trust each other, so then with timing we would know when to stop and be active. Furthermore, patience came into play as some of us were lagging behind the others in understanding what goes on in the scene. Instead being angry at each other, which would be counterproductive in the short amount of time given to us, we had to learn to be civil with one another. Being civil allowed us to help each other understand what was going on, which enabled the rehearsals to succeed.

On the contrary, this play will be one of the most important memories of my life, which sounds dramatic, but it’s not. The reason why is because it made everyone closer as a

family (including Farhang) rather than “friends”; we loved, laughed, been happy with each other as well as angry and frustrated – all which made us closer with each other. Every time I hear Ben King “Stand by Me” I always remember the play and the stiff dancing we performed in rehearsal (well particularly me to be honest). The song brings warmth into my heart, but also sadness, because I wish we could have done this sooner – in the first or second year – to have continued our new bond into third year. Another reason is that the play taught me how to be confident in expressing my emotions around others, which challenges the notion of hyper masculinity. I feel this is a big improvement for my personality, as it allows me to connect with others in alternative ways, which makes me closer to others. Other skills such as patience and teamwork have improved – especially through learning how to be civil with each other in rowdy circumstances, which is important for future careers.

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AN EXTRACT FROM THE PLAY “HANDS UP”

Beatrice Duduianu and illustrations by Livia Cuciurean

Have you ever looked in the mirror and not recognised your face?

Have you ever looked in the mirror and not wanted too?

Because you know what you're going to see is so much worse than what's in your head,
than the image you have constructed to a point you believe it's really you

And when you look in the mirror after years of avoiding glass, water, metal, cameras, you
look in the mirror and you are nowhere near who you thought you were

But you're right there, alone and slowly shrinking into an image that the powerful men
created

You know this self to a point where you could make someone fall for them

Make someone trust them enough to lend them money

To let them stay in their house, to share their darkest secrets with them

To feel like they know this person enough to say they truly know them

But then reality hits, revolutions starts, they're gone, just like a character when they go
off stage, they're gone

As at some point, when you can no longer love this side of yourself, you create another
version, a better version, a safer more reliable version of you for society and at that point
you can surely say you are alive

Do you feel me? Do you believe me? Do you trust me enough to listen?

AN EXTRACT FROM THE PLAY "HANDS UP"

Beatrice Duduianu and illustrations by Livia Cuciurean

Then you, just like me and everyone else, are part of this room right now


On this stage I can see something different to what you can see, but we are both feeling the same lights on our skin, in different intensities but the same light


I feel light, literally feel it

It's that light that connects me to you, because physics GCSE taught me that everything is touching, so in a way the light on me and the light on you means that we are touching

So, did you feel me? Did you believe me? Did you trust me enough to listen?

The full script and actors and actress details and roles appeared in DEN's magazine and insidewestminster: <http://insidewestminster.co.uk/>.







THE END OF THE GLOBAL?

'The End of the Global' features a collection of papers presented at the first 'DEN International Student Conference' in 2017. This publication is one of many projects that the Democratic Education Network (DEN) has been responsible for since its launch in 2016, within the department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster. In addition to supporting various other initiatives, DEN encourages and inspires students to research, get involved in student-led workshops, and publish magazines and journals. It hopes to increase our knowledge about how to open up deliberative and empowering spaces for students, and how to maximise the impact of their projects on other students' experience. This book is a result of eclectic ideas and hard work put in by many students, and covers the views of student authors on various economic, political and social crises that shape our world today. We hope that we have taken an important step in achieving the aims of DEN through encouraging students to believe in themselves and push the boundaries of imagination and possibility.

"Education should not only be about knowledge gathering, skills enhancement and degree acquisition, but be a transformative life experience. If students go away with more confidence, more humility, and better equipped to deal with the various challenges and opportunities that the world around them offers, we would have succeeded as educationists."

Prof. Dibyesh Anand

Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster

"This book is produced by some of the students active in the 'Democratic Education Network'. It is essentially a collective work of the former and present students in the department to learn and explore their own world independently."

Dr. Farhang Morady

Academic Coordinator of DEN, University of Westminster



The Democratic Education Network

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